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This chapter starts the study of fair allocation. We start by studying fair division, and introducing the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes solution concept. Then, we cover Fisher markets, and introduce the Eisenberg–Gale convex program for computing an equilibrium.
This chapter studies the fair allocation of indivisible goods. We develop the notions of envy freeness up to one good (known as EF1) and maximin share. Then, we describe the discrete analogue of the Eisenberg–Gale program, known as “max Nash welfare.” We show that it achieves compelling fairness and efficiency guarantees, and study its computation. Finally, we move on to studying fair allocation with combinatorial utilities, where we introduce the approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (A-CEEI) mechanism. We describe A-CEEI in the context of fair course seat assignment.
This chapter studies large-scale methods for computing Fisher market equilibria. We introduce the notion of relative Lipschitzness, and show that online mirror descent can leverage this concept for stronger convergence guarantees. Then we show how to derive the proportional response dynamics, a highly efficient method for computing Fisher market equilibrium. After this, we study “abstraction” methodology for markets, which enables the solution of coarse-grained representations of a market.
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