This book presents an original account of anarchism as a tradition of constitutional thought and a novel theorisation of anarchist constitutional practice. It exposes the statist impasse in conventional constitutionalism to reconnect anarchism to debates in political theory, International Relations and critical legal theory about the constitutional crisis in global politics. The reconstruction is based on a fresh reading of historical anarchist thought and co-produced research examining the constitutional practices of three inspirational grassroots movements: the Industrial Workers of the World, the Occupy Oakland encampment, and the UK workers and housing co-op Radical Routes. Grounding anarchism in an ontology of anarchy that was informed by a distinctively anarchist approach to social science, the book engages with concepts of power, division and balance familiar in liberal and republican constitutionalism and subverts constitutionalism by developing an constitutional architecture without permanent, fixed authority. The book discusses the work of a raft of anarchist thinkers, from Proudhon to Lucy Parsons, Tolstoy to Kotoku Shusui, all of whom developed decentralised federalist alternatives to old imperial orders and shows how their ideas resonate more or less consciously in anarchist movements. Dispelling myths about the incompatibility of anarchism and constitutionalism, it argues that the practice of anarchist constitutionalising can be replicated, mimicked and extended by everyone.

In “Globalization, the Politics of Identity, and Social Hope,” Rorty presents a pair of claims: tinkering with the concepts of “identity” and “difference” cannot be made politically useful, but tinkering with the concepts of “rationality” and “truth” can be made politically useful. In this chapter, I use this pair of claims to explain Rorty’s reasons for thinking that leftist critics of his liberalism fail to recognize that they are themselves part of the liberal “we” to which he regularly refers. When Rorty claims that tinkering with rationality and truth can be made politically useful, he has in mind the anti-authoritarian idea that moving from philosophy to redescription makes room for social progress. When he claims that tinkering with “identity” and “difference” cannot be made politically useful, he is making two points: the politics of identity as a philosophical program is overly theoretical and overly pessimistic, but the politics of identity as a political project is nothing other than good old-fashioned liberalism. Together, these claims leave leftist philosophers and activists in a position where we cannot radically undermine liberalism, but where we can work to gradually reform it.