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This chapter argues that two of the common methods used in behavioural and social sciences to reduce the chances that models overfit the available data, namely heavy reliance on benchmark models and rigorous parameter estimation techniques, can slow the advancement of these sciences. An examination of classical decision research highlights how applying these methods shaped the field but have also led to limited success. As an alternative, the chapter proposes a prediction-oriented approach to the development of behavioural models. Evaluating and comparing models based on their predictive power inherently guards against overfitting and also facilitates accumulation of knowledge. The chapter reviews research employing the prediction-oriented approach in behavioural decision research and demonstrates that, in contrast to a common misconception, the focus on predictions can also facilitate better understanding of the underlying processes.
Previous research demonstrates a large difference between decisions from description and decisions from experience, and also between decisions and probability judgment from experience. Comparison of decisions from description and from experience reveals a description–experience gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009): higher sensitivity to rare events in decisions from description. Comparison of judgment and decisions from experience reveals the coexistence of overestimation and underweighting of rare events (Barron & Yechiam, 2009). The current review suggests that both sets of differences are examples of the J/DM separation paradox: While separated studies of judgment and decision making reveal oversensitivity to rare events, without the separation, these processes often lead to the opposite bias. Our analysis shows that the J/DM paradox can be the product of the fact that the separation of judgment from decisions making requires an explicit presentation of the rare events, and this mere presentation increases the apparent weighting of these events. In addition, our analysis suggests that feedback diminishes the mere presentation effect, but does not guarantee increase in rational behavior. When people can rely on accurate feedback, the main deviations from rational judgment and decision making can be captured with the reliance on the small samples hypothesis.
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