War and society scholarship has changed how historians understand the Korean War, reinterpreting the concept of civil-military relations to broaden its reach, introduce new voices, and incorporate fresh perspectives. The traditional model of civil-military relations centers on the linear interactions between a policy maker, who outlines objectives, and the senior commander tasked with implementing military actions to achieve those desired ends. The clash between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur is the most iconic example of this conventional approach and has held sway over much of the literature. However, there are numerous more subtle instances of civil-military relations during the Korean War that illuminate the valuable contributions that war and society scholarship has made to our understanding of this conflict and that highlight the significant possibilities of expanding our conception of civil-military relations writ large. This chapter explores how unpreparedness for the Korean War collided with the structural racism inherent in the nation’s segregated military, producing significant consequences for both the U.S. military and American society.

In lieu of a traditional introduction, the editors elected to invite leading scholars to open the volume with a roundtable, inviting discussion and debate over the value, limits, and contributions of war and society studies to understanding the American experience of war. In a robust conversation prompted by questions from the editors, these prominent scholars tackled the question at the very heart of the volume—what defines the study of war and society? Their conversation is followed by commentary from a scholar who offers a counterpoint from the vantage point of military history. The introduction closes with some concluding thoughts from the editors and a roadmap for the volume that follows. The volume’s subsequent essays grapple, explicitly or implicitly, with the ideas laid out in the opening roundtable. The authors collectively aim to help define and elevate the field of war and society by showcasing its approaches, its promise, its sensitivities, and its possibilities. The volume overall stands as a collaborative declaration of the ambitions, character, and future of the field of war and society.

The American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the smaller conflicts in between helped to define who Americans became. They pursued Indian lands and freedom from impressment and British trade restrictions. These wars altered political boundaries, brought social hierarchies into sharp relief, and disoriented people’s sense of identity. Their wartime experiences shaped fighting men as well as civilians. New scholarship on war and society during the Revolutionary Era takes the actions of marginalized groups seriously, attempting to understand the experiences and allegiances of women, Black people, and Indigenous people as well as internal conflicts among whites. Recent work also explores the harshness of wartime conduct, from destruction of homes to the treatment of prisoners and civilians. These wars transformed society by forcing questions of national inclusion, cultural interaction, and racial exclusion; gendered violence and gendered upheavals; the ennobling and degradation of rank-and-file soldiers, deserters, and prisoners of war. Unmistakably an era of brutality, dispossession, and enslavement, these wars etched enduring patterns for the future of the United States.

For many U.S. military leaders, the Vietnam War was the first time they confronted the limits of American power overseas. More and more, the word “stalemate” crept into their wartime evaluations, raising important questions for war and society historians. How do uniformed leaders deal with frustration, even failure, in times of war? In Vietnam, how did military officers managing the war effort react when their expectations came up short? What perspectives might we gain from their disappointments? This essay evaluates how the American armed forces in Vietnam handled their frustrations when confronted with disappointment and failure. Exasperation over the limits of their power shaped Americans’ wartime experiences. Dissatisfaction contributed to increased civil-military tensions and to military leaders obscuring the truth from an increasingly war-weary public. Soldiers’ frustrations led them sometimes to elevate personal interests and instigate violence against the local South Vietnamese population when their efforts failed to support larger strategic objectives. Frustration and failure became emblematic of America’s participation in a long and bloody Southeast Asian civil war.

The 2009 strategy review resulted in the most consequential decisions of the war. While scholars and historians have typically focused on the surge of 30,000 additional troops, the administration’s strategy was not simply to add more troops. Obama rejected the logic that to defeat al-Qaida required defeating the Taliban and made an explicit decision not to seek the Taliban’s defeat – but he also chose to escalate the war against them anyway. Instead, Obama adopted a vague goal of “reversing their momentum,” while training Afghan security forces. That was muddled enough, but he undermined even those goals by adopting a public withdrawal timetable for US troops and failing to coordinate the surge with reconstruction and diplomatic efforts. Coupled with internal miscommunications, tensions with the military, and a growing attitude of pessimism, the changes introduced in the December 2009 strategy hamstrung the surge and set the course for the rest of Obama’s presidency.

The introductory chapter sets up the empirical puzzle of the book: Paradoxically, while large swaths of the Israeli electorate have long thought of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “Mr. Security,” the Israeli security community has for decades viewed him as a security liability. The Israeli public’s general indifference to the years’ long, publicly expressed views of senior veterans of the security establishment is a fascinating and important phenomenon this book aims to explain. The book’s twofold argument is stated here: First, a chasm characterizes the relationship between the Israeli national security community and Netanyahu – on a personal level but also in terms of his approach toward national security; second, that three interconnected trends explain the security establishment’s diminished status in Israeli society: Perceived military debacles since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; the disintegration of the political left in the aftermath of the second Intifada, with the security community being a casualty of the left’s collapse given its association with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and the rise of populist nationalism in Israel. Following a historical survey of civil-military relations in Israel, this chapter concludes with a description of the book’s structure.

Chapter 4 begins with a look at the decline of the IDF’s once-unassailable reputation due to perceived failures on the battlefield. In the aftermath of the debacle of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF underwent important changes, mirroring changes in Israeli society, which negatively impacted the generals’ role in shaping public opinion. The second Intifada, moreover, led the general public to conclude that Israel lacked a Palestinian negotiating partner – a widely accepted opinion that has been firmly entrenched in Israeli society in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The “no partner” mantra has further diminished the generals’ clout given the security establishment’s association with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This chapter also addresses the implications of the national religious camp’s ascent and its increased influence in both the IDF and in the political arena.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rise of populist nationalism in Israel. The collapse of what was once called the “peace camp” at the start of the century opened up the political space for nationalist politicians to link the security establishment with “the failed left” given its close association with the Oslo peace process. The continuous attacks by populist-nationalist politicians on the top echelon of the army and intelligence services must be seen as part of the broader pattern of assaults on state institutions including the courts and the media – all targeted as part of the maligned “leftist” elite. The security officials who have challenged the right’s policies – particularly, its approach toward the Palestinians – have found themselves ostracized and, in some cases, their careers cut short for their so-called “leftist” agenda. Senior veterans of the security establishment, who are more free to speak their minds, have likewise found themselves targeted by populist politicians on the right in an effort to neutralize the criticisms and dire warnings often issued by ex-generals and retired heads of the Mossad and Shin Bet security services.

Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, synthesizes the key themes discussed in this book and summarizes the central conclusions drawn from the empirical research and why they matter. The practical implications of the book’s research findings include potentially open disobedience by the IDF top brass of orders as a developing norm; an ever-escalating clash over values and incongruous visions for Israel’s future between the security community and the messianic religious-right; the delegitimization of institutions that serve as the gatekeepers of Israeli democracy, such as the media, the courts, human rights NGOs, and even the IDF; and significant economic and political repercussions for Israel if it ceases to be a liberal democracy.

Chapter 1 focuses on the Israeli security community’s desire to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, a sentiment that serves as the basis for the security veterans’ disproportionate support for the two-state solution. This chapter explores the assessments of the security establishment from the 1967 War to the Oslo peace process of the 1990s to the breakdown of the peace process in the 2000s. It shows that proposals for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were submitted by the IDF and intelligence services to the Eshkol government even before the conclusion of the 1967 “Six Day” War. Two decades later, the IDF top brass played an important role during the first Intifada in prodding the Rabin-led government to pursue peace talks with the PLO. During the second Intifada in the early 2000s, retired senior security establishment officials urged Prime Minister Sharon to resume peace diplomacy with the Palestinians. As this chapter shows, Israeli governments have varied in their commitment to pursuing a deal with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution, often putting them at odds with the national security community.

Chapter 3 focuses on the policy disagreements with the security community in the period following Netanyahu’s return to power in 2009, a decade after he lost his reelection to Barak. His dismissal of the two-state solution and aggressive settlement policy in the West Bank; his approach toward Hamas-led Gaza; and key aspects of his policy aimed at thwarting Iran’s nuclear program have encountered serious opposition by the security establishment and retired senior security officials. This chapter describes how civil-military tensions spiked following the formation of Netanyahu’s sixth government in December 2022 and its pursuit of its highly controversial legal overhaul.

Netanyahu’s worldview, his modus operandi, and the significant steps he has taken to keep the generals at bay are explored in Chapter 2. It is argued that he is a pragmatic hardliner – a lifelong right-wing ideologue and opponent of Palestinian statehood who nevertheless has displayed flexibility, enabling him to remain coy about his territorial vision for Israel. A master manipulator of the media, he has cultivated an image of himself as “Mr. Security” and sought, early on, to exclude the IDF generals from the decision-making process, associating them with the political left and seeing them as potential rivals. The security community, for its part, sees Netanyahu not as “Mr. Security” but, rather, as a politician who routinely places his personal and political interests ahead of national security concerns.

This chapter traces the Army’s rehabilitation of its reputation in the wake of the Vietnam War. Two features were central to this transformation: the first was the advent of the All-Volunteer Force and the post-Vietnam reforms to Army training, equipment and doctrine. After a shaky start, the All-Volunteer Force’s success normalised the notion of soldiering as an occupation rather than an obligation, and reforms seemed to create a much more professional and competent force than the one that was wracked by unrest and uncertainty. Second, the Army’s performance in Operation Desert Storm affirmed this narrative of professionalism and competence. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the aftermath of the war. The celebrations that took place to welcome home Gulf War veterans stood out as the largest seen in the United States since the end of World War II. Representing a crucial moment in the American public’s deepening veneration for US soldiers and veterans, the Gulf War celebrations marked a turning point when the Vietnam-era image of the soldier as a broken or rebellious draftee was finally and purposefully eclipsed by the notion of the volunteer service member as hero.