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Chapter 10 shows how Vietnam exposed the limits of existing constitutional war-powers practices and set the terms of the postwar reforms. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and later appropriations enabled a strategy of gradual escalation, while executive secrecy helped widen the battlefield into Laos and Cambodia. The chapter traces the legal rationales that treated escalation and cross-border operations as commander-in-chief choices, and it examines how Congress, once committed, was slow but ultimately able to constrain the war through hearings, statutory limits, and proposed restrictions. Courts largely refused to adjudicate the war’s legality so long as there was some mutual participation by the political branches, leaving Congress as the decisive checker. In Vietnam’s aftermath, lawmakers pursued reforms that narrowed attention to war initiation through the War Powers Resolution and expanded intelligence oversight through the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and the Church Committee; they also joined the Executive in ending the draft and building an all-volunteer force. These reforms reflected a period of restraint, and later activism would strain them again.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 led to rapidly increased US involvement in the Vietnam War, yet its connection to the broader concept of freedom of navigation is often underappreciated. The United States justified its naval presence and actions in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam as an exercise of the principle of freedom of navigation. North Vietnam’s interference with that right precipitated the incident and led to the “blank check” authorization to the president by Congress to escalate the war. The actual incident involved two separate encounters between US Navy warships and North Vietnamese naval forces in early August 1964. On August 2, 1964, the US destroyer USS Maddox was conducting reconnaissance patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin when it was attacked mid-day by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Two days later, the Maddox and another US destroyer, USS Turner Joy, reported another night attack, although historians debate whether the second attack occurred. President Lyndon Johnson sought and received congressional authorization to use military force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war.
Addresses the three presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, with particular focus on the Watergate scandal that led to the near-impeachment, resignation, and pardon of Richard Nixon. Of special importance is the relation of President Nixon’s misuse of the pardon power as part of his effort to obstruct the Watergate investigation and the impeachment inquiry that led to his resignation. The pardon of Nixon by Gerald Ford is carefully examined. As are the lessons about use of the pardon power drawn by Nixon’s immediate successors.
The Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) was the most important institution for the identification and nurturing of a community of radical economists. The Union for Radical Political Economics was founded in September 1968 at Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, by junior faculty members and graduate students. The immediate circumstances of the founding of URPE were closely related to the anti-Vietnam War movement and to a nationally divisive event. In August 1968, Chicago police violently charged against demonstrators at the Democratic Party Convention. The aftershocks of the police riot were felt in economics through a boycott of the city by some of the rank and file. On its first anniversary, URPE had swelled in members and in ambition. At the next annual convention of the American Economic Association, radicals read a list of grievances charging their peers as sycophants of inequality, alienation, destruction of the environment, imperialism, racism, and patriarchy, and in so doing choosing for themselves an oppositional attitude toward their colleagues, their values, and practices.
The leaders of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) were students in the early 1960s, and by mid-decade were either junior faculty or were studying for their doctoral degrees. In 1965 the campus came alive with the issue of the Vietnam War. To understand the varied but always raw ways the war shaped relationships between students, faculty, and administrations, this chapter looks at the distinct experiences of the University of Michigan, University of Chicago, and Harvard University. What emerges are three ways student power was enacted and then responded to. This reflects the identity and institutional character of the three institutions but also crucially how senior faculty understood the threat and opportunity of the student rebellion. At Michigan professors relived traumas of the 1950s. At Chicago professors seized on the chance to reaffirm their authority. While at Harvard professors found common cause with the rebels.
As in other parts of Southeast Asia, the power of ancestral spirits and the spirituality of the place are both distinct, constitutive elements of the domestic and communal ritual activity in Vietnam. In the realm of death remembrance, the homebound ancestral relics are typically contrasted to the displaced souls of the dead and their supposedly homeless existence. However, the notion of home that structures this existential divide is complicated by the experience of a long civil war and the war-caused mass human dislocation, both physical and political. This chapter explores the question of displacement in death, focusing on the shrine for the earth god where people routinely make small offerings on behalf of the wandering souls of the dead today. It will ask if an alternative idea of home is found in this ritualized act and, if so, what the act of remembrance can tell us about the ethics of hospitality.
This chapter approaches the anthropology of death through the example of the lasting sociopolitical and material effects of what the Vietnamese know as the “American War” and the US as the “Vietnam War.” Specifically, we examine the conjoined legacies of missing war dead and the chronic ecological-physiological systems of damage so firmly fixed in the two countries’ often clashing but unavoidably tethered narratives of reparation and normalization. Death in this case tells two stories: one about formerly warring states and how they use the dead – namely, their respective and mutually exclusive sets of missing combatant dead – to advance postwar geopolitical interests on the global stage, and a second, about the necropolitical “drift” of toxins, mutations, and irreparably harmed bodies and psyches that unfolds in the shadow of state-centered narratives. Juxtaposing ethnographic insights from our respective fieldwork, we illustrate how destruction endures, vivifying the past – not just figuratively through postwar geopolitical narratives and memories of the absent but also within the physical bodies of the survivors and the tainted ecologies that surface in war’s wake.
Throughout U.S. history, women have served and participated in war efforts in both official and unofficial capacities, playing central roles in furthering U.S. war aims and achieving the mission at hand. At times, military authorities have acknowledged women’s unofficial contributions by offering payment for services and access to postwar benefits. Military leaders have also recognized the value of servicewomen when personnel needs required them. Since the end of the Vietnam War-era draft in 1973, the U.S. armed forces have gradually opened military occupation specialties, including combat positions, to women. Yet in the civilian world and within the military ranks, resistance to women’s service remained steady over the decades. Critics have cited unit cohesion and readiness as reasons to keep women out of the forces, and they have also made cultural arguments grounded in the links between gender, power, and military service to oppose the mobilization of women. Although U.S. military leaders have opened opportunities for women due to pragmatic needs for personnel, Americans have held on to the notion that soldiers are men, and women belong on the homefront.
This chapter outlines the history of conscription in the United States and argues that the draft can be used as a tool to decipher public understandings of religion, race, gender, obligation, and the role of government in each historical moment and over time. The answers to the questions of who was included, who was left out, and most importantly, why, reflect larger trends in American society and politics and constitute a clear field of inquiry for the war and society approach to history. The study of conscription is critical to understanding how war radiated out to all levels of American society and how the complex stew of American liberal individualism, republican notions of obligation, gendered and racial hierarchies, and personal psychology impacted American warfighting. In other words, the draft provides a roadmap to Americans’ relationship with and to war.
This essay critically examines the temporality of American war and surveys the persistence of armed conflict in U.S. history. “Wartimes” structure U.S. historical memory. Wartime is thought to be episodic, followed by peacetime. Instead, military conflict is endemic in North American history. Armed conflict was a means of European settlement in the Colonial Era. It was a method of westward expansion. War enabled national survival in the Civil War. It was a means of solidifying American power and influence in the world over time. The geography of war ultimately altered the character of the civilian experience. The Civil War deeply affected civilians, but this direct experience was lost when U.S. wars in the twentieth century were distant from North America. Major twentieth-century wars nevertheless affected the home front. As technology changed warfare, however, armed conflict became an abstraction for the U.S. polity. This undermined political restraint, enabling ongoing small wars, since the nation could go to war without U.S. civilians feeling that they were in a wartime.
Over the course of his career, Ginsberg became known as much for his political activism as for his poetry. In fact, Ginsberg didn’t necessarily see a strong distinction between his poetry and his political activism, and this chapter traces how his political consciousness emerged in the early 1960s at the same time he was developing new kinds of poetics to articulate this political consciousness. During the 1960s, Ginsberg became a central figure in the growing and increasingly visible counterculture. The war in Vietnam was a major catalyst for his embrace of countercultural political activism, and as the 1960s unfolded, he came to see language, the corruption of language, and its bad faith use by politicians and others in power as symptom of a callous, violent American culture that seemed to revel in oppression, self-repression, and in escalating the war. He turned to poetry as a counter to this “black magic language,” notably in poems such as “Wichita Vortex Sutra,” and this chapter shows how Ginsberg saw his socially and politically engaged poems of the era as doing the crucially important work of raising or changing consciousness about the war and a host of other social and political issues.
Drawing on archival sources from Albania, China, the former Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, this article places the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV) response to the Prague Spring in 1968 within an international framework. The available documentation suggests that DRV policymakers repeatedly expressed deep concern about Alexander Dubček’s radical reform programme and, prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion, signalled their support for external intervention. The article moreover contends that Hanoi’s stance reflected broader anxieties about its own national reunification struggle, fears of ideological destabilization, and continued reliance on fraternal assistance.
Este artículo plantea que Grrr (1969), el primer libro de artista de Guillermo Deisler, constituye una intervención poética sobre la relación entre los medios visuales y la guerra de Vietnam en el marco de la Guerra Fría. Frente a lecturas que lo han situado tan solo como un antecedente de la poesía visual chilena, argumento que el libro problematiza el papel de la televisión en la producción y el consumo de imágenes bélicas. Mediante procedimientos como el collage, el recorte, el troquelado y el montaje, Grrr hace de la materialidad del soporte un dispositivo crítico que fractura la ilusión de transparencia mediática. En ese proceso, Grrr vuelve legibles los marcos visuales que organizan la percepción pública e interroga las condiciones bajo las cuales la guerra deviene imagen.
Journalist and historian Mark Dapin argues that ‘every stage of Australia’s Vietnam War has been misremembered and obscured by myth'. This is not unusual. Much of Australia’s military history is coloured by storytelling and the perpetuation of legends. Several myths, legends and falsehoods have also grown around the conduct of operations of the Australian Army’s intelligence personnel during the war in South Vietnam. These range from simple fabrications and ‘storytelling’ to an attempt to deflect criticism from those responsible. One of these relates to a particular allegation of torture and the mistreatment of a prisoner by Australians during the Vietnam War.
At the end of January 1968, the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched their Tet Offensive, a series of coordinated attacks on more than one hundred towns and outposts in South Vietnam. These attacks aimed to foment rebellion among the South Vietnamese population so that they would revolt against the corrupt South Vietnamese regime and break the United States’ resolve before peace talks. In response to this offensive, the US and South Vietnamese forces commenced a massive operation, Toan Thang (Complete Victory), which aimed to destroy the remaining enemy involved in the Tet Offensive and prevent fresh enemy forces from moving towards the capital, Saigon. In these objectives neither side obtained complete success. In April 1ATF became part of this operation with its infantry battalions conducting ‘reconnaissance-in-force’ operations to block enemy infiltration routes. In May, the task force changed its concept of operations by deploying several units outside Phuoc Tuy province into Area of Operations (AO) Surfers, which had been sub-divided into battalion areas of operation Manly, Newport and Bondi. Artillery located at Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral would support these tactical areas.
The action at the Long Tan plantation on 18 August 1966, about six kilometres east of the Australian base at Nui Dat, was the Australian Army’s most significant and costliest single-day battle during the Vietnam War. Eighteen Australians died in action, and 24 were wounded. Over the years, several myths and accusations have emerged about the battle. This includes the role of some senior officers, the number of enemies that faced the Australians and the number killed, and even the timings of the battle. Some of these myths were reinforced, and new ones were created through the Danger Close feature film. Among the myths and accusations are claims of an ‘intelligence failure’ and post-war statements by the task force commander, Brigadier Oliver Jackson, that he did not have good intelligence. From an intelligence perspective, the various claims related to how a large enemy force could have approached within a few kilometres of the 1ATF base at Nui Dat without the task force’s intelligence detecting it.
On 18 August 1971, the Australian Prime Minister, William McMahon, announced that Australian forces would commence a phased withdrawal from Vietnam. In effect, this phased withdrawal had already started. When 8 RAR completed its tour in October 1970, the Australian Government decided not to replace it. By then, Phuoc Tuy province was quiet, and the enemy was close to being defeated. The two VC battalions that had operated in Phuoc Tuy, D440 and D445 Provincial Mobile Battalions, were significantly understrength and had either left the province or become inactive; highway 15, the main supply route through Phuoc Tuy from Saigon to Vung Tau, was open to unescorted traffic; the people increasingly separated from the VC; and both VC and NVA were suffering from low morale and severe food shortages, and had difficulty recruiting from within the province. The task force’s intelligence teams reinforced this picture through analysis of captured enemy documents and the interrogation of prisoners, which ‘told of shortages of men, key cadre, food, medical supplies, ammunition and weapons’.
Psychological and civil affairs operations in Vietnam, while very different in scope, resource requirements and primary objectives, were also of specific interest to the intelligence staff of 1ATF. The former had the dual aims of countering VC propaganda while appealing to the ‘attitudes, vulnerabilities and susceptibilities’ of the local population to persuade them to accept and assist the South Vietnamese authorities and Australian forces. In this way, it aimed to attack the enemy’s morale and induce them to surrender. The latter sought to complement the former and support the Australian Government’s foreign policy objectives in Vietnam. From an intelligence perspective, both aided in what is now called the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, which built an extensive database on each operational area’s environment, including people, terrain, infrastructure and the level of VC support in each village. The information collected also covered ‘sociological, political and economic aspects which when related to the enemy can indicate his strengths and weaknesses’.
The Commander's Eyes and Ears: Australian Army Combat Intelligence in the Cold War, 1945–75 explores the contribution made by the Australian Army's combat intelligence services to force commanders during the Cold War (1945–75), focusing primarily on the Australian Intelligence Corps. The book covers the support provided by intelligence resources to Australian and allied commanders on operations in Japan, Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. Through the lens of the Australian Intelligence Corps and other intelligence resources, the book pays special attention to significant events during this period, including the Japanese war crimes trials, the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, the Korean War, the Malayan Emergency, the Indonesian Confrontation, and the Vietnam War. Criticisms of the Army's involvement, challenges faced by soldiers, mistakes made and lessons learned in these events are explored throughout.
From the Frontier Wars to contemporary conflicts, this chapter considers the role of Australian poetry in shaping understandings of war. It includes early critiques of British command during the Boer War and national mythmaking around Breaker Morant. It then considers the patriotism and propaganda of poetry in World War I and the generation of the Anzac or digger myth in national identity. It considers the role of humour and the vernacular in popular poetry, and writing from the homefront. It traces the change in attitudes as World War I continued and resulted in a heavy loss of Australian lives. The chapter also considers poetry written during World War II and the Vietnam War. It considers how writers experimented with form and imagery to create a vehicle of protest, as well as to navigate disillusionment and loss. The chapter considers poetic engagements with a movement into perpetual war and conflict in the late twentieth century, including the role of media. Lastly, it considers the voices of asylum seekers and the role of poetry in protesting and critiquing government policy around border security.