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This chapter reconceptualises EU competition law as an interpretive and argumentative practice rather than a technocratic, value‑neutral regime. It starts from the observation that persistent indeterminacy and reasonable disagreement about core antitrust concepts (restriction of competition, abuse of dominance, effective competition) are not temporary defects, but structural features of a field animated by conflicting yet plausible views about what competition is for. Traditional responses, whether top‑down axiomatic projects that seek a single master value (such as consumer welfare) or bottom‑up doctrinalism that trusts incremental case law development, share a commitment to economic formalism and legal positivism, and thus miscast indeterminacy as a technical gap to be closed by better models or more refined doctrine. Drawing on interpretivism and “law as integrity”, the chapter develops an Argumentative Practice Model in which legal content emerges from the dynamic interplay of value judgements, doctrinal reasoning, and extra‑legal knowledge. Through case‑based analysis on agreements and abuse of dominance, including digital markets and refusal‑to‑supply scenarios, it shows how doctrinal shifts are intelligible only as interpretive moves that renegotiate the purposes of competition law. Embracing this argumentative character, the chapter argues, is essential for epistemic openness, adaptability, and normative legitimacy in a changing economy.
Edited by
Mary S. Morgan, London School of Economics and Political Science,Kim M. Hajek, London School of Economics and Political Science,Dominic J. Berry, London School of Economics and Political Science
This chapter examines the criteria exposed by Stephen Jay Gould’s original paper on just-so stories to sustain such a charge. I show that Gould’s concerns were neither directed to narrative explanations nor were they ineluctably linked to their narrative quality. Then I analyse how advocates of narrative science have met the challenge. I identify two basic defensive approaches: the vindication of explanatory narratives in cases where the historical, contingent and causally complex nature of the phenomena demand a narrative approach and an unveiling strategy showing how there’s a narrative behind each law-like generalization or nomological explanatory formula. The chapter’s concentration on the argumentative moves of the discussants helps clarify their positions. Moreover, the argumentative quality of their object of study (scientific reason-giving practices) is also emphasized. I claim that the dialectical requirement of openness to collective survey and discussion is what may prevent just-so charges for any kind of explanatory model.
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