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This chapter delves into the concept of scientific pluralism, focusing on its modern philosophical defence by Mill. He argued for tolerating diverse opinions asserting that conflict is essential for understanding truth and that most doctrines reveal only partial truths. His pluralism stems from the rejection of claims to infallible knowledge. Popper, influenced by Mill, endorsed fallibilism but rejected inductivism, proposing falsifiability as a demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience. He saw the proliferation of competing testable conjectures as the source of conflicts driving scientific progress. Feyerabend initially extended Popper’s pluralism but later radically opposed all methodological rules (‘anything goes’). In particular he argued for the incommensurability of theories due to theory-laden observations and meaning variance across theories. Kuhn introduced the distinction between ‘normal science’ operating within a dominant ‘paradigm’ (or ‘disciplinary matrix’) and ‘scientific revolutions’ marked by paradigm shifts. Kuhn viewed pluralism as characteristic of immature sciences or revolutionary periods. Lakatos attempted a synthesis between Popper and Kuhn, focusing on ‘research programmes’ based on a ‘hard core’ defended by a ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses. He adopted the distinction between progressive versus degenerating programmes as a criterion for scientific rationality. In particular, this chapter highlights the ongoing tension between internal and external paradigms of pluralism.
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