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Part I examines the birth of neo-socialism and the 1933 “neo-socialist schism” within the SFIO. The extant historiography of this schism tends to interpret it as the joint product of a doctrinal revision introduced by the neo-socialists and a separate tactical challenge by the party’s reformist wing pushing for a policy of socialist ministerial participation within bourgeois governments. The problem with this interpretation is that it treats neo-socialism as a coherent and ready-made doctrinal alternative to socialist orthodoxy, whereas the neo-socialists themselves initially conceived of their project as a “tactical,” and not “doctrinal,” challenge to the party leadership. Neo-socialism was not the driving force of the 1933 schism but emerged as a distinct doctrinal identity through the schismatic dynamic of the factional conflict over ministerial participation.
This chapter traces the factional conflict over ministerial participation in the SFIO from 1925 to 1933, focusing on how the distinction between “doctrine” and “tactics” was discursively mobilized within this conflict in relation to the changing balance of forces between the factions. Although initially both sides of the conflict agreed that it pertained to a “tactical” and not “doctrinal” question, as the minority favoring socialist ministerial participation grew in strength, their factional rivals began to reinterpret the conflict as a “doctrinal” one in order to delegitimate the minority. While the participationist minority at first rejected this interpretation of the conflict, as a schism came to appear inevitable, they embraced the label of doctrinal heretic that had been imposed upon them. It was thus through the schismatic dynamic itself that “neo-socialism” emerged as a distinct doctrine differentiated from the socialism of the SFIO.
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