The profession, the legal system and society have all traditionally seen loyalty, confidentiality, care and competence as cornerstones of professional responsibility. Lawyers are in a fiduciary relationship with their clients – clients need to be able to trust their lawyers to provide advice and represent them loyally in the legal system, uninfluenced by any concern other than the client’s interests. We examine lawyers’ general duty of care and competence in Chapter 5 and their obligations to avoid conflicts of interest in Chapter 6 . The topic for this chapter is the duty of confidentiality: the obligation to keep secret all communications made by the client to the lawyer about their affairs and all the information learned about the client directly or indirectly during the professional relationship (subject to various exceptions to be discussed).

Chapter 6 takes a detailed look at the concept of negligence as it applies to health care, and how it is tied to the nurse’s duty of care towards their patients. It explains how a failure to meet that duty of care can lead to a legal finding of negligence against a nurse. It describes how a nurse’s required standard of care is determined in law, and how negligence is proven (or defended). It also explains a nurse’s legal liability and professional indemnity, as well as the employer’s vicarious liability for the actions of nurses. Finally, it discusses the role of apology and when an apology to a patient is appropriate. It also introduces the related concept of a ‘statutory duty of candour’, recently introduced into law in Victoria.

Chapter 1 uses the picture of human creation to “rule” other creatures in Genesis 1 as an entry point for exploring how the category of “animal” most fundamentally identifies a nonhuman being that is a) exploitable if useful or b) expendable if not. At the same time, Genesis 1 provides an occasion to reflect on how agriculturally oriented humans created gods in their image, gods who exhibited both the power and the care of other beings characteristic of domesticators.

Chapter nine translates the book's insights into a proposal for legal reform. It argues that fiduciary duty should evolve to require deliberative capacity when corporate decisions have significant social effects.

The chapter does not propose new substantive obligations. Instead, it focuses on process. Boards should be required to establish governance structures that allow informed inquiry, justification, and independent review. Failure arises only when no such structures exist or when deliberation is cursory.

The chapter shows how this approach fits within existing doctrine. Courts already evaluate processes in areas such as mergers and compliance oversight. Extending this logic to social governance preserves deference while improving accountability.

The chapter addresses concerns about judicial overreach and managerial paralysis. By focusing on capacity rather than outcomes, the proposal avoids asking courts to resolve social disputes.

This chapter offers a practical path forward that aligns corporate governance with contemporary realities while respecting institutional limits.

This chapter examines the collision between generative AI (GenAI) and traditional tort law, specifically with respect to negligence and product liability. It presents the legal dilemma of who is accountable when probabilistic, “black-box” algorithms cause harm. Courts struggle to apply concepts like duty of care and causation to nondeterministic systems. The discussion contrasts negligence, which focuses on a “reasonably prudent developer,” with strict liability, which is limited by whether GenAI is defined as a “product” or a “service.” Key legal frameworks explored include the Learned Hand formula (B < PL) and the “cheapest cost avoider” approach. Ultimately, the chapter argues that courts must evolve past rigid tests, prioritizing functional analysis and expanded developer accountability to deter wrongdoing and prevent catastrophic risks.

This chapter begins by introducing administration – the action of issuing and adhering to binding and impersonal instructions – as the exercise of internal authority attributed by the treaty-basis of international organizations to the principle executive officer, their delegates and regulating governance organ. Second, the legal principles of administration are identified, namely: (1) Administrative authority is unilateral, but may not be arbitrary; (2) Internal law must be adhered to, but may be amended; and (3) Structural terms of employment cannot be suppressed. Third, two attendant legal duties of administration are considered, as follows: (1) Administration must be diligent; and (2) Administration must ensure safety. Fourth, the relevance of practice to administration is considered. Fifth, and in conclusion, this employment law of administration at international organizations is restated.

The element of duty of care is covered in three sections. Section 11.1 covers the role and nature of duty – what it is there for and what it covers. Section 11.2 deals with the law on the established categories of negligence (duties and immunities). Section 11.3 discusses the methodology of negligence in cases involving novel fact scenarios, where a duty is not pre-established and needs to be developed from scratch.

Because of the complexity of this area of the law, this chapter introduces a new ‘Summary points’ feature at the ends of sections 11.1 and 11.3. It summarises the matters you should take into account when approaching a problem question and asks you to engage in an active reading exercise, linking each point with a case in that section.

Negligence governs the legal obligations individuals and organisations owe to others to avoid causing harm. Once liability is considered, however, there are defences available that can reduce or even eliminate a defendant’s responsibility. These defences reflect the fact that the blame for that harm cannot – or should not – always be laid solely at the defendant’s feet and that the actions of the plaintiff themselves can affect legal outcomes.

In this chapter, we’ll explore the key defences to negligence, such as voluntary assumption of risk (volenti), the statutory defence provisions that exist in various jurisdictions and contributory negligence. By examining the legal principles and significant cases behind these defences, you’ll gain insight into how the courts deal with these defences and the impact they can have on liability.

Once a duty of care has been established, the plaintiff must then establish that there was a failure to comply with that duty – that the defendant fell below the standard required. There are two steps to this: establishing the standard required and determining whether the defendant fell below that standard. This area of law was developed in case law, which has been affected by statute in most jurisdictions. However, the statutes use many of the concepts, and much of the wording, from common law.

As we have seen, to establish that a defendant is liable in the tort of negligence, the plaintiff has to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that (1) a duty was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) the duty was breached; and (3) the breach caused compensable damage within the scope of liability. The first of these requirements, the duty of care, was the key innovation established by the case of Donoghue v Stevenson and the concepts of ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘reasonable foreseeability’ are central to the reasoning in that case. However, although these concepts are easy to describe and have theoretical elegance, they are much more difficult to apply to a given relationship. This chapter shows the attempt by Australian courts to find a unifying principle or single approach by which to answer the question of duty in a novel case, and then a resolution of sorts, occurring around 2000–01, that any such test is likely to be problematic. The current approach in a novel case is the ‘multi-factorial’ or ‘salient features’ approach.

This is the first of three chapters dealing in depth with directors’ duties, following the overview provided in Chapter 10. The duties are divided into two themes: duties of care, skill and diligence, and duties of loyalty and good faith. The focus in this chapter is on the duties of care, skill and diligence. These duties are imposed by the common law, equity and the Corporations Act. This chapter commences with the common law and equitable foundations of the duty of care, skill and diligence, and considers their adoption into statute and the current law. It examines the safe harbour provided by the business judgment rule, and recent discussion on the scope and application of that rule. This chapter examines the ability of directors to delegate their duties and to reasonably rely on the information or advice provided by certain types of persons. Finally, the chapter considers the requirements imposed on directors and officers as a company approaches insolvency. The chapters which follow then consider the duties of loyalty and good faith.

This chapter explores safeguarding as a duty on tennis sport governing bodies (SGBs) and tennis academies in respect of their athletes, whether junior or senior. The chapter considers safeguarding as a duty of care, the violation of which gives rise to tort-based liability. It looks at the various instruments and codes adopted by tennis SGBs, as well as by national tennis federations, including also their monitoring processes. The chapter explores how these processes are enforced with a view to limiting exposure to risks present or future. The chapter also considers health and safety as part of the duty of safeguarding and goes on to point out legal consequences for failure to meet safeguarding obligations.

Chapter 19 looks at two landmark decisions that were issued after the submission of the full manuscript of this book for publication: the Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on climate change and marine protection, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland. The authors situate these decisions within the broader context of climate litigation, examining their implications for future cases and drawing connections to the themes explored in other chapters. They demonstrate how these decisions both reflect and advance emerging best practice in climate jurisprudence, potentially inspiring further innovation based on science and rigorous legal reasoning.