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Constitutional heteronomy, understood as a viable balance between autonomy and heteronomy, represents a core difficulty in democratic decision-making. Framed within Kant’s transcendental balance between private and public autonomy, it rests on two interrelated normative demands: countering inhibitive heteronomy by eliminating impediments to citizens’ equal standing and fostering affirmative heteronomy by enabling their intersubjective engagement. This second prospect proves structurally elusive. Default reliance on majority rule yields truncated rather than substantively robust forms of aggregation. To illustrate, the article considers two influential theoretical perspectives: Republican majoritarianism, as in Waldron and Bellamy, grounds the legitimacy of majority decisions in the twin imperatives of political equality and the need to resolve persistent disagreement. Yet this decisionist conception remains ill-equipped to confront the problem of civic decoupling associated with a routine reliance on majoritarian procedures. Habermas’ deliberative reformulation of majoritarianism seeks to address this gap by grounding the legitimacy of majority will-formation in discourse ethics, an aspiration that sits uneasily with the empirical realities of the public sphere. I argue that neither egalitarian nor deliberative accounts provide a definitive framework for addressing the heteronomous potential of majority rule, which exposes the infeasibility of substantive aggregation and thereby the undecidability of constitutional heteronomy.
The renewed interest of constitutional scholars in the role of the armed forces in West Africa is so far focused on the francophone countries in the region. This article shifts the attention to anglophone West Africa by analysing the military’s position and interdependence in the constitutions of the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Building on the idea of including the armed forces in a framework of separation of powers, it appreciates the military’s constitutional position beyond its executive role as a separate constitutional actor and makes visible its interdependence also in relation to the other branches of government. As becomes clear through such a perspective, the military’s constitutional entrenchment in anglophone West Africa continues to be shaped by a number of “secured benefits” of past military regimes. In addition, some further vulnerabilities become visible that demand constitutional reform.
This book presents an original account of anarchism as a tradition of constitutional thought and a novel theorisation of anarchist constitutional practice. It exposes the statist impasse in conventional constitutionalism to reconnect anarchism to debates in political theory, International Relations and critical legal theory about the constitutional crisis in global politics. The reconstruction is based on a fresh reading of historical anarchist thought and co-produced research examining the constitutional practices of three inspirational grassroots movements: the Industrial Workers of the World, the Occupy Oakland encampment, and the UK workers and housing co-op Radical Routes. Grounding anarchism in an ontology of anarchy that was informed by a distinctively anarchist approach to social science, the book engages with concepts of power, division and balance familiar in liberal and republican constitutionalism and subverts constitutionalism by developing an constitutional architecture without permanent, fixed authority. The book discusses the work of a raft of anarchist thinkers, from Proudhon to Lucy Parsons, Tolstoy to Kotoku Shusui, all of whom developed decentralised federalist alternatives to old imperial orders and shows how their ideas resonate more or less consciously in anarchist movements. Dispelling myths about the incompatibility of anarchism and constitutionalism, it argues that the practice of anarchist constitutionalising can be replicated, mimicked and extended by everyone.
This chapter presents an overview of the praxis of late twentieth-century alterglobalisation movements to explain why the statist assumptions of traditional or mainstream constitutionalism have been called into question and builds the theoretical framework for an anarchist constitutional politics by reviewing the half turns to anarchism in five disciplinary : post-Marxism, societal constitutionalism, republican political theory, International Relations, and anarchist legal theory. Highlighting the anarchistic sensibility of the literature on global constitutionalism, we outline a four-part model architecture for the anarchist constitution. As constitutionalists, we argue, anarchists have an acute sociological predisposition to identify domination and injustice, and they invoke the constitution to challenge and balance power.
This article extends Eric Voegelin’s analysis of symbolic forms to modern constitutionalism. Voegelin viewed symbols not merely as functional or superficially representative, but as articulations of reality. Therefore, this article proposes “permeability” as a core diagnostic concept. It constructs a novel symbolic framework for secular politics that establishes a creative tension between foundational “ontological human rights” and specific “practical human rights.” This article explores Voegelin’s concept of “reflective distance” to outline a potential method for analyzing the coherence between constitutional symbols and the state of national consciousness. It thereby lays the philosophical groundwork for assessing a symbolic framework’s health.
Anarchism is often assumed to stand outside constitutionalism, yet it forms a significant, if overlooked, tradition of constitutional thought. Addressing global constitutional crises and the impasses of state-centred politics, this book brings anarchism into productive dialogue with constitutional, political and international theory. At its core is a reconstruction of anarchist social theory grounded in an ontology of anarchy shaped by European social science and republican concerns with dividing and balancing power. These ideas were reinterpreted by major anarchist thinkers - from Proudhon to Lucy Parsons, and from Tolstoy to Kōtoku Shūsui - who advanced decentralised, federalist alternatives to imperial and hierarchical orders. Combining intellectual history with co-produced research alongside anarchist groups, Constitutionalising Anarchy shows how constitutional practices developed within militant labour unions, protest movements and cooperatives across the twentieth century. It reconsiders anarchy, constitutionalism and the possibilities of political organisation. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
Carbon competence refers to individuals’ knowledge and understanding concerning the causes and impacts of greenhouse gas concentrations. Using a robust and expansive version of the concept, this essay poses the question of whether contemporary democratic theory demonstrates carbon competence. I argue that prevailing approaches reveal low carbon competence in two respects: implicit or explicit underestimation of the scope and severity of the ecological crisis, and commitment to normative strictures that actively discourage the possibility of rapid decarbonization. As exemplary models, I foreground the work of Nadia Urbinati, Cristina Lafont, and Hélène Landemore.
This chapter first situates the book’s argument in the context of two global phenomena: the proliferation of hybrid regimes and the diffusion of court-centric constitutionalism. It then shows why a normative look at constitutional courts in hybrid regimes is an important, but overlooked topic in the literature. Next, the operating assumptions of the book are specified, and basic terms are defined, including constitutional courts and democracy. The chapter concludes by offering a roadmap of the book.
The paper introduces the concept of ‘eco-digital constitutionalism’ to denote one of the latest offsprings of digital constitutionalism that, building on environmental constitutionalism, articulates rights and principles to face the ecological challenges of the digital revolution. We propose this concept as an analytical lens synthesising digital and environmental dimensions to study the response to the specific constitutional challenges of the twin transition: a convergence often overlooked by environmental or digital constitutionalism in isolation. In particular, the article leverages this new concept to investigate the emergence of digital sustainability principles within the EU, positioning the Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles as a catalytic normative blueprint. To contrast the Declaration’s fragmented structure, we develop a typology of three digital sustainability principles. We employ this categorisation as a parameter to conduct a socio-legal study of constitutionalisation of digital sustainability principles across EU member states. By examining a spectrum of sources, including constitutions, ordinary laws, policy documents and digital charters, our empirical findings reveal a process in its infancy, with no formal constitutional recognition and relegated to isolated pieces of legislation. On the contrary, policy documents remain the laboratory of digital sustainability principles, and digital charters display an effort to shift from principles to rights.
The present article articulates and defends a version of constitutionalism that is only present in a few jurisdictions around the world: unwritten constitutionalism. Far from being irrelevant or unconnected, however, the operation of constitutionalism within unwritten constitutional settings has a great deal to offer to the theory and practice of constitutional studies. In doing so, we uphold the use of ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ terminology, differentiate unwritten constitutionalism from other types of constitutionalism and argue that the insights of unwritten constitutionalism are crucial given the global turn to more authoritarian types of government. Examining some of the indicative features of unwritten constitutionalism, the article goes on to explore what lessons unwritten constitutionalism may be able to bring to written settings. By further unpacking the mystery of the unwritten constitution, we hope to make this unique form of constitutionalism more accessible and relevant to those that acknowledge constitutional text is not the end of the story.
This article argues that the current Anglican Communion crisis is best understood as constitutional erosion: the weakening of shared norms that historically mediated disagreement through recognizable form, restraint and reception. Doctrinal and moral disputes function as triggers, but the deeper driver is the loss of a common grammar of legitimacy, so that procedurally valid provincial actions can be constitutionally unintelligible to other provinces. The article interprets key African and Global South interventions not primarily as theological or cultural reaction but as contested constitutional reasoning rooted in episcopal guardianship, communion discipline and inherited catholic order. It analyses the Global Anglican Future Conference and Global South instruments as substitute constitutional documents generated by the incapacity of the Instruments of Communion to secure effective restraint and proposes a minimal inter-provincial accord: clarified instrument authority, operationalized reception, limited covenantal discipline and a standing advisory process for communion impairment.
This chapter introduces the U.S. Constitution by exploring its purposes, functions, and significance as a written document, contrasting it with Britain’s unwritten constitutional system. It argues that a written constitution limits governmental power, including legislative authority, unlike the British system of parliamentary supremacy. The chapter traces the American shift in the 1760s toward viewing constitutions as superior laws fixed by the people’s consent and enforceable against the legislature. It outlines the settlement functions of constitutions – establishing government structures, ensuring stability, and channeling disputes – emphasizing how written constitutions enhance these functions. The chapter further examines the ends of free government, balancing liberty and order through democratic self-governance and the protection of natural rights, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s preamble. It introduces the Constitution’s structural features – separation of powers, federalism, checks and balances – while addressing critiques of its alleged undemocratic nature and introducing the Founders’ intent to create republican remedies for the diseases most incident to republican government.
We are sometimes told that the Declaration is an airy statement about individual rights, whereas the Constitution does the hard work of structuring a government. This Part argues that the Declaration is primarily concerned, not with individual rights, but with the structure of government. That is, how do we structure a government so that our rights are most reliably protected? And the answer is not as little government as possible, but a competently structured government, subject to the rule of law, that works for the benefit of the people.
This groundbreaking volume shatters many longstanding myths about the Declaration of Independence. Although states-rights advocates have long claimed that the Declaration created thirteen independent nations, Carlton F. W. Larson shows that the Declaration announced the birth of a new nation: the United States of America, a nation governed by an unwritten constitution in which the states were confederated and subject to national authority from the very beginning. Larson counters libertarian claims that the Declaration views government as a necessary evil, demonstrating instead how it embraces constitutionalism, active government, and the rule of law as positive goods. Along the way, Larson debunks other myths, such as the notion that the Declaration is the parchment text enshrined in the National Archives and that it was authored by Thomas Jefferson. By exploring the true meaning of the Declaration of Independence, One Nation Under Law helps us better understand America itself.
This chapter follows Tocqueville in arguing that civic culture must support formal learning in schools and colleges, by providing a social spirit of reflective patriotism. A particular challenge given America’s civic fracture of angry polarization, but also widespread apathy, is to motivate citizens to care about America, citizenship education, and a discursive patriotism; thus, civics now should emphasize stories of American hope and achievement, forging an e pluribus unum out of our pluralism. It then develops the sections: (a) E Pluribus Unum and Civic Hope: Jazz, Constitutionalism, Religious Liberty – with subsections on (i) American Story and Song, Especially Jazz – featuring the Ray Charles version of American the Beautiful, Justice O’Connor and Wynton Marsalis in conversation, and jazz pioneers such as Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, and Benny Goodman, (ii) The Declaration and Constitution as Achievements of Harmony, and (iii) Religious Liberty and Pluralism as American Harmony, featuring George Washington, Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr.
The chapter discusses how the Gulf republics, namely Iran and Iraq, have distinct political cultures shaped by historical factors. In contrast, the monarchies, often underestimated by rentier theory, have exhibited resilience and adaptability. The analysis encompasses the Gulf states’ political institutions, examining the role of constitutions, electoral chambers, and guarantees of political and civil liberties. It highlights the political diversity within the Gulf subregion, showcasing various political systems beyond simplistic labels of ‘republic’ or ‘monarchy’. Despite these apparent structures, the chapter underscores the limitations on political and civil activities, judicial independence and press freedom in the Gulf. The discussion delves into the nuanced nature of political activism, from platforms in Iraq and Iran to the emergence of political tendencies in Bahrain and Kuwait. The text further explores the use of force to suppress dissent in various Gulf states, leading to a lack of transparency and the absence of the rule of law. Finally, the chapter assesses the IDEA ratings, revealing the subregion’s generally low scores on the ‘democratic index’. Despite the challenges and limitations, the Gulf states remain dynamic entities with diverse political organisations, and in the absence of shocks or geopolitical disruptions, the author anticipates an evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in these countries’ political systems.
This chapter revisits Sadr’s production from the mid-1970s until his execution in 1980, analyzing two overlooked texts – Manabi‘ al-Qudra fi al-Dawla al-Islamiyya and Al-Madrasa al-Qur’aniyya – that challenge portrayals of Sadr as an unequivocal supporter of Khomeini and Wilayat al-Faqih. These writings reflect Sadr’s engagement with Arab Leftist thought and Marxist determinism, as well as his commitment to developing a political theology centered on human agency. In contrast to Khomeini’s model of absolute clerical guardianship, Sadr advanced a participatory theory of Islamic government. His writings articulated the cultural and civilizational aims of Islamic governance. Notably, Sadralso staged a rare intervention on veiling and gender norms, marking a striking but forgotten episode. The chapter situates Sadr’s thought within ideological currents of the 1970s, including intra-Shi‘i debates in Iraq, the emergence of the Islamic Left, and evolving conceptions of turath (heritage). It argues that Sadr’s vision represented a distinctive alternative to both leftist models and clerical authoritarianism: a Shi‘i Islamic framework for cultural renewal, moral agency, and constitutionalism. By theorizing an Islamic notion of free will and social contract, Sadr carved out a critical space within post-1967 Arab political thought – one that remains vital to rethinking modern Islamic political thought.
Chapter 1 draws on the history of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine to distinguish two conceptions of sovereign equality under international law. It argues that that international law in the twentieth century embraced a constitutional and equitable conception of sovereign equality, generating state obligations to cooperate with one another to resolve disputes over matters of common concern in accordance with equitable principles.
The encounter with the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led some prominent thinkers in East Asia to painfully grapple with the questions of constitutional government and democratic self-government by embracing the discourse of rights and the political systems of Western origin in a way suitable in the local Confucian context. However, the seminal Confucian constitutional discourse did not see its full fruition due to various, often tragic, historical events, including civil wars and national divisions. In the end, the rise of modern states in the region, liberal democratic or communist, made the idea of Confucian constitutionalism completely obsolete in the public discourse, reinforcing the popular belief propagated by (liberal or socialist) elites that Confucianism was the single greatest obstacle to modernizing East Asian states and societies.
This book offers a selection of key texts mostly written by leading figures in the history of Spanish American political thought during the first century of independence. Political thinkers in the region had to grapple with rather unique and extraordinary circumstances after three centuries of Spanish colonial rule. The emergence of a significant number of new independent polities that adopted representative institutions in an era when absolutism still prevailed in Western Europe, their general adoption of republicanism (except for Mexico during the brief rule of Agustín de Iturbide in 1822–1823, and Maximilian in 1864–1867), and their complex demographic composition, all posed serious challenges for the formation and consolidation of national states in Spanish America. In dialogue with the major currents of thought in Western Europe and North America, Spanish American thinkers often reflected upon these and other related problems while being politically engaged, either in government or in opposition.