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The new central bank, the Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), was a monobank, and simply constituted a part of the planning process, very much under the control of the Finance Ministry, with substantial mobility of personnel at the top between the ministry and the bank. Many of the leading figures of the new bank came surprisingly from a background in the non-communist home army, Armia Krajowa. Gradually Western credits appeared again to be attractive or even necessary. They appeared to hold the way out of a dilemma. In theory, in a planned system there should be no inflation. But in practice, the central bank in the planning system presided over a regime of almost permanent excess demand, internal and external, to the point of leading to the identification of the economics of socialist planning with what the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai brilliantly diagnosed as “the economics of shortage.” The central bank was thus at the heart of a problem that constituted the major fault line in socialist society: If it tried to find ways of reducing the shortages by suggesting an increase in planned prices (that would mop up excess savings and demand), the result was mass protest.
The Introduction lays out the dilemma of modern central banks in terms of the “Odysseus contract” under which central bankers guide the ship of state safely through monetary turbulence, with wax stuffed in their ears so that they ignore calls for generosity and complaints about meanness, while the political master – Odysseus, the government, the people – agrees to be bound. Poland in the 1920s and again in the 1990s tried to establish such a central bank, in the wake of the reestablishment of the state. Important theorists conceptualized the central bank as part of an underground, alternative state, during moments of foreign rule: the nineteenth century division of Poland, the German occupation of 1939–45, and communist rule. Security considerations played a prominent role, and dictated the national importance of building up gold reserves, especially at moments of geopolitical strain.
The Złoty draws on recently available Polish archival material from central banks and international institutions to show how long-lived debates about inflation have been central in Polish political history. It offers surprising revelations about the drama of the evacuation and legal treatment of the central bank's gold after the German invasion of 1939 and the long struggle for economic and monetary reform while Poland was part of the Soviet system, going back to the late 1950s. It includes interwar and post-1990 sections that give an exemplary case of how a country on the periphery of the international economic system tried hard to integrate, ultimately failing in the first instance, while succeeding with dramatic success over the past thirty-five years. Written in gripping and non-technical language, this book offers a scholarly yet accessible account of Poland's struggles with inflation, foreign debt, and Nazi and communist rule.
Most European universities lag behind the best universities in the Anglo-Saxon world. A key challenge is to raise resources per student in Europe to US levels. The Lisbon agenda demands fundamental reform of the European university system in order to enhance efficiency, yet avoid grade inflation, to foster more competition, to allow for much larger private contributions accompanied by income-contingent student loans, and to attract larger numbers of foreign students. European universities will be pushed to compete with each other, to offer better incentives and to generate substantially more income. Universities will be stimulated to provide sufficient diversity and quality to meet the demands of a growing and diverse student body. Their ambition should be to educate the best minds in society irrespective of whether their parents are rich or poor, academically inclined or uneducated. A shift from grants to loans and an increase in tuition fees are justified by high returns. Reform should lead to a better and more equitable system of European universities.
Since the early 1930s, a broad acceptance of the need for social planning had been growing in Britain. Neurath naturally became involved in debates on this matter, not only with British and American scholars (C. H. Waddington and James Burnham) but with fellow Central European émigrés in the UK, Karl Mannheim and Friedrich Hayek. Neurath and Mannheim concurred on the possibility of ‘planning for freedom’, whereas Hayek feared that any socialist planning would lead inevitably to totalitarianism. Neurath took issue with this, not least in his reading of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, which can be reconstructed from Neurath’s copious notes in his own copy. Neurath’s ideas of the 1920s for a socialized ‘economy in kind’ were moderated by his situation in Britain, with its democratic ‘muddle’ of the 1940s. By contextualizing Neurath’s views in relation to other prominent figures of the era, we point out what made him unique among them.
With the emergence of big data and artificial intelligence, the feasibility of central planning has again become a popular topic. The essential feature of the planned economy is the use of systematic and institutional force to negate entrepreneurship and deprive individuals of the freedom to choose, especially the freedom to start a business and innovate. Can big data revive the planned economy? The essence of this question is: Can big data displace entrepreneurship? The impossibility of a big data-based planned economy is demonstrated from five perspectives (i.e. the nature of knowledge, the nature of entrepreneurial decisions, the distinction between risk and uncertainty, the importance of ideas, and the evolutionary view). In other words, big data cannot replace entrepreneurship. The false belief that central planning is possible with big data is extremely naïve.
When the Communist Party of China announced a new government on October 1, 1949, the economy that government inherited was in shambles. China had been at war for over twelve years and much of the infrastructure of the country had been destroyed or badly damaged and prices were rising at 51 percent per month or 13,000 percent per year. The Guomindang government fleeing to Taiwan took much of the country’s foreign-exchange and gold reserves with them, along with many of the managers of the banks and industrial firms. Inflation and war left many of the businesses that stayed barely able to function even when their managers and technicians did not flee.
Chapter 10 argues that the central contribution of Tinbergen is his decision models, which conceive of economic policy as the relation between instruments and goals. The chapter analyzes the way in which the original econometric models of the 1930s were transformed by Tinbergen (and Ragnar Frisch) into models for policymaking, in response to their new state positions. Tinbergen was director at the Central Planning Bureau in the Netherlands, which developed into the premier economic policy institute there. The transformation of econometric models into decision models no longer treated policy as a given, but instead treated behavioral economic relations as given, and the policy variables as decision variables, placing the economic expert inside the model. The chapter explores this fundamental transformation, and how it impacted Tinbergen’s own view of economics. He no longer believed that the primary goal was to describe the economic structure, but rather to design of (optimal) decision models to pursue targets. This was true at the firm and state levels. He sought to redefine crucial concepts such as unemployment and business cycles in policy terms. Finally, he used that transformation to analyze the optimal level of decision-making in the economy, a crucial insight for his later work.
Using recent advances in historical national accounts and scholarship of the region, this chapter depicts the economic development of eastern Europe from the times of the Habsburg monarchy and the Russian Empire before World War I through the turbulent interwar years, with the onset of the communist regime and socialist experiment in Russia, the spread of the centrally planned economic system and communist rule in the post-World War II decades, its collapse in the late 1980s and then a decade of transition to market economies. The chapter assesses the region’s economic performance in each of these periods. Even though the path of eastern Europe since the late nineteenth century has been one marked by a series of significant shocks, there were also significant continuities, so that the socialist ‘experiment’ did not result in the significant break with the past that its architects had envisaged.
Paternalist policymakers face a severe knowledge problem that is analogous to the knowledge problem faced by central planners. They do not and often cannot possess the kind of local and tacit knowledge needed to craft policy interventions that reliably improve human welfare. We provide a taxonomy of types of knowledge that paternalist planners need but typically do not have: true preferences, extent of bias, self-debiasing and small-group debiasing, dynamic impacts on self-regulation, counteracting behaviors, bias interactions, and population heterogeneity. We also critique two leading efforts to surmount knowledge problems of behavioral paternalism: the augmented revelatory frame approach and unified behavioral revealed preference.
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