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The secrecy of jury deliberations is foundational to our entire jury system … or so we are told. In theory, the secrecy allows jurors to speak their minds and vote their consciences. These upsides of jury secrecy are so important that it is broadly believed, as one court put it, that opening the door to deliberations would “destroy the jury system itself.” It is no surprise, then, that every state and the federal government has an evidentiary rule that prevents the piercing of deliberations.
The Supreme Court's composition tends to remain stable over time, yet its docket and rulings change, affecting our understanding of the Court's broader political ramifications. In Majority Opinions, Stephen Jessee, Neil Malhotra and Maya Sen examine how the Supreme Court's alignment with public opinion shifts dramatically, shaping its legitimacy, approval, and vulnerability to reform. Introducing an empirical method and framework that systematically compares Americans' preferences on case outcomes with the Court's actual rulings, the authors uncover yawning gaps and unexpected alignments across issues and terms. They show how changes in court composition-Amy Coney Barrett replacing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example-can shift the Court's trajectory rightward, while docket choices can move rulings closer to public sentiment after unpopular rulings. Examining how the Supreme Court navigates a polarized political environment, the authors reveal how its choices have profoundly affect influence, legitimacy, and national policy.
This chapter explains the principle of equivalence in medical rights between prisoners and the free public and argues that MAID will be authorized for prisoners on the grounds that depriving them of this option is unconstitutional.
From the founding era to the turn of the twentieth century, Congress has at times asserted its power over elections robustly and creatively, even in periods of judicial obstruction, and its role in shaping the nation’s electoral landscape has always been pivotal – even when contested, uneven, or ineffective. This period invokes a rich and overlooked history that reveals a repository of federal authority over elections that was triggered (or ignored) less for reasons of federalism, and more so due to pragmatic, principled, or partisan considerations.
This book examines the dynamic and politically consequential relationship between US Supreme Court rulings and public opinion. It argues that the ideological alignment between the Court and the public is a critical, yet fluctuating, feature of American politics. Using the period surrounding Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death and the Court’s subsequent rightward shift as a central case study, the analysis explores how and when the Court moves in and out of step with public sentiment, with the 2022 Dobbs decision serving as a pivotal example of an unpopular ruling that triggered significant backlash. The book introduces an innovative methodology, leveraging annual surveys from 2020 to 2024 that directly compare public preferences with the issues in cases before the Court. Key findings reveal that while the Court’s rulings shifted sharply out of line with the average American after 2020, they later moved back toward closer alignment. This was achieved not through ideological moderation but through mechanisms like docket selection, where the Court took up cases in which the conservative outcome was popular. This study demonstrates that the Court’s relationship with public opinion is a fast-moving dynamic that shapes judicial legitimacy, public backlash, and the Court’s strategic behavior.
Violent uprisings across the South, from the Colfax Massacre of the 1870s to the Wilmington Insurrection of the 1890s, further complicated Congress’s already precarious standing on issues related to voting and elections, especially given its ongoing war with a Supreme Court intent on limiting congressional power. In addition, the controversy surrounding the Federal Elections Bill of 1890, which would have instituted federal supervision of congressional elections, revealed that there were political risks attendant to legislating toward the outer limits of constitutional power to empower and protect Black voters, risks that tended to manifest at the ballot box. Republican support for the bill cost them a significant number of congressional seats in the 1890 and 1892 elections. Instead of becoming a moment in which a revitalized Congress used the Constitutions of Political Structure and Political Rights to ensure that African Americans would be permanent fixtures in the political community of “We the Voters,” politics guaranteed that they would remain transient and temporary visitors.
With Reconstruction in its death throes, Congress sporadically used its power under Article I, Section 5, to review the elections of its members and, in the process, police racial discrimination in voting, even though much of the disenfranchisement written in law was ostensibly race neutral. As illustrated in Chapter 9, Congress fought back against these disenfranchising regimes, which were adopted across the South over the course of the 1890s and set the tone for the exclusion of Black voters from American politics for almost a century. Congress’s efforts during this period bring this book back to a reoccurring theme: that political limitations, rather than constitutional constraints like federalism, were more of a barrier to the broad implementation of federal power over elections.
Racial reckoning should only address material racial inequality, not mere claims of hypothetical constitutional injury. This chapter defines racial inequality in measurable, visible terms and shows how Blacks experience disadvantage in institutional environments. Place, or residency, determines the access to resources that flow from key institutions like schools, neighborhoods and social capital networks. Place has a leveraging effect, amplifying advantages for some and compounding disadvantage for others. Less visible, race-neutral means perpetuate racially segregated places. The chapter shows how conservative constitutional doctrine conspicuously ignores these mechanics of inequality, and produces empirically bizarre results like the Supreme Court’s 2023 anti-affirmative action opinion about getting into Harvard. Colorblind antidiscrimination law offers a radical view of equality at odds with lived reality and core principles of racial equity, which reproduces more inequality.
In an increasingly contemptuous political environment as the nation prepared to celebrate its semisquicentennial on July 4, 2026, the US Supreme Court capped its 2025–2026 term, which included profound decisions on a series of cases raising significant controversies in health law and policy. As per Figure 1 and analyses below, major topics addressed by the Court this term include: (1) the scope and limits of presidential emergency authorities; (2) state debates over LGBTQ+ rights and discrimination in parental and sports-related settings; (3) First Amendment interests juxtaposed against states’ rights to regulate medical professionals or require vaccinations; (4) expansion of Second Amendment rights to possess firearms; and (5) state-based product liability and other claims foreclosed via Congress.
We hypothesize that the public assesses U.S. Supreme Court nominees in light of the contemporaneous Court’s partisan composition. In a preregistered conjoint experiment (n = 9,895), we find that Democrats and Republicans weigh nominee partisanship more heavily when their party is losing the Court and less heavily when their party already enjoys a secure majority. Consistent with affective polarization and threat-based political psychology, however, they care just as much about partisanship when the Court is split as when the other party enjoys a strong majority – even though the new Justice would swing the Court only in the former scenario.
Although the Supreme Court has historically resisted a partisan sorting out of its public legitimacy, today, Republicans and Democrats look at the Court in very different ways. This Element assembles original survey and experimental data to unpack these changes in three ways. First, the authors illustrate the powerful role that partisanship plays in shaping judicial public opinion. Second, they validate a new three-item measure of specific support and show that it reliably predicts perceptions of Supreme Court legitimacy. Finally, they introduce a new, applied measure of support for the rule of law and connect it to specific and diffuse support. Taken as a whole, their work demonstrates that large chunks of the mass public view the Supreme Court critically. Looking ahead, it is unclear whether legitimacy will rebound when citizens perceive that the balance of judicial power within the nation's High Court has fractured along party lines.
This festschrift essay honors the academic life and work of Douglas Laycock, one of the most important scholars and advocates in American law and religion. This essay offers tribute to a mentor from whom I took three classes and an independent study in law school, for whom I worked as a research assistant, and with whom I have remained in close conversation during my two decades in the academy. It also offers an insider’s account of Laycock’s intellectual project and influence—punctuated with stories, observations, and nuggets of wisdom drawn from a close reading of his scholarship and briefs. This essay traces Laycock’s career from his early academic work to his later role in landmark Supreme Court litigation, ultimately seeing Laycock’s deepest legacy as lying not only in the doctrines he helped shape, but in a model of intellectually serious, cross-ideological engagement that both inspires us and calls us to account.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ambiguous institutional position—insulated from external pressures yet retaining important linkages with elected officials—complicates how the public assigns responsibility for its decisions. Using a survey experiment that shows respondents information about Dobbs, we explore how messages that politicize or depoliticize the Court affect responsibility attribution for Court decisions. We find that politicizing the Court increases responsibility attribution towards President Trump, and that this effect is conditioned by party cues. We explore downstream effects on evaluations of political actors, but do not find conclusive evidence. We argue that these findings have important implications for democratic accountability.
The Supreme Court is less constrained than political science has recognized. Motivated justices can dramatically alter politics without deferring to actors in the other branches. Subverting constraints, justices can aggrandize power and impose their irreducible preferences. Using Reconstruction as an example, this article brings new evidence to support the claim that an autonomous Court precipitated the end of Reconstruction. I make three essential arguments: First, the Republican commitment to federal civil rights protection extended longer than is traditionally supposed. Second, the architect of postbellum constitutionalism, Justice Bradley, harbored long-standing fear of Black equality and enfeebled the Reconstruction amendments when neither legal nor political imperatives compelled him to do so. Last, Bradley’s interventions substantially hindered Reconstruction by facilitating the “redemption” of southern state governments. This article employs mixed-methodology, using a difference-in-differences analysis and novel archival data. Contrary to scholarship arguing that the Court simply followed a Republican retreat, the Court dramatically reshaped the political-social development of Reconstruction.
The last decade has witnessed a significant increase in academic and journalistic interest in the United States Supreme Court’s “shadow docket.” Yet despite this increased interest, there exists no systematic database of the shadow docket. This paper summarizes the Supreme Court Shadow Docket Database, which we created by parsing the Journal of the Supreme Court from the 1993 through 2024 terms into individual orders. We categorize these orders into a set of usable categories, including cert denials, injunctions, summary reversals, mandamus petitions, and grant, vacate, and remands. We illustrate some potential uses of the data by examining several interesting trends in the Court’s use of the shadow docket over time.
This chapter provides an introduction to the core concepts of US law, for those with an HCI background but not a legal background. The chapter covers the history of U.S. law, the basic constructs of the U.S. legal system, the core sources of legal rules: constitutions, statutues, regulations, and case law, differences between civil and criminal law, the differences between law and policy at the federal versus state level, searching for and using legal resources, and how to apply basic legal principles to HCI research.
This Element examines the complex intersections between minority religions, legal protections and restrictions, and the role of courts in securing, or inhibiting, religious freedom. It considers the legal status of minority religions in selected countries from a comparative perspective, using sociology of law theories to explain how legal systems treat such religious groups. Relevant actions of the European Court of Human Rights are examined as is how minority religions are dealt with in selected societies where authoritarian or theocratic systems of governance prevail. The Element then examines how interactions with law and the courts have led to changes, or 'deformations,' in selected well-known and controversial new and other minority religions. The Element concludes by observing how courts in Europe and North America have used cases involving minority faiths to promote their own agendas and authority, as well as accomplish other important considerations, including religious freedom.
In this reflection, I seek to determine to what degree Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Collins et al. v. Yellen genuinely indicate a final legal sanctioning of the unitary theory, and thus precipitate a serious and significant disruption in both the political status quo and the stability of the constitutional system of separated powers. After a rigorous analysis of the trajectory of the court’s approach to the removal power, I find that there are four potential outcomes for the upcoming clashes between the Trump administration and several recently removed independent agency heads. Each of these potential outcomes have important constitutional implications, especially for the role of the Supreme Court in the Constitution’s separation-of-powers system. Understanding these constitutional implications will help to prepare political scientists to analyze and interpret future judicial and executive behavior.
The Indian constitution was poised to create a new map of power, transforming the relationship between existing state agencies and new authorities. This chapter demonstrates how the individuals staffing the state apparatus were not mere spectators, passively following the constitution-making process, but actors who actively sought to influence, change, or resist the emerging constitutional order through both public and private channels. The success of the future constitution of India required a smooth transition of the organs of the colonial state to the postcolonial order. Turning their loyalty and ambitions to the new state and its constitutional order was not an obvious outcome in 1947. The chapter examines how provincial legislators sought to guard their autonomy; how the higher judiciary endeavoured to protect their judicial independence; the contested constitutional status of Delhi; and finally, how the ‘neutral’ bureaucracy who were managing the process of constitution making actively sought to defend their own jurisdiction and interests at the time. This process, which paralleled the integration of territories, led to the functional integration of the units of the state.
Joseph Story thought that the United States needed more than courts to vindicate its independence in the War of 1812. The youngest justice on the Supreme Court also believed that the nation needed legal doctrines that would support its aspirations to global power. For decades, American policymakers – and especially the Court under John Marshall – had defended the rights of neutral nations to trade peaceably in wartime. That approach made sense when a militarily weak but commercially vigorous United States sought to profit from trade with European powers embroiled in conflict. But now that the United States itself was at war, Story envisioned a different national future, in which a robust military and strong central government were the foundation of American sovereignty. The split that emerged on the Court over neutral and belligerent rights reflected a generational divide over how to preserve and extend American independence, and it fractured the Marshall Court’s prior unanimity. Despite Marshall’s resistance, Story persuaded his colleagues to adopt doctrines that favored the rights of nations at war, pushing the courts – and the country – to assume a more assertive presence at sea.