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This chapter examines the President’s constitutional role in overseeing law execution, arguing that the Executive Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause grant the President authority to supervise, but not personally execute, national laws. It posits that the President’s power includes appointing and removing principal officers without congressional interference, as affirmed in the "Decision of 1789" and in Myers v. United States (1926). It explores the Appointments Clause, links the removal and appointment powers, and offers a novel explanation for why the Constitutional Convention did not discuss the removal power. It also addresses inferior officers, whose removal may be vested in department heads with potential tenure protections, provided adequate control mechanisms exist. Along with the next chapter, however, this Chapter suggests that the President cannot necessarily direct principal officers in the exercise of their discretionary duties unless statutorily authorized. The chapter proposes a nuanced view: the President can demand information and remove officers but lacks a constitutional right to control their actions, distinguishing this original account of presidential power from other “unitary executive” and “persuader-in-chief” theories.
This chapter investigates the President’s role in overseeing the administrative state, focusing on the contentious issue of for-cause removal restrictions for independent agencies. It argues that while the recognition of “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) is inconsistent with the Constitution’s tripartite power structure, Congress may still create agency independence through statutory discretion and bipartisan structures without violating the President’s executive power. The chapter proposes a formalist middle path: the President retains the constitutional power to remove principal officers but lacks a constitutional right to control their statutory duties directly, aligning with historical practices from the First Congress, several early presidential administrations, and statements from Daniel Webster and William Howard Taft. This distinction avoids both unchecked presidential control, which risks politicizing administration, and a “persuader-in-chief” model which lacks historical support and risks a parliamentary despotism.
This chapter examines the creation of the U.S. presidency under Article II, arguing that the Executive Vesting Clause grants a limited power to execute laws, not a broad reservoir of executive authority. Unlike Article I’s enumerated legislative powers, Article II’s vesting of “the executive Power” omits “herein granted,” prompting debates over its scope. The chapter explores the Constitutional Convention’s intent and influences like Locke and Blackstone and contends that Article II’s opening grant primarily assigns the President the duty to execute Congress’s laws, with other powers – such as the commander-in-chief power or treatymaking – explicitly enumerated. It critiques expansive views, like Theodore Roosevelt’s stewardship theory, as deviations from the original, formalist design, which sought an energetic executive while ensuring the presidency would not devolve into monarchy. The chapter clarifies that the “unitary executive” debate concerns the scope, not unity, of presidential power, emphasizing that the Constitution cabins executive authority so that such authority can be safely entrusted to a single chief magistrate.
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