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The July Crisis spanned just over five weeks, separating the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, on 28 June 1914 from Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August. In the vast scholarship on the July Crisis, commercial and financial issues have received relatively little attention. This absence reflects the character of the July crisis, in which the key actors were a small number of men, in the chancelleries, foreign ministries, and general staffs of Serbia and the great powers. The crisis affected markets from early July in Vienna, but panic across European markets set in on Monday, 20 July, three days before the delivery of the ultimatum. In contrast to crises in September 1911 and autumn 1912, collapsing financial markets and rising food prices did not restrain leaders. Indeed, perceptions of opponents’ financial and commercial vulnerabilities led leaders, particularly in Berlin and Vienna, to adopt more assertive diplomatic and military strategies. This chapter examines why the July crisis culminated in great power war in contrast to previous crises.
While economic interdependence did not render war between the European great powers unthinkable, it placed significant constraints on the use of military force amongst the great powers. In addition, deepening international trade and capital markets produced new instruments for the European great powers to pursue foreign policy, provide security, and advance interests. This chapter examines the vibrant intellectual and political debates about economic interdependence, the rising costs of war, and the maintenance of peace. It then shows how the risk of war created market turmoil, drawing on two case studies: the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the Bosnian Crisis in 1908. Markets recovered, but after political signals demonstrated great power restraint. Using the work of Kurt Riezler, the chapter shows how contemporaries came to understand economic interdependence not merely as a constraint on military force, but as a particular field of power politics. The chapter concludes by examining, briefly, how different European states considered their foreign policy options in an economically interdependent order and how they negotiated the interdependence dilemma.
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