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Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus relates how Lycurgus came to power in Sparta and the various constitutional reforms he instituted and for which he is famous. These include the introduction of the Gerousia or Senate of Elders or ephors to stand as a moderating force between the kings and the people. He also embarked on an ambitious project of land redistribution, and reform in currency so as to make it heavy and hard to transport in order to discourage commercialism. He instituted a society-wide practice of common meals (phiditia), as well as a rigorous system of education for the young in order to train them to be effective warriors. Women were notoriously more independent in Sparta than in the rest of the ancient Greek world, but the system is shown to have defects, most notably in the treatment of the helots or rural slaves in Sparta. Lycurgus’ constitution is said to have lasted 500 years, contributing to its reputation as an example of good constitutional design, both in the ancient world and subsequently.
This paper offers the largest empirical study to date of the rights of persons with disabilities in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Drawing on interviews, surveys, focus groups and consultations conducted across twelve jurisdictions between 2017 and 2022, it examines the persistent gap between the region’s formal commitments under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the lived realities of persons with disabilities. Deploying Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach, alongside intersectional theory, the paper argues that pervasive failures across education, health care, employment, social protection, accessibility and civic participation deprive persons with disabilities of the substantive freedoms necessary for human flourishing, with compounded effects for those experiencing multiple forms of marginalisation. Situating these findings within the region’s heterogeneous legislative landscape, and assessing Barbados’s Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2025 as the region’s most far-reaching statutory response, the paper contends that transforming disability rights from aspiration into substantive capability requires structural change that addresses the intersection of ableism with racism, sexism, classism and geography.
There is likely no law and religion scholar who has done more to shape the doctrine of strict scrutiny as a protection for religious exercise than Professor Douglas Laycock. Since five justices have called the notorious Free Exercise case—Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith—into question, Laycock’s work has taken on additional salience. And that is even more true as justices and scholars have asked and debated what test should replace Smith if overruled. Some scholars have argued that the court should abandon strict scrutiny across the board and Bruen-ize the First Amendment—that is, incorporate the newly minted Second Amendment historical-analogue approach from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen into the First Amendment context. In this article, I discuss three important aspects of Laycock’s work regarding strict scrutiny: (1) the textual and historical arguments Laycock has made to support strict scrutiny in the religious exercise context; (2) the important insights he has offered about how the doctrine should operate, particularly with respect to his most-favored-nation theory; and (3) the normative justifications Laycock has offered to support this approach. Building on previous work of mine, I explain additional reasons why strict scrutiny is an important and historically justified doctrine in the free exercise context. I also explain why Bruen’s categorical historical-analogue approach, while potentially useful in some constitutional contexts, would be problematic in the Free Exercise context. More importantly—and ironically—Bruen’s purported historical approach would be contrary to the best textual and historical understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.
In a separate essay, we argue that a right to freedom of religion as it is standardly understood is morally indefensible. In this article, we sharpen this proposition, arguing that there is no account of religion on which there is even a pro tanto right for activities to be exempted from generally applicable regulations—or otherwise privileged over other human projects, commitments, and passions—in virtue of their being religiously motivated. Beyond largely uncontroversial invocations of freedoms of thought, speech, and association, what remains of a pre-theoretical embrace of a right to freedom of religion is best explained by the principle of equal regard. Along the way, we respond to the work of Cécile Laborde and Alan Patten, who both maintain that an equality-centered view of religious freedom cannot adequately protect religion unless religious exercise is understood to be elevated in value over other human projects. In our response, we review our account of equal regard and its application to the kinds of cases that worry Laborde and Patten, showing that equal regard can account for the sense of injustice elicited by those cases. We also briefly address the positive views of Laborde and Patten and suggest that their accounts, and others with the same structure, inherit the problems of more straightforward accounts of freedom of religion.
This book could not be more timely. Immediately after Donald Trump won the presidency in 2024, the recriminations began. Democrats could not fathom how their compatriots voted for a convicted felon who attempted to stop the peaceful transfer of political power. How can these two groups possibly come to understand one another, let alone come to respect one another’s positions?
After COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many countries levied windfall taxes on specific sectors that obtained abnormal levels of profitability (e.g. banking, energy, food distribution). Windfall taxation is evolving from the traditional taxing of unearned profit due to luck (i.e. extraordinary profit due to interest rate rise) to taxing profits derived from unsustainable practices (i.e. profit-shifting in Pillar Two). Such a shift reveals the profound crisis of corporate income tax on tax business profit and places windfall taxation as an interim solution to collect tax revenue. This need to collect revenue complicates and renders incoherent the legal design of windfall taxes (in-scope rules, taxable base and tax rate) under the ability to pay and equality principle. To prevent creating a tax on general income, the legislator struggles to single out the industries subject to the tax, calculate the taxable base (extraordinary profit) and determine a tax rate. Such tensions reveal the difficulties of drawing lines in taxing business profits and suggest the need for a fully fledged reform of corporate taxation.
A brand new chapter to this Edition of the Course Manual. Ethnicity and social background adversely affect maternal and perinatal outcomes. This chapter focuses primarily on the inequalities experienced by those of black, Asian and mixed ethnicity as well as those experiencing social deprivation. We explore the impacts of inequity and inequality, as well as strategic action and central support for local improvement. Key learning points: There is an immediate need to act and address inequalities and inequity within maternity services. Non-white ethnicity and social deprivation adversely affect maternal and perinatal outcomes. It is important for individuals and wider society, that women are healthy, educated, and feel safe in their environment. Equality and equity are not the same, both need to be provided for fair and inclusive maternity care. Unacceptable differences in perinatal mortality related to levels of deprivation and ethnicity have increased. Microaggressions and stereotypical assumptions are examples of inequalities that have been reported to contribute to substandard care for women. Research inequalities, and staff representation associated with non-white ethnicity and deprivation, impact clinical care. There are national recommendations to increase research in this area, provide education for staff and women, as well as a call for action to ensure that the quality of maternity care is improved for all.
This chapter examines court cases of citizenship deprivation in France and the UK. As the chapter reveals, virtually all citizenship deprivation cases have failed in the courts. There has not been a single ‘blockbuster case’ in which the courts have defied Parliament or the executive in support of such high principles as citizenship equality, private life, or even basic principles of access to courts. In this chapter, we explore why this is the case, and the mechanisms through which it has occurred. In doing so, we address two of the book’s central concerns: how we got to where we are today, looking at how courts have accompanied or resisted the expansion of citizenship deprivation powers, and the stories of constitutional citizenship that underpin these court cases.
This chapter clarifies the substantive scope and core content of the right to science as enshrined in Art. 15 ICESCR. By employing a reverse-engineering methodology grounded in the core obligations identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 25, the chapter systematically derives the core rights of the right to science. The analysis identifies four distinct yet interrelated substantive rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (Art. 15(1)(b) ICESCR; the right to the conservation, development and diffusion of science (Art. 15(2) ICESCR); freedom of science (Art. 15(3) ICESCR); the right to international scientific ollaboration (Art. 15(4) ICESCR) and the right to equality and non-discrimination in science. Each dimension incorporates essential, immediately enforceable core rights, which constitute the non-derogable nucleus of the right to science, thereby making them inherently justiciable irrespective of resource limitations. The findings contribute to bridging gaps between theoretical frameworks and practical adjudication, enhancing the protection and realisation of the right to science.
This Introduction sets out the book’s central aim, and it also provides an overview of the main arguments with summaries of subsequent chapters. The starting point for this book is that there is a need to test a common assumption about the widespread use of techniques and procedures used to prevent the birth of a disabled child: that in a modern liberal state this practice is mainly or solely a matter of individual choice, and that the state itself is neutral. Further, it might be assumed that this neutral stance would allow the modern liberal state to maintain its stated commitment to equality, and that it provides a shield against any charge of eugenics. The Introduction begins to explain how this common assumption will be tested, by reference to interpretations of a neutral state intention. It also emphasises the book’s original contribution: while there is already extensive literature on the ethics of selecting against disability, this book is distinctively centred on an analysis of the state’s position.
This Conclusion sums up the main arguments in the book, addresses some final questions, and suggests some future directions of travel. In particular, it returns to the eugenics question, and examines whether current practices in modern liberal states might be in line with a type of eugenics that does not involve state coercion, but that rather involves manipulation, and chiefly the manipulation of women. It also emphasises how an analysis of individual choice should be a secondary concern in our approach to the ethics of selecting against disability, and that the position of the state should be our starting point. The last part of the chapter offers additional reflections on the topic of starting points, and on the importance of thinking further about the nature of pregnancy.
Islam addresses social issues extensively because it acknowledges that individuals are profoundly influenced by their societies. Individuals and societies are interdependent, requiring mutual cooperation due to differing abilities, shared goals and collective challenges. Islam emphasizes community building by deepening innate human desires for social interaction, giving them philosophical significance, sanctifying them as religious obligations and setting ethical guidelines to strengthen community bonds.
Islam views society as composed of individuals engaged in exchange and reciprocity, driven by natural human disparities and collective aspirations. It sanctifies these interactions by considering communal responsibilities as spiritual duties, reflected in concepts such as piety, trust and cooperation. Islamic teachings underscore equality among people, highlighting differences only in specialized talents, which facilitate mutual service and cohesion.
Islam consecrates relationships through cultural, faith-based, ethical and jurisprudential dimensions, promoting familial respect, neighborly duties and social justice through practices like prayer, fasting, almsgiving (zakat) and pilgrimage (hajj). These rituals reinforce social solidarity and mutual responsibility. Islam also addresses societal development dynamically, encouraging continuous interaction with both divine revelation (Qur’an) and the universe, fostering adaptive and evolving communities aligned with spiritual and moral values.
In this chapter, I examine attempts to respond to the scenario of unmitigated capitalism, where the rich continue to get richer. This second possibility focuses on how greater economic equality might be created. I discuss four approaches. First, I explore how taxation can be used to redistribute wealth. Next, I introduce the emerging idea of “degrowth” – the purposeful shrinking of some parts of the economy to protect the environment. Third, I examine communism as a means of pursuing economic equality. Finally, I outline socialism as a fourth path toward building more equal societies. I identify and articulate the strengths and limitations of each approach. These reflections lay the foundation for the third and final possibility.
This Element provides a systematic analysis of Aristotle's theory of justice in exchange as developed in Nicomachean Ethics Book V. It examines Aristotle's distinction between voluntary exchanges (commutative justice) and involuntary transactions (corrective justice), explaining how proportional reciprocity in voluntary exchange secures an equitable balance between parties of different contributions, while corrective justice redresses unjust gains and losses in involuntary transgressions. Key concepts such as proportional reciprocity and the arithmetic mean are explored to show how Aristotle's vision of fair exchange underpins civic stability. The analysis also highlights Aristotle's notion of fairness (epieikeia) as a principled adjustment of rigid legal norms, illustrating how equitable judgement supplements strict justice to accommodate particular cases. Overall, the Element clarifies Aristotle's distinctions and principles, linking the ethics of equality and reciprocity to their practical application in law and commerce.
In this article, I offer a novel critique of Jeremy Waldron’s attempt to reconcile Locke’s skeptical epistemology with his normative theory of equality. I argue that Waldron’s turn to a theologically valent “real resemblance” to ground Lockean equality cannot confer the moral or ontological objectivity he imputes to his Lockean egalitarianism. I identify interpretive issues with Waldron’s turn to John McDowell’s metaethics to explain this resemblance’s theological valence. I highlight instead Locke and McDowell’s shared emphasis on education and our communities in cultivating moral sensibilities. Locke’s education underscored the ethical imperative of cultivating epistemic and social virtues to improve fallible understanding and probabilistic judgments. This pragmatic guidance offered a bridge between our authoritative moral claims and our engagement with others qua equals and everyday conduct in the world. I conclude by locating Locke’s continued relevance in his practical measures for realizing egalitarian commitments despite our fallibility, not his theological premises.
Throughout the world, in liberal states, it is common to use prenatal selection techniques and procedures which can prevent the birth of a disabled child. A common assumption is that this practice is driven by individual choice, and that the state itself is neutral. If instead the state was not neutral, this would raise fears of eugenics. The purpose of this book is to test this common assumption. While there is extensive literature on the ethics of selecting against disability, this book proposes a different starting point based on an analysis of the state's position. Through an examination of liberal theory, and a review of concrete examples of state practice, it sheds new light on our society's commitment to the equality of disabled people and the equality of women.
Māori comprise 17.4 per cent of the total population of Aotearoa New Zealand. They are a relatively young population, with a median age of 25.5 years for males and 27.6 years for females, compared to the national median age of 37.0 years for males and 39.1 years for females. Contemporary Māori, like their pre-colonised counterparts, are diverse in their identity, with many having connections to iwi (tribal nations) or hapū (constellations of whānau, or extended family networks). Today, rather than being defined solely by iwi and hapū differences, Māori are also diverse regarding their histories of colonisation, their levels of disconnection from te ao Māori (Māori world) and their contemporary social experiences. Disconnection from te ao Māori means not all Māori know their whakapapa (genealogical) connections.
This chapter begins by introducing remuneration – as a term encompassing both compensation corresponding to the work an international official performs and benefits addressing their personal circumstances – as integral to the treaty-based obligation upon international organizations to secure staff possessing the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence, with due regard to recruitment on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Second, the legal principles of remuneration are identified, namely: (1) Compensation must secure staff of the highest standard; and (2) Pay must be equal for equivalent work. Third, two attendant legal duties of remuneration are considered, namely: (1) Benefits must ensure geographic diversity; and (2) Remuneration revision methodology must be objective. Fourth, the practice of tax reimbursement is examined. Fifth, and in conclusion, this employment law of remuneration at international organizations is restated.
A reflection on the recent Nairobi-Cairo proposals of the Inter-Anglican Standing Commission on Unity, Faith and Order (IASCUFO). The background to the proposals is set out with criticism of the resulting document and suggestions for improving relations in the Anglican Communion.
Do field experimental interventions produce durable changes in gender representation? We examine the persistence of experimental treatment effects in Karpowitz, Monson, and Preece (2017), where a single letter from Republican Party leaders significantly increased women’s election to state delegate positions. Two years later, differences between treatment and control conditions evaporated. Treated precincts largely retained earlier experimental gains, but the treatment effect size was smaller because of increases in the control condition. We examine four possible explanations for this pattern. First, we find considerable evidence of an incumbency effect among women in one treatment condition. Second, increases in women’s representation in the control condition appear to be related in part to larger turnout during the 2016 election cycle. Finally, we find little evidence of lasting attitude changes about women’s representation and few traces of post-experimental spillover.