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This chapter examines the lead-up to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq as a prime illustration of two distinct motives for insincere coercion: mobilizing the support of a key ally and making an example of a target. Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration shifted from a strategy of containment to one of preventive war and regime change. Although the United States had already formalized a foreign policy objective of regime change in Iraq, President George W. Bush pursued coercive diplomacy through the United Nations to secure Security Council Resolution 1441. The chapter argues that this diplomatic effort was not a genuine attempt to disarm Iraq peacefully but an instrumental maneuver to help British Prime Minister Tony Blair overcome domestic opposition and secure the United Kingdom’s diplomatic and military support. Furthermore, the chapter details how the US administration utilized the destruction of the Iraqi regime to make an example, aiming to deter other rogue nations, including Libya and North Korea, from pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the Iraqi case demonstrates how intentional coercion failure may be used as an instrumental step towards brute force war.
The British Labour Party is unique among social democratic parties in the way that over the past generation programmatic change has, rather than being incremental, been sudden and sharp, taking the form of paradigm shifts, as the term is understood by Peter Hall. This brief survey of the party over the last thirty years uncovers four actual or attempted paradigm displacements under the leaderships of Tony Blair, Ed Miliband, Jeremy Corbyn, and Keir Starmer. The chapter argues that Labour’s propensity for paradigm shifts is due to two principal factors: fluctuations in social learning processes and instabilities in institutional settings, in particular the structure of power within the party. It finds that the learning process, while to a degree evidence-based, is inherently both subjective and political, with much depending on how problems are framed and the lessons of the past interpreted. But the most important variable explaining why Labour is prone to a greater extent than other social democratic parties to ideological volatility is the fluidity of its power structure which, in turn, reflects its institutional structure, especially its pluralist and federal character.
Spying in South Asia’s conclusion addresses the impact of the end of the Cold War, and the onset of a ‘war on terror’, on British and American intelligence relationships with India. It explores the rationale behind Indian governments’ softening of anti-CIA rhetoric from the mid-1980s, and the implications for New Delhi’s intelligence agencies of the precipitous collapse of the USSR, and the abrupt conclusion of the Cold War. It assesses factors underlying the post-Cold War recovery of Western secret services from the position of public pariahs in India to that of New Delhi’s principal partners in intelligence and security matters. In 1947, as the Cold War dawned and the newly independent subcontinent confronted formidable threats to its stability and security, New Delhi turned to London and Washington for covert support. Some half-a-century later, after decades of what might best be described as circumscribed cooperation compromised by conflict and conspiracism, the intelligence services of India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, once more found compelling reasons to put their differences aside, and work together as close partners in a new secret war.
This chapter shows how the Bush administration and other Iraq hawks promulgated a successful case against containment after 9/11 based on the idea that containment and deterrence could not address the “nexus” threat of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist groups, and rogue states. It then examines what I call the “Powell–Blair” approach to Iraq, which defined the political/policy establishment's thinking on Iraq in this period. Tony Blair, Colin Powell, most of the foreign policy elite, and many Democratic politicians criticized how Bush was pursuing regime change but nonetheless endorsed the basic tenets of the regime change consensus. They made a tactical and procedural argument for pursuing regime change “the right way” but did not think that containment was a viable alternative. Thus, after the Bush administration made a cursory effort at supporting inspections in Iraq in the winter of 2002–2003, the majority of this establishment supported the invasion.
Examines September 11 attacks and the Cold War–style response of George W. Bush. Assesses competing interpretations of 9/11. Outlines Bush Doctrine and argues for its continuity with Cold War strategies. Considers case for and performance in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Details first phase of the War on Terror and the traditional alliances that it relied on.
British successes and failures in Barroso Drama. Several reasons for Blair's support for nomination Barroso. Blair's personal choice for Peter Mandelson. Ambivalence in Mandelson's action during the affair. Pressure from London on MEPs.
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