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This chapter argues that disproportionate police brutality against Black people is a fact of every American generation because the systems of oversight are not designed to deter it. The history of unchecked misconduct shows that criminal charges are almost unheard of because police criminality is not perceived as criminal. Civil constraints also face numerous structural obstacles--from a failure to monitor to a range of doctrinal roadblocks judges have imposed on federal civil rights laws. Many cases never get to court because of administrative hurdles drafted into collective bargaining agreements. Despite a small number of exceptions, the consistent result is a mutual lack of trust between Black communities and the public safety officers they count on and a systemic lack of deterrence when policing goes wrong.
Pay structures and collective bargaining are central to compensation management. This chapter explores how salary bands, job classifications, and union negotiations impact internal pay equity. It examines how organizations balance fairness, employee expectations, and market competitiveness when setting pay ranges. Topics include the impact of unions on wages, how pay compression affects employee morale, and strategies for effective collective bargaining. By understanding these dynamics, managers can better design compensation systems that align with business and workforce needs.
This chapter is dedicated to Article 101(1) TFEU balancing tools. It examines tools aimed at balancing competition with state or public interests, such as the state action defence, notion of undertakings, Article 106(2) TFEU exception for services of general economic interests, the exception for collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees, and the inherent restriction doctrine. The chapter also studies tools for balancing competition and commercial interests, such as the rule of reason, objectively necessary agreements, ancillary restraints, and the de minimis doctrine. The chapter shows that unlike most of the explicit-substantive balancing tools that are based on EU primary or secondary law and which were largely developed by the Commission, the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU does not explicitly refer to a balancing function. Rather, the balancing tools of Article 101(1) TFEU are predominantly derived from the CJEU’s case law. It reveals that the CJEU introduced those tools to counterbalance the Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition falling within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court has held that agreements restricting the commercial freedom of parties might escape the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU if they are necessary for attaining social or efficiency-related goals.
This chapter is dedicated to Article 101(1) TFEU balancing tools. It examines tools aimed at balancing competition with state or public interests, such as the state action defence, notion of undertakings, Article 106(2) TFEU exception for services of general economic interests, the exception for collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees, and the inherent restriction doctrine. The chapter also studies tools for balancing competition and commercial interests, such as the rule of reason, objectively necessary agreements, ancillary restraints, and the de minimis doctrine. The chapter shows that unlike most of the explicit-substantive balancing tools that are based on EU primary or secondary law and which were largely developed by the Commission, the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU does not explicitly refer to a balancing function. Rather, the balancing tools of Article 101(1) TFEU are predominantly derived from the CJEU’s case law. It reveals that the CJEU introduced those tools to counterbalance the Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes a restriction of competition falling within the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Court has held that agreements restricting the commercial freedom of parties might escape the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU if they are necessary for attaining social or efficiency-related goals.
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