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This chapter discusses empirical evidence for a range of decision procedures underlying individuals’ choices in games. These include (1) quantal response equilibria. These are stochastic choice models where a player does not best reply to their beliefs, but instead chooses actions with a higher expected payoff with a higher probability. It also includes (2) cognitive hierarchy models where, roughly speaking, players possess different, discrete levels of cognition. A level-0 player chooses some fixed anchor strategy. And, recursively, having fixed the strategies of players of level 0,...,k-1, a level-k player best responds to a belief that all other players are of a lower level. Lastly, it includes (3) a variety of learning models.
A reading of the literature on cognitive hierarchies leaves the impression that a subject’s type is predetermined before she comes into the lab so that the distribution of types is exogenous and immutable across games. In this chapter we view the choice of a person’s cognitive level as endogenous and explain it by focusing on subject’s ’expectations about the cognitive levels endogenously chosen by others. We run a set of experiments using the two-thirds guessing game where subjects receive public advice offered by a set of advisors. We discover that certain types of public advice, those that are commonly interpreted as meaningful, are capable of shifting the distribution of observed cognitive types, indicating that the distribution is endogenous.
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