Judges on apex courts sit in panels to resolve the most consequential legal issues within their jurisdiction. On occasion, these panels are closely split on the outcome. Where that split reflects only one judicial opinion or vote, the decision is rendered by a ‘bare majority’. That decisions with the potential for seismic legal, political and social importance can be made by such slim margins has received increasing academic attention in recent years. Yet, many of the responses to this ‘bare majority puzzle’ are of a conceptual nature, grounded in theory and addressing the normative implications. This article adds a perspective on the practice of bare majorities to this wider discussion. It does so by drawing on the practice of bare majorities at the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights and identifying six questions of salience to the nature, style and implications of the division. Engagement with these questions demonstrates that the theoretical discomfort posed by bare majorities is not always replicated in their practice.
