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This chapter examines how political polarization reshapes our understanding of courts – especially supreme and constitutional courts – at the level of theory and institutional design. We first revisit leading justifications for judicial review (formal, process, deliberative/dialogical, and substantive) and show how advancing polarization erodes their premises: breakdowns of social consensus and public reason unsettle deliberative and process accounts; cognitive and affective polarization strain formalism’s promise of neutral application; and only a strong substantive-rights theory plausibly survives, by recasting courts as guardians against anti-democratic threats. We then analyze core court features often thought to mitigate polarization – structured reason-giving, fact-centered adjudication, rights to a hearing, gridlock relief, and legal continuity – and explain why, once courts and litigants are themselves polarized, these features lose traction. Finally, we identify attributes that can intensify polarization – binary winner-take-all rulings, moralization of outcomes, and democratic deficits – especially as courts drift towards partisanship. The chapter sets up our comparative analysis of polarized judiciaries in subsequent chapters and beyond.
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