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In this chapter, I test the book’s first two hypotheses regarding which leaders contribute to regional security operations and receive support from co-members in return. I expect that leaders with the greatest need for RIOs’ protective benefits – heads of state facing high coup risk – are the most motivated to remain in good standing with co-members who are able to intervene on their side during security crises. In statistical analyses at the RIO-state-year level of analysis, I find that leaders most prone to irregular removal through coups are indeed more likely to deploy security personnel in support of co-members. The chapter also presents tests of the second hypothesis derived from the theory: that leaders who contribute personnel to support RIO co-members increase their odds of receiving protection. Quantitative tests again provide evidence consistent with the theory. The RIO co-members are more likely to deploy troops in support of leaders with prior records of security cooperation in these four RIOs with mutual defense pacts.
This chapter develops the theory of regional cooperation driven by mutual interest in stability and protection for heads of state. It also provides justifications for the theory’s top-down focus on the interests of heads of state within RIOs, which are often considered actors in their own right. The chapter contextualizes the book’s focus on leader survival, and presents the argument regarding why some heads of state turn to RIOs and co-members as part of their multipronged survival strategies. The chapter elaborates on the criteria of “good standing,” and the salience of good standing for RIO members. The chapter also considers alternative explanations and whether they generate similar predictions regarding regional cooperation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of observable implications and testable hypotheses derived from the theory, for which I provide evidence in the remainder of the book.
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