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Chapters 3, 4 and 5 argue that the emergence of convict politics in the early Chinese empires was a direct result of the legal system producing a significant number of innocent convicts, thereby undermining the understanding of crime and criminality. Chapter 3 delves into the mutual-responsibility system – a major principle of legal practice from the Qin and Han dynasties through to the twentieth century. This system, aimed at deterring crime through the imposition of severe punishments to instill fear, inadvertently compromised justice. It led to openly punishing the lawful, including the families, neighbors, and friends of offenders. While effective in enforcing surveillance and procuring convict labor, the mutual-responsibility system underscored the absolute power of the throne, yet it distorted the relationship between crime and punishment and conflated moral standards. This systemic injustice sparked ongoing and fervent debates among scholars, officials, and even emperors. However, the bureaucratization of legal processes prevented any meaningful reform from happening.
Although legal practices were sharply criticized and reforms were occasionally suggested, no significant changes were ever realized. Chapters 10 and 11 delve into the puzzle by examining the critics themselves. The majority of these critics were Confucians, who often attacked the law implementers – the technical bureaucrats – for lacking virtue and enforcing the law with brutality. Chapter 10 argues that the Confucians’ fierce attacks on technical bureaucrats were, in fact, a struggle against the bureaucratic hierarchy and its mechanism for producing political elites. Leading Confucians refused to serve as prudent, detail-oriented, and technique-focused bureaucrats. Nor were they willing to climb the ladder of success from the bottom of the bureaucracy. However, they faced a significant dilemma: those Confucians who aspired to act according to their ideals rather than submitting to institutional rules were rejected by officialdom. Yet, once Confucians successfully became officials, they were expected to obey the bureaucratic hierarchy and follow administrative regulations – ultimately becoming the very technical bureaucrats they had once criticized.
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