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This chapter analyses the relationship between takeover bids and corporate sustainability. Specifically, we ask how boards (should) deal with sustainability issues under company law, including national rules implementing the EU Takeover Directive, either before or after the launch of a takeover bid, especially if the bid is hostile. Resistance to hostile bids motivated by ESG considerations was undoubtedly unlikely at the time of the adoption of the Directive, when takeover bids were mainly aimed at increasing shareholder value and the protection of stakeholder interests mainly concerned creditors and employees. After a brief introduction to the economic and legal literature, we present three case studies in which a hostile bid was either rejected by the target board for reasons that included sustainability concerns, or accepted by the target board for reasons that mainly concerned shareholder value. We then discuss whether and to what extent the target board’s resistance to a hostile bid could be based on sustainability concerns. We also consider whether and to what extent defensive measures could be justified by the target board’s sustainability concerns.
This chapter starts by generally providing an overview of the problem, i.e. the cross-border situation, and the solutions that are given by conflict of laws through its typical methods. It then proceeds with an analysis of how choice of law intersects takeover law. Even though the Takeover Directive addresses the problem, spaces are inexorably left for the typical choice-of-law characterization issues, at the frontiers between matters relating to the bid procedure and matters relating to company law, each potentially subject to the laws of different Member States (see Article 4(2)(e) of the Directive). Keeping in mind the different connecting factors for the lex mercatus and the lex societatis, this chapter addresses particular questions raised by cross-border takeovers, trying to find legal strategies to solve them. These include rules on information, on corporate governance and on defensive measures. Also recent developments concerning corporate sustainability are mentioned, taking them into consideration while pondering whether current societal and ecological concerns should operate as a justification for allowing boards of companies to defend against cross-border takeover bids.
This chapter examines the defensive measures provisions of the EU Takeover Directive of 2004 in the light of the changing policy orientation of both the EU Commission and the Member States towards the role of takeovers in relation to industrial policy. As far as the Commission is concerned, it charts a decline from initial enthusiasm for the threat of the hostile takeover as a central tool for promoting the Union’s industrial policy, via acceptance that the Directive would not achieve this goal because of Member State opposition, to at least partial acceptance of the arguments against making the control of companies contestable. The second half of the chapter analyses whether the failure of the Commission’s initial plans for defensive measures can truly be regarded as a missed opportunity, because those proposals would have been of limited importance, even if enacted. The chapter concludes that the ‘shareholder structure’ and ‘pre-bid defences’ versions of the argument that the Commission’s proposals were trivial carry more weight than the argument that other provisions of national company law already achieved the Commission’s goal.
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