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Critics argue that assigning to the courts the authority to resolve certain categories of contested questions of value will lead to judicial overreach and unjustified interference with the majority’s exercise of power. This argument is deeply misleading. The most salient instances of judicial failure have involved judicial restraint and deference to the other branches of government rather than the exercise of judicial power. The cases that constitute paradigm examples of judicial failure—Plessy, Korematsu, Bowers v. Hardwick—involved excessive judicial deference and inaction, not judicial overreach. While critics argue that intervention by the courts to protect rights may produce bad consequences, the consequences of failure to intervene are tangibly more significant than the consequences of intervention. While consequentialist objections to judicial review do not, I have argued, undermine or qualify the arguments for the value and importance of the institution of judicial review, recent instances of judicial overreach point to the need for greater accountability. Nominees must be required to provide full disclosure of their judicial philosophy and approach to judicial reasoning, and members of the Senate must give that information significant weight in their deliberations.
We begin our data analysis in Chapter 5, which empirically links our broad predictive theory of the judicial tug of war to the nation’s courts. This chapter examines the federal courts, the most politically important courts in the entire American judiciary. As we show in this chapter, fights over federal courts appointments illustrate the tense tug of war between the national bar and politicians. Given that federal courts appointments operate with the advice and consent of the US Senate, an elected body whose political leanings do not dovetail with the bar’s, we expect to see (and we document using empirical data) an ideological divergence. In the last decade, this divergence manifests itself in a federal judiciary that is substantially more conservative than is the national bar. As we show, this also creates supply-side incentives among legal elites. Specifically, conservative graduates of elite law programs have a much higher probability of becoming a judge (of any kind); their relative scarcity in law schools and in the academy, furthermore, has increased the importance of conservative-leaning legal associations, such as the Federalist Society.
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