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In this chapter, I argue that John employs the increasing tension between divine presence and absence to transfer the negative consequences commonly associated with divine absence from those who believe in Jesus to the unbelieving world. I first survey Graeco-Roman epiphanic narratives to demonstrate a common expectation that violent divine judgment was expected against those who failed to discern and rightly respond to a manifestation of divine presence. I then examine three key passages which depict Jesus’s staged departure from the Jerusalem temple (8:31–59; 10:22–40; 12:20–50). I argue that John’s understated narrative of this departure activates the expectation for violent divine judgment, which John then subverts in order to portray Jesus’s departure and physical absence from the world as God’s judgment on unbelief. The chapter then considers the implications of construing Jesus’s departure and absence as divine judgment and how they illuminate contested areas in scholarship, including the timing of Jesus’s departure, John’s use of a descending-ascending redeemer motif, and John’s depiction of those he labels “the Jews”.
Scholars have long recognized John's dual focus on Jesus's relationship to God's presence and his impending physical absence. Yet attention to Jesus's absence is often restricted to the Farewell Discourse. Josiah D. Hall here provides an innovative reading of John's Gospel, arguing that tension between Jesus's presence and absence develops throughout the narrative and is integral to the Gospel's plot. Drawing on sources from across the ancient Mediterranean basin, Hall contends that John leverages conceptions of how deities would manifest their presence to clarify that Jesus is the enfleshed divine presence. Likewise, John depicts Jesus's absence by drawing on motifs of divine departure, especially those which understand a deity's absence as judgment. Attending closely to the paradoxical import of Jesus's presence and absence in John, Hall provides insights on classic Johannine riddles, including John's perspectives on the temple, the characters he labels as 'the Jews', and the Spirit-Paraclete's relationship to Jesus.
Chapter 4 tests the claim that the biblical god Yhwh is uniquely aggressive by rereading two biblical royal psalms, Psalms 89 and Psalm 132.These royal psalms share many features with the royal psalms of Chapter 3—but they differ in one crucial respect: where all the previous royal psalms exempted Yhwh’s favoured king from experiencing divine aggression, Psalms 89 and 132 reflect Yhwh’s past aggression exactly towards his own king. The chapter thus identifies these texts as psalms of defeat because in them, a past event of divinely sponsored damage to the king comes to speech: and shocked and alarmed speech at that, particularly in Psalm 89. As such, they begin to articulate a unique theological contribution with regard to divine aggression: a real departure from the unconditional loyalty of a patron god for his individual, favoured king.
Divine determinists face several problems related to divine commands, the divine will, and divine blame. First, if God sometimes wills that divine commands are broken (which seems to be the case if divine determinism is true) then the original act of command seems to be deceptive. Two other problems come from further considering the conflict between divine commands and the divine will. First, if there is such a conflict, then the deliberating agent who aims to obey divine commands and fulfill the divine will seems to face a problem, and if the divine will is followed above all, then the agent seems able to justify any course of action. Second, contrition ordinarily seems to include a desire that the previous bad action had not been performed, but given divine determinism, this seems to amount to a wish that the divine will had not been fulfilled. This seems impious. The final worry to be considered is that in determining agents to perform evil actions, God seems to have lost the standing to blame and punish them for these very actions. In this chapter I investigate each of these four objections, considering possible lines of response to each.
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