Chapter 8 examines the Court’s decision in Women against Violence and Exploitation in Society (WAVES) & Anor. v. The Republic of Sierra Leone. In this case, the Court declared that Sierra Leone had discriminated against pregnant schoolgirls by banning them from attending mainstream schools and providing substandard education in the special school established for the girls. The WAVES case is one of the few women’s rights cases decided by the ECOWAS Court, which granted all the reliefs sought by the applicants against the state without exception. The chapter argues that the Court’s reasoning in WAVES perfectly illustrates its narrow application of the due diligence principle, as WAVES presents an ideal set of facts that align with the Court’s thinking. It further argues that the Court should expand its application of the due diligence principle, drawing the attention of applicants and their legal representatives to what they can do to persuade the Court to broaden its scope.

Chapter 5 examines three cases involving victims of rape: Adama Vandi v. Sierra Leone, Ekundayo Idris v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Satta Lamin Banya v. Republic of Sierra Leone. In two of these judgments, there was a partial award of the applicants’ claims for violations against the defendant states, as well as the remedies sought, while in the third case, all claims were granted. In the cases of Vandi and E.I., the Court declined to declare the respective defendant states liable for GBV as a form of gender-based discrimination, which was the specific relief sought by the applicants. However, it did issue such a declaration in Banya. The Court’s reasoning for this decline echoes its reasoning in Njemanze, discussed in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the Court’s finding of gender-based discrimination in Banya was not supported by its earlier jurisprudence set out in Njemanze. Essentially, the ECOWAS Court is reluctant to declare a violation of gender-based discrimination by a state on the basis of individual victims unless the violation is demonstrated to be systemic. This chapter explains how this reasoning is rooted in the Court’s first Maputo Protocol decision – Njemanze – which drew on the ideology of the Velasquez case that established the due diligence principle. It argues that a broader and proper application of the due diligence principle could expand the Court’s limited perspective on state responsibility for human rights violations. The discussion contrasts the proposed wider application of the principle with the implications it may have on the Court’s functioning, given its liberal access rules, highlighting the need for a balanced approach.

Chapter 10, the final chapter of the book, compiles all the qualitative and quantitative trends and patterns identified throughout the detailed analysis. It shows, through a comparative analysis, facts such as the total number of cases with violations against the state and those without violations, the most common rights issues in the Maputo Protocol that have been contested, the nature of these rights and those still to be adjudicated by the Court, the defendant states involved, the types of applicants, the remedies awarded, the reliefs denied, and the duration from case filing to judgment. These elements form the quantitative aspect of the trends and patterns. The qualitative part addresses each of the book’s research questions, presenting findings from all analysed cases. This discussion culminates in the chapter’s final section on the structure of women’s rights jurisprudence in the ECOWAS Court, outlining the Court’s current position and potential future developments. It recommends measures for the Court and its users to further develop its women’s rights jurisprudence.

Chapter 7 presents a critical and nuanced analysis of Kadiatou Siby v. Mali. This pioneering case addresses state responsibility for discrimination against widows and violations of their rights to housing, property, and dignity. The Siby case is especially notable because it is among the few rulings on widows’ rights by the ECOWAS Court and establishes an original international precedent for widows’ rights in Africa. However, although the applicants invoked some provisions of the Maputo Protocol, the specific provisions explicitly outlining the rights of widows were not included. In addition to examining how much the Court relied on the due diligence principle to hold Mali accountable for the violations, the chapter highlights the implications of neglecting relevant and context-specific provisions of the Maputo Protocol in cases like Siby on the Protocol’s scope and influence. It proposes potential solutions to address this gap.

Chapter 2 examines the ECOWAS Court’s jurisprudence on gender-based discrimination in light of the judgment in Dorothy Njemanze and 3 Ors v. Nigeria. This case is the pioneering decision of the ECOWAS Court that pronounced on the Maputo Protocol and held the Republic of Nigeria responsible for gender-based discrimination against a marginalised group of women – alleged sex workers. The decision significantly influenced the African women’s rights legal framework on holding states accountable for violations of women’s rights. I argue in this chapter how the principle of due diligence made its debut, albeit implicitly, in the Court’s use of the letter and spirit of the Maputo Protocol. The chapter also highlights the ripple effects of the Njemanze decision in other regional courts, such as the African Court, which took judicial notice of the case and expressed its opinion on vagrancy laws across Africa.

Chapter 3 parallels the Njemanze and the Collectif Cri de Coeur Pour Le Mali v. Republic of Mali cases. While the Njemanze decision was ruled in favour of the women victims, the Collectif decision was not. The applicants in Collectif relied on Njemanze to support their claims against the Republic of Mali. The Court further clarified its jurisprudence and limitations regarding holding states accountable for violations against women. The Collectif case raised important questions about when a state discharges its obligations under the Maputo Protocol to punish acts of violence against women and to implement programmes for the rehabilitation of victims. The chapter shows how the Court’s reasoning largely echoes the principles of the due diligence doctrine, which is why it rightly found Mali not responsible for the victims. However, it also reveals two jurisprudential faults in the Court’s reasoning. One involving the use and application of a decision of the African Court out of context, and another concerning its interpretation of when the due diligence principle applies in relation to healthcare services. It demonstrates how this flawed reasoning conflicts with the operation of the ECOWAS Court’s human rights mandate, especially its rule on local remedies.

Chapter 9 presents a selection of cases that fall under the category of post-Njemanze cases without the Maputo Protocol. These cases are chosen based on two criteria: first, those involving similar subject matter to the post-Njemanze cases with the Maputo Protocol, which were discussed in detail in earlier chapters. The analysis particularly focuses on comparing the Court’s reasoning to identify any notable similarities or differences in jurisprudence when the Maputo Protocol is cited and when it is not. The second criterion includes cases selected for their diversity, specifically involving other groups of intersectional women’s identities not covered in previous chapters, such as women in protest, working women, women in customary marriages, and extradited women. The purpose of examining this second group is to demonstrate how references to the Maputo Protocol could have influenced applicants’ legal arguments. The analysis underscores the comprehensive and distinctive nature of the Maputo Protocol as the Bill of Rights for African women, emphasising its importance in all cases concerning women’s rights in Africa. It also highlights certain gaps within the Protocol.

Chapter 4 compares two domestic violence cases: Mary Sunday v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Mrs Sarah Kingsley Odoro v. ECOWAS Commission and 2 Ors. Although the Maputo Protocol safeguards the rights of domestic violence victims within international law, holding states accountable for such violations occurring in the private sphere remains a significant challenge. In Mary Sunday, the ECOWAS Court clarified its stance regarding the types of evidence needed to establish a state’s liability for domestic violence. Meanwhile, in the Sarah Odoro case, the Court reiterated the scope of defendants over which it would have jurisdiction in domestic violence matters. This chapter highlights the potential of the due diligence principle at the individual level to broaden the Court’s perspective on holding states accountable to individual victims, while also considering the implications of such an approach for domestic violence cases in international forums.

The extent of the ECOWAS Court’s intervention in holding states accountable for violating women’s rights to the protection of their person and family is examined in Chapter 6. In Aminata Diantou Diane v. République du Mali, the Court ruled that Mali had infringed upon the rights to protection, a fair trial within a reasonable time, and an adequate remedy for the applicant and her children, but it declined to grant other systemic remedies related to gender-based discrimination. The chapter evaluates the key aspects of the Diane decision, focusing on how the Court’s reasoning aligns with the five Ps of the due diligence principle, while also overlooking the opportunity to hold Mali responsible for gender-based discrimination and to mandate legislative reforms.

This chapter concerns state responsibility. Responsibility is based upon the existence of an international legal obligation in force between the states in question and a violation of that obligation imputable to the state responsible, with consequential loss or damage. The nature of the fault is discussed, as are issues as to the identity of offending persons or organs, as well as the existence of direction or control by the state. A variety of circumstances may preclude wrongfulness and thus responsibility. For example, consent or the existence of a lawful act causing the damage, such as the exercise of self-defence, or where the act constitutes a lawful countermeasure where the other state has committed a prior unlawful act. Force majeure constitutes a further example. The consequences of internationally wrongful acts include cessation or reparation. The question of serious breaches of peremptory norms (jus cogens) is also noted and the nationality of claims is analysed. The need for exhaustion of local remedies is discussed, as is the treatment of aliens and foreign property in this context.

This chapter concerns international environmental law. It commences with a consideration of an argued human right to a clean environment and the increasing case law on this issue. The relationship between economic development and environmental protection is also addressed, before the key question of state responsibility is surveyed. The appropriate standard, whether or not actual damage is caused, the question of transboundary harm arising from hazardous activities, environmental impact assessments, the precautionary and polluter-pays principles are examined before turning to the range of international treaties on this topic. The question of atmospheric pollution is addressed before the chapter turns to a consideration of climate change and the various international instruments concerning this, including the important Paris Agreement of 2015. Environmental issues and outer space are then discussed, followed by a section on international watercourses and one on ultra-hazardous activities. Questions as to the requirements for the provision of information and assistance are covered.

This chapter explores the golden era of the classical doctrine of civil war, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. Its focus is on the Spanish American revolutions and the emergence of the law of neutrality in the context of civil wars. The several case examples illustrate how the familiar questions and disputes from the previous chapters persisted and developed in state practice throughout the period. In addition to the Spanish American revolutions, the chapter also discusses the impact of European and American revolutionary ideologies on international movements and illustrates the significant practical limitations of the classical doctrine: while it stemmed from the practice of the transatlantic world, elsewhere in the world it often seemed absent or selectively applied to deny the legal standing of indigenous and colonial insurgents, or to legitimise local rebellions within Oriental empires.

The rules of state responsibility are set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This chapter introduces the basic features of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, beginning with an explanation of what constitutes an internationally wrongful act. It then discusses the circumstances precluding wrongfulness that may be invoked by states seeking to avoid responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The chapter then covers the aftermath of an internationally wrongful act, which can involve legal consequences, such as reparations, as well as countermeasures. This chapter focuses specifically on the responsibility of states, rather than the responsibility of international organizations or individuals.

A framing case study examines Russia’s 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia. Then the chapter examines how states break international law. The chapter first discusses the law of state responsibility, including: (1) determining responsibility by assessing attribution and wrongfulness; and (2) the consequences of state responsibility, such as cessation, prevention, and reparation. The chapter then examines various theoretical accounts of why states break international law, including the enforcement, managerial, and flexibility perspectives.