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Chapter 7 returns to a key issue from the previous chapter: should Cantor’s diagonal construction (CD) be considered a genuine real number? To answer, we need first to clarify the distinction underlying Wittgenstein’s take on Cantor’s proof, between ‘intensionalism’ and ‘extensionalism.’ The main message here is, again, ultimately therapeutic-liberatory, and not revisionist (only reluctantly so): we are not forced to accept that CD is a genuine real, and hence to say that there are more reals than naturals. We may say this, and introduce a new concept of a real, but we don’t have to. That CD is a genuine irrational is not an epochal discovery, but an invention, a technical stipulation. A background difficulty in this chapter concerns the overarching philosophical problem Wittgenstein grapples with in RFM II. I propose that this is the question, ‘What is the significance of Cantor’s discovery of the hierarchy of infinities?’ – and I argue that he saw it as ill-posed. Since mathematicians are inventors and not discoverers (RFM I-168), Cantor did not discover anything; so, the question is based on a confused presupposition and should be discarded.
Carnap’s naturalism evidently differs from Quine’s, but the precise nature of this difference has proven elusive. This chapter focuses on what Quine defends as his “provincial” naturalism against a Carnapian “cosmopolitan” alternative. The problem with this contrast, however, is that Quine does not represent a pure form of what he calls a “provincial” view. This is illustrated by his tergiversations about analyticity; after initially denying that there was even an explicandum worth bothering about, he later offered his own ordinary-language-based account of analyticity, without feeling any need to supply a more exact explication; there would appear to be no way to resolve the resulting stand-off with the cosmopolitan standpoint. This paper suggests a more robust explicandum for analyticity (and cosmopolitanism more generally). We come back, in the end, to the confrontation between Carnap and Quine in Chicago in 1950, where Carnap convinced Quine that their differences did not concern any question about which there could be right or wrong, correct or incorrect; it is regretted that Quine soon lost this lesson from sight.
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