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This chapter explores Aristotle’s account of the good life as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, emphasizing his empirical, observational approach to virtue, social life, and human flourishing. Aristotle presents human beings as inherently social and defines virtues—such as generosity, magnanimity, and justice—as traits expressed in habitual action and observed within social contexts. Justice, in particular, emerges as a “complete” virtue, operative only within the framework of law and reciprocity. Aristotle also articulates the importance of friendship (philia), distinguishing between lesser forms based on utility or pleasure and the highest form—friendship grounded in shared virtue. Intellectual virtues are treated alongside moral ones, with phronêsis (prudence or practical wisdom) guiding right action. Ultimately, Aristotle identifies contemplation as the highest human activity, likening it to divine activity. Though only attainable by few, contemplation fulfills the intellect’s potential and brings human beings closest to the divine. The chapter concludes by reflecting on Aristotle’s conception of divinity, the nature of blessedness, and how these inform a hierarchical vision of reality in which the contemplative life represents the fullest expression of human excellence.
Biblical interpreters assume that the moral concepts in Proverbs resemble virtues as understood by moral philosophers, especially Aristotle. No study, however, has considered how the moral-philosophical criteria for defining virtue compare to the concepts in Proverbs. I argue that Proverbs’ moral instructions (focusing on Proverbs 10-29) cohere with Aristotle’s understanding of moral virtue and vice in the Nicomachean Ethics, including his notion of the mean. That is, certain concepts in Proverbs are virtues and vices in the Aristotelian sense. To demonstrate this, I argue that (1) virtues of action and emotion in Proverbs are identifiable through praise and blame; that (2) the vices reflect excess and deficiency in action and emotion; and that (3) the virtues “hit the mean” of these actions and emotions.
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