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This chapter examines the defensive measures provisions of the EU Takeover Directive of 2004 in the light of the changing policy orientation of both the EU Commission and the Member States towards the role of takeovers in relation to industrial policy. As far as the Commission is concerned, it charts a decline from initial enthusiasm for the threat of the hostile takeover as a central tool for promoting the Union’s industrial policy, via acceptance that the Directive would not achieve this goal because of Member State opposition, to at least partial acceptance of the arguments against making the control of companies contestable. The second half of the chapter analyses whether the failure of the Commission’s initial plans for defensive measures can truly be regarded as a missed opportunity, because those proposals would have been of limited importance, even if enacted. The chapter concludes that the ‘shareholder structure’ and ‘pre-bid defences’ versions of the argument that the Commission’s proposals were trivial carry more weight than the argument that other provisions of national company law already achieved the Commission’s goal.
The Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids was enacted on 21 April 2004 as a framework directive. The Member States transposed the mandatory bid rule with little variation in the definition of control, with thresholds varying narrowly in nearly all Member States, between 30 per cent and a third. Also concerning the supervisory authority and squeeze-out and sell-out rights, the transposition of the Directive had a harmonizing effect. Therefore, the occasionally encountered opinion that the Takeover Directive was a failure is plainly incorrect. However, Member States vary not only in their legislative approach concerning the offeree’s defence measures, but also in respect of derogations and deviations from the mandatory bid rule. While in the late 1990s the board neutrality rule was dominant on the continent, Germany, France and Italy altered their takeover regimes and now favour a more flexible approach. A growing number of Member States later changed their initial transposition of the Takeover Directive’s breakthrough rule. In a future reform of the Takeover Directive it should be taken into account that the markets for corporate control have changed dramatically since the 2010s.
Thirty years after the European Commission requested Robert Pennington to produce a draft directive, Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids was published. This chapter examines the Commission’s various proposals during this time and the manner in which both the nature of the Directive and its provisions changed. It analyses the Commission’s 1989 and 1997 proposals and Council’s 2000 Common Position focusing on the provisions that dealt with the General Principles, the supervisory authorities, board neutrality and the mandatory bid. It describes the subsequent conciliation process and the compromises reached in order to arrive in June 2001 at an approved text. Having recounted the dramatic rejection of this proposal by a tied vote in Parliament in July 2001, the chapter examines the role of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts in restarting the process and its introduction of the ‘breakthrough rule’. It then explores the Commission’s 2002 Proposal and the intense negotiations, lobbying and political manoeuvring in 2003 that led to a further compromise text in November 2003. The chapter concludes by noting the unenthusiastic reception from Member States and commentators and the obvious disappointment of the Commission at what it perceived as a watered-down proposal.
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