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This chapter examines the constitutional foundations, historical development, and judicial interpretation of eminent domain in the United States. Rooted in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the doctrine highlights the tension between private ownership and public necessity. Early cases such as Barron v. Baltimore (1833) limited the Clause to federal action, but Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Chicago (1897) incorporated it against the states. The Supreme Court has since expanded its reach: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922) introduced the concept of regulatory takings, while Penn Central v. New York City (1978) stressed investment-backed expectations. The Court has distinguished physical takings, as in Loretto v. Teleprompter (1982), from regulatory restrictions and scrutinized exactions in Nollan (1987), Dolan (1994), and Koontz (2013). Controversy peaked with Kelo v. New London (2005) and most recently Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023). Overall, eminent domain jurisprudence reflects the struggle to balance property rights with public purposes
This chapter examines the scope and limits of state authority in the US federal system, emphasizing the tension between state powers and federal supremacy under the Commerce Clause. It traces the issue from the Articles of Confederation, where fragmented state regulation created disorder, to the Constitution’s grant of congressional authority over interstate and foreign commerce while reserving state powers under the Tenth Amendment. Supreme Court decisions chart the evolving balance: Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) stressed federal control, while Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) allowed state regulation of local commerce. Later rulings refined taxation and regulation at the state level, while dormant Commerce Clause cases such as Dean Milk (1951) and Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978) barred protectionism. The chapter concludes that states retain broad police powers, yet these are constrained to safeguard the national economic union.
Chapter Seven presents a critique of the Court’s so-called “federalism” doctrines. Those doctrines have had very little practical effect in protecting state autonomy from unwarranted federal interference. Under the banner of federalism, the Court has engaged in illegitimate judicial lawmaking by creating a set of judge-made rules that have no basis in the Constitution’s text. Moreover, when the Court speaks of federalism, it conveniently ignores the fact that the Supreme Court itself is part of the federal government. If the Court truly wants to protect state autonomy from unwarranted federal interference, it should exercise self-restraint by limiting the reach of judge-made law that interferes with state autonomy. In particular, the Court should repudiate incorporation doctrine – a judge-made doctrine invented by the Warren Court that has no basis in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a practical matter, incorporation doctrine imposes much more severe restrictions on state autonomy than all of the federal statutes (viewed in the aggregate) that the Court has invalidated under various federalism doctrines.