This chapter takes a fresh look at the period 1993–2000, when the Oslo Peace Process dominated international and Norwegian understandings of the Middle East. Several dimensions of the Oslo Process have been analyzed by previous research. However, this chapter looks at the process from the vantage point of what came after (i.e., the Second Intifada), which marked a turning point in the radicalization of the global and the Norwegian left, in particular the trade unions, regarding the Middle East. The chapter looks at how the identity of Norwegian foreign policy elites and the labor movement was linked to the concept of Norway as a humanitarian great power. The Labor party and the trade unions owned the Oslo Process and took great pride in it. When it fell apart after Camp David in 2000 the reaction of the left was deep disappointment, and this is a crucial element in an analysis of the left’s turn towards a more radical denunciation of everything Israeli.

This chapter traces the Oslo peace process’s shift from informal backchannels to formal diplomacy. Under Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) pressure, Shimon Peres sent Uri Savir to Oslo, initiating Track I negotiations. This transition introduced protocol and state representation, replacing improvisation. Joel Singer, a Washington-based lawyer, joined the Israeli team, adding legal depth. Secrecy became vital, as leaks could derail progress. Within this tense atmosphere, negotiators drafted the Declaration of Principles (DoP), outlining a phased move from Israeli occupation to limited Palestinian self-rule. The DoP envisioned a cautious path from violence to coexistence and from political manoeuvring to reconciliation. Despite its significance, the agreement left major issues unresolved: it did not halt settlement expansion or address Jerusalem, the Al Aqsa Mosque, Palestinian refugees or statehood. The Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction was narrowly defined, excluding Israeli settlements, military zones and Jerusalem. The two-state solution remained absent; only autonomy was offered. On 20 August 1993, Savir and Ahmed Qurie initialled the DoP in Oslo. Peres informed the Americans, and on 13 September, the Accords were signed on the White House lawn, with President Bill Clinton presiding over a moment of cautious optimism.

The period since the 1990s has proved, in an ironic way, the strength of Israel–US relations. In 1991, American president, George H. W. Bush, clashed with Israel, and since 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had strained Israel–US relations in an unprecedented manner. In both cases, the constants that determined the course of the Israel–US relationship, religion, shared values, and history, proved to be stronger than any individual, regardless of their position. The period covered in this chapter was characterized by a close friendship and strategic partnership between the two nations. During those years, the two countries signed several memoranda of understanding which solidified the American commitment to Israel’s security and ensured its qualitative military edge, as well as expanding the cooperation on economic and cultural matters. The military-industrial cooperation as well as security cooperation between the two countries deepened. The growing Israeli attachment to American culture and values was another manifestation of the deepening relations between the two countries. The Israeli economy changed from socialist to neoliberal under the influence of American economic thinking. Neoconservatism spread across Israel’s political and intellectual elites through institutions and people, most notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis adopted many of the characteristics of American culture and economy, bringing their country closer to the United States in form and content. The ties between Israel and the Christian Zionist Evangelicals deepened as well. With the Evangelicals returning to the forefront of American politics since the mid-1970s, they became a major force in the support of Israel, a tendency that was especially encouraged by the right wing in Israel. Evangelical support for Israel has only increased during the 1990s and 2000s.

The two decades from 1969 marked the tightening of Israel–US strategic ties. With the Cold War becoming more and more predominant in the America view of the Arab–Israeli conflict, American presidents, from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, justified the tightening strategic relations between the two nations in the role Israel would ostensibly play in the defence of the Middle East against Soviet expansion. It did not really matter that Israel would not play that role; for Israel, the idealism that was prevalent in the relations between the two nations was not solid enough, and Israeli leaders gladly recited the Cold War rhetoric in their communication with American officials. Visually, the Arab–Israel conflict played a significant role in the conduct of the relations between the two countries, from the attempts to deal with the consequences of the 1967 June War to the 1982 Lebanon War. These, though, were only a minor irritation in what became deeper and closer ties, encompassing economic and industrial ties, the deepening of cultural connections and intensification of strategic cooperation, mainly in intelligence sharing and development of technologies.