Between 2011 and 2018, Bulgaria enacted a series of reforms accommodating the two most salient demands of its Muslim minority in the postcommunist period: the registration of elected Muslim leadership and the provision of state funding for religious communities. This constituted a significant departure from the restrictive policies pursued during the first two decades after communism and from the repressive legacies of earlier periods. Through process tracing based on 11 semi-structured elite interviews, press releases, and secondary sources, I argue that the geostrategic concerns of Bulgarian elites from the influence of the minority’s kin-state, Turkey, from 2011 onward, and their aim to decrease the dependence of the minority on the kin-state provided the main motivation to accommodate Muslims’ religious demands. These concerns were driven by domestic political changes in Turkey in the post-2011 period and their reflections in the country’s foreign policy.

Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has become highly contested in the last two decades. The changes in the international and domestic environment have led to the emergence of competing ideas as to the elements of Turkish foreign policy in this region. This article argues that these ideas ultimately represent worldviews as they start with different assumptions about what Turkey is, what the basis of Turkey's interest and involvement should be in this region, to what extent Turkey should engage the Middle East, and what the threats and/or opportunities emanating from the region are. Each of these worldviews has been institutionalized to some extent. I conclude that these worldviews continue to co-exist and compete with each other in Turkish foreign policy today.

Recently, Turkish foreign policy, compared to the 1990s, has manifested a number of puzzlements. They range from the rapprochement with Greece, the turnabout over Cyprus, mediation efforts involving a series of regional conflicts to a policy seeking an improvement in relations with Armenia and Kurds of Northern Iraq. These puzzlements have increasingly transformed Turkey from being cited as a “post-Cold War warrior” or a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft” power. Academic literature has tried to account for these puzzlements and the accompanying transformation in Turkish foreign policy from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. This literature has undoubtedly enriched our understanding of what drives Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, this literature has not paid adequate attention to the role of economic factors shaping Turkish foreign policy as we approach the end of the first decade of the new century. This article aims to highlight this gap and at the same time offer a preliminary conceptual framework based on Richard Rosecrance's notion of the “trading state” and Robert Putnam's idea of “two-level diplomatic games” to explore the impact of economic considerations on Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take part in Turkeys Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interaction in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors.