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This chapter begins by introducing standards of conduct – implementing the integrity and independence attributed to the international civil service by the treaty-basis of international organizations. Second, the legal principles of conduct are identified, namely: (1) The interests of the international organization are paramount; (2) Abuse of authority must be manifest, to be contestable; (3) International officials must be uncorrupted; and (4) External authority must not compromise international officials. Third, three attendant legal duties of conduct are considered, as follows: (1) Integrity requires honesty and reputability; (2) Integrity requires reserve and respect; and (3) Integrity requires discipline and hierarchical authority. Fourth, the duty to report alleged beaches of the standards of conduct (sometimes styled, ‘whistleblowing’) is considered. Fifth, the chapter examines the interaction between the immunity typically possessed by international officials in the course of their duties and the exercise of national legal jurisdictions, notably when crimes may have been committed in connection to the workplace. Sixth, and in conclusion, this employment law of standards of conduct at international organizations is restated. The employment law of the enforcement of integrity and the independence of the international civil service – procedures to ascertain and sanction breaches of standards of conduct – is the subject of Chapter 10, ‘Misconduct’.
This chapter charts the processes by which deceptive sex came to be regarded as potentially constituting rape. Through tracing these developments, the chapter shows how doctrinal features of the law, such as the way consent and deception are thought to be related and the modes of deception punished by law, were important to this process. Yet the chapter also argues that to fully appreciate how and why the changes occurred, it is necessary to pay attention to the array of interests the law has sought to protect and how these have shaped the range of topics of deception that might ground a charge of rape. This argument leads to the conclusion that, in the context of deceptive sex, deception has not been considered wrongful because it invalidates or precludes consent, as is commonly thought; rather, deception has invalidated or precluded consent because it has sometimes been considered wrongful. The chapter ends by introducing some reasons why this insight is important to ongoing debates regarding the criminalisation of deceptive sex.
This chapter explores the civil wrong of seduction to establish its nature and parameters and draw out its associations with deception. It argues that, as the earliest legal response to deceptive sex, seduction is in some senses the civil law analogue of later criminal laws. The chapter then shows how the action of seduction was rooted in the idea that deception was wrongful because it was one way of leading a woman off the ‘right’ path and that the harms it caused reflected the gendered significance of marriage and other ‘moral’ forms of intimacy. Furthermore, it highlights how these features of the action provided a framework within which the range of qualifying deceptions was limited and the temporal dimensions of the wrong were set. Finally, the chapter offers some reflections on how the distinctions between private and public introduced in Chapter 1 bore on the decision to keep seduction a civil wrong before foregrounding how these observations, and those made throughout the rest of the chapter, are pertinent to contemporary discussions about criminalising deceptive sex.
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