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This chapter examines the distribution of foreign affairs powers, arguing that the Constitution’s text sufficiently allocates authority between Congress and the President without requiring unenumerated or inherent presidential powers. It rejects both formalist claims of a residual executive power and functionalist assertions of necessity-driven authority, asserting that the President’s powers, such as appointing ambassadors and treatymaking, cover essential functions like managing international relations. Historical episodes, including Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and the Monroe Doctrine, illustrate that presidential actions rely on enumerated powers, not a broad policy-setting prerogative. The chapter argues the President does not have unilateral or exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments or to terminate treaties. Treaties are necessary for long-term international obligations and to bind state courts under Article VI, but executive agreements are constitutional if Congress has delegated the relevant authority to the President. While Congress holds most foreign affairs powers, the President’s role is robust but constrained by the Constitution’s formal structure. This formalist approach ensures a balanced separation of powers in foreign affairs.
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