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In this chapter, I offer an account of the kind of freedom that alreadypertains to natural life. It begins by laying out how Hegel’s account of the freedom of life is related back to his critiques of Kant’s practical philosophy: his objections against the empty formalism of the moral law, the bad infinity of the ought, and the paradox of self-legislation. It reveals that all of these critiques are based on Hegel’s fundamental insight that self-determination has to be construed as a mode of living self-constitution. Hegel first develops this notion of self-constitution in his account of animal life, revealing both the freedom of natural life and why it still falls short of true spiritual freedom. Drawing on his Philosophy of Nature, the chapter reconstructs the ways in which animal life constitutes itself through the process of shape, the process of assimilation, and the genus-process. This reconstruction gives us a concrete understanding of self-constitution and reveals how self-determination can be a natural reality. At the same time, Hegel’s analysis of the inherent limitations of animal nature reveals the ways in which the freedom of spiritual self-constitution goes beyond animal self-constitution. The chapter argues that Hegel does not hold an additive view according to which our spiritual self-constitution is just tacked onto our animal self-constitution, but endorses a transformative view. It develops the way in which Hegel’s dialectical version of the transformative view is superior to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian varieties of the transformative view.
Chapter 6 concerns the contentious issue of the role of the concept of life in the Logic and its consistency with the artifact-centered conception of teleology defended in chapter 5. There is a common tendency in the literature to think that the Life chapter implicitly imports references to the biological domain in the Logic itself. It is here argued instead that Hegel’s Life chapter must be read in “topic-neutral” terms: in a way that requires application neither to the natural or cultural domains. Once it is read in this neutral way, we can see that “logical life” is simply the notion of a self-determining purpose. However, the concept of life as developed by Hegel is not at all opposed to the artifactual domain; this is especially because the social and cultural domain (social ontology) give us prime examples of “living artifacts,” the kind of artifacts that can be based in a process guided by thought.
The boundaries between humans and animals have been redrawn in modern Europe. This is especially true for the development of human–animal relations in cities since the onset of urbanisation around the middle of the nineteenth century. Although cities in the wide spectrum of European urban spaces differed significantly with respect to animal inhabitants and to the formation of so-called co-habitations of humans and animals, nevertheless the changes in human–animal relations took place under common overarching tendencies, which this contribution will pursue from the perspective of an Animate History. The central elements of a new order of human–animal relations developed not in the countryside, but in cities. Cities have always been multispecies spaces, both historically and in the present. The working assumption for this chapter is that the interaction of people, animals and the built environment creates new living worlds.
The main question this chapter asks and attempts to answer is: What is the principal difference between animal life and human spirit, as Hegel construes it at the end of his Philosophy of Nature? More specifically, in what way are non-human animal organisms “inadequate” or “imperfect” and in what way, correspondingly, are human beings the “perfect” animal? Answering this question requires getting clear on the different ways in which non-human and human animals bear their respective natures, the connection between reproduction and the manner in which non-human animals relate to their genus, and the role of biological death within that process of reproduction. To the extent that Hegel commentators have dealt with the relation between animal life and human spirit, they have been predominantly concerned in recent years with Hegel’s Anthropology. The end of the Philosophy of Nature has, by contrast, been relatively neglected. On the occasions when it has been discussed, the latter text has tended to be the object of passing paraphrase rather than the focus of an attempt at philosophical comprehension. This chapter contributes to remedying this scholarly situation.
Here, I ask the question: how many planets are there with life in the Milky Way? This question has many variants. We can ask about simple microbial life. Alternatively, we may ask about more complex life – for example multicellular animals and plants. Then again, we may ask specifically about intelligent life. An approach that can be used for all of these variants is the one pioneered by the American astronomer Frank Drake. In this chapter, I use the Drake equation to estimate the number of microbial worlds and the number of worlds with animals. (In a later chapter I use the same approach to estimate the number of worlds with intelligent life.) When Drake first devised his equation, we were hard put to come up with meaningful numerical values for any of its parameters. Now we have reasonably good values for at least some of them. Hence our estimates are better than before. However, there are still wide errors, so I investigate the effects of these errors on our estimates. Bearing them in mind, I only attempt estimates to the nearest order of magnitude. These estimates are: 1 billion planets with microbial life; and 10 million planets with animal life.
Human intelligence exercises a decisive influence on the ecological balance of the landscape, to store knowledge and to organise the use of natural resources. This chapter starts by considering some of the main physical characteristics of the Scandinavian landscape throughout the millennia that have passed since the Quaternary glaciations. A number of physical processes were responsible not only for the geological construction of the Scandinavian landscape but also for the later changes that took place. The soils in Scandinavia consist mainly of relatively coarse glacial deposits, which have generally proved difficult to cultivate. In the last 5,000 years, shore displacement around the Baltic has mainly been caused by land uplift. However, the Norwegian Sea has not undergone such drastic changes. The chapter also deals with the climatic changes, coastal landscapes, and the vegetation zones and animal life in the Scandinavian region.
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