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The Barbary Wars constitute the second armed conflict the United States fought as an independent state to defend against state-sponsored piracy in the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The war was fought against semi-autonomous Barbary principalities in North Africa - Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco. Warships from these kingdoms preyed on European and American commercial shipping, demanding payment of tribute to allow safe passage through the Mediterranean Sea. In response to demands by the Pasha of Tripoli, President Thomas Jefferson sent the US Navy to the Mediterranean to protect American merchant vessels and challenge the Barbary pirates. The United States demonstrated a commitment to protecting freedom of the seas by combating piracy rather than submitting to ransom demands. The Barbary Wars established the precedent that the sea should be free for all nations to conduct trade without being subject to piracy or coercive tribute systems.
Residents of Syria in the mid-1250s – Franks and Arabic-speaking Muslims, Christians and Jews – would probably not have imagined the possibility of a region without Frankish communities and polities in Outremer, what today we call the Levant. King Louis IX’s crusade to Egypt in 1249–50 had ended in spectacular defeat, and a Mamlūk state of sorts had been established in 1250, bringing Ayyubid rule in Egypt to a close (discussed later). There were worrisome rumblings from the East – a large army under Hülegü (Chinggis Khan’s grandson and brother of the Great Khan Möngke (r. 1251–59)) had arrived in north-eastern Iran, and was working its way across that large country. But Louis IX had paid his ransom to the Mamlūks, been released, and had spent four years in Palestine rebuilding fortifications and strengthening the Frankish communities before he returned to France in 1254. The Mamlūks of Egypt and the Syrian Ayyubids had battled themselves to a standstill in the early 1250s, with an uneasy frontier somewhere between north-eastern Sinai and south-western Palestine.
Each of the small areas controlled by these forces formed the nucleus of one of four new Latin principalities named after its capital city: the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the kingdom of Jerusalem, and the county of Tripoli. Collectively these lands became known to contemporaries as Outremer, an Old French expression meaning ‘[the land] beyond the sea’ (i.e. as seen from the perspective of Western Europe). At the beginning of the twelfth century, however, they constituted only a fraction of the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Syrian Desert. Most of Palestine as far north as Beirut owed allegiance to the Fātimid Caliphate of Egypt, while most of Syria was divided between the two large Saljūq kingdoms centred on Aleppo and Damascus, with smaller independent emirates at Tripoli, Hama and Shaizar.
History rarely provides us with tidy scenarios in which even dates mark clear transitions to new eras. The year 1250, however, does offer something of a transition, with the death of Frederick II, the failure of Louis IX’s crusade, and the collapse of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt. The decades that followed were characterised by external threats from the Mamluks and the Mongols, with pressure from the former culminating in the fall of the remaining Frankish strongholds in 1291. Another key feature was the series of wars between the Italian trading cities as well as other armed conflicts involving successive counts of Tripoli and their vassals. Struggles over the succession to the throne of Jerusalem and the complex and frequently fraught relations between the crown, the Military Orders and the Italians were further significant aspects of the age.
Security measures aimed at the repression of corsairing continued apace in the wake of 1816. ‘Barbary piracy’ remained a subject of negotiation and cooperation during the late 1810s and early 1820s. It was dealt with at ambassadorial conferences in London, during meetings of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), in combined talks with the Ottoman Porte, and through an Anglo-French expedition to the coasts of North Africa. Increasingly ambitious efforts to enact maritime security and an increasingly vocal opposition to such efforts marked the eight years following the Anglo–Dutch bombardment of 1816. The authorities of the regencies managed to thwart several European security practices, ranging from concerted communications to defensive alliances. To understand the starts, stops and reversals of the fight against Mediterranean piracy, local activity needs to be analysed. This chapter foregrounds the role of actors who were deemed piratical threats. The contestations of these threatening actors influenced the shape and success of European security practices.
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