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Our ordinary ideas of protest take it to be a collective act: many individuals assembledto form a group entity. Connected to this ordinary assumption is the expectation that they assemble with purpose: a protest consists of people gathered to do something together. This chapter examines these ordinary ideas, arguing that political collectivity is at once a criterion of protest as well as a performative effect of gathering publicly. Protest is the deliberate activity of a political agent. Based on public discourses about the two gatherings, the chapter reconstructs unity, order, and intention as conventions of political collectivity. As evidenced in the Riots/Uprising, gatherings that appear only unified can also appear to be wild, frenzied mobs. Public characterizations of the anti-Prop. 187 march suggest that a sense of order and shared intention lends political rationality to a collective. It is this political collective that is retroactively imputed to be the agent who has initiated and managed the act of protest. Revealed in our ordinary ideas of protest is an instrumental, subject-centered logic of politics.
Chapter 6 builds on the argument of Chapter 5. Whereas Chapter 5 shows that people can be morally responsible as individuals for actions outside of their core agency, Chapter 6 extends this argument to groups. It first shows that it makes intuitive sense to think of European-descended people as a group. Then, philosophically, the chapter develops the views of Christopher Kutz and Tracy Isaacs, to show that having an implicit intention is sufficient to satisfy a participatory intention in a collective action. And even if European-descended people are prevented by white ignorance from understanding how their actions contribute to a historical pattern of racial domination, still this does not shield members of this group from responsibility for this collective undertaking. Individuals in this collective undertaking are responsible not only for their own contributions to the project but also for the collective's contribution as a whole. And so, in this way, contemporary European-descended people are responsible for the overall actions of the group and the larger project of racial domination.
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