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It has been widely recognised in the legal as well as law and economics literature that both regulatory and private enforcement are needed to ensure the effectiveness of market regulation in general and EU private law in particular. This chapter unpacks the interplay between these two enforcement mechanisms, focusing on three major issues that arise in practice: the disclosure of evidence gathered by regulatory agencies, the limitation periods for private enforcement actions, and the combined application of administrative sanctions and private law remedies. The chapter constructs three models of the relationship between public and private enforcement – separation, substitution, and complementarity – and explains their main characteristics, manifestations, and implications. It also assesses the potential of each model to strike the right balance between deterrence in the name of the public interest and compensation in the name of interpersonal justice, as well as between uniformity and diversity in regulatory and private enforcement, and draws out some of the practical implications of this analysis for EU private lawmaking and enforcement.
Chapter 6 addresses the second theme outlined in the introduction. It first analyses whether the capacity to impose discipline as an organizational requirement for the status of party to an armed conflict implicitly presupposes the capacity to impose penal sanctions over members of the armed group. Moreover, it discusses to what extent an obligation to punish conduct with penal sanctions can be derived from the doctrine of command responsibility under ICL and whether the customary law duty to prosecute and punish war crimes, as applicable to states, can be extended to armed groups. The chapter argues that while courts and penal sanctions administered by armed groups might be a legitimate way to ensure respect for IHL and to avoid individual criminal responsibility on the basis of command responsibility, this conclusion does not translate into a positive obligation of armed groups as a collective to employ penal sanctions, let alone to set up judicial institutions. This conclusion notwithstanding, the chapter points out that there is increasing state practice requiring armed groups to ensure accountability within their ranks.
The chapter describes how the mix of competition law sanctions and enforcement instruments in Germany has been significantly expanded in recent years. A special feature of the German competition law procedure is that there are two different types of proceedings. Administrative proceedings allow for less serious consequences, such as prohibitions, behavioural and structural remedies, and disgorgements. More severe measures, such as regulatory fines, can only be adopted in regulatory offence proceedings. Criminal law does not play a major role in the enforcement of competition law in Germany. There is only one real criminal offence, bid-rigging. Recent reforms have concerned the liability of parent companies and legal and economic successors, the codification of the leniency programme and the calculation of fines. A highly controversial issue is the liability of managers and employees. New enforcement approaches currently being discussed or already being tested include exclusion from public tenders, reputational sanctions, whistle-blowing and increased use of negotiated settlements. Private enforcement seems to be making particularly great progress as a result of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive. Overall, the current system in Germany seeks to combine incentives for voluntary compliance with tough sanctions and strict enforcement for those who nevertheless break the law.
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