To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
I present an objection to the idea of democracy as an intrinsically fair procedure. I show that this idea rests on the assumption that citizens have equal stakes in their polity’s collective decisions. I then argue that, in real-world societies, this assumption does not hold. First, I claim that participants’ stakes in a collective decision are proportional to the level of risk the decision imposes on them. I then show that, in real-world societies, the polity’s decisions impose much higher risks on the worst off compared to their wealthier fellows. Hence, the former have higher stakes in their polity’s decisions, compared to the latter. My argument thus shows that, in the deeply unequal societies we inhabit, democracy is not an intrinsically fair procedure. I then discuss my argument’s implications for a theory of procedural fairness.
This chapter addresses three questions about health systems: What is a health system? What are health systems for? What functions should a health system perform? A health system can be understood as an interconnected set of structural relationships between two components: a population and a set of providers. A health system includes the resources, actors and institutions related to the financing, regulation and provision of activities, whose primary intent is to improve or maintain health. Health systems include personal health services, hybrid health services and population health services. The defining purpose of the health system is to improve health, both the average level and its distribution across individuals. Two other intrinsic goals of the health system should be responsiveness to the legitimate expectations of the population, and fairness in financial contribution. Health systems must perform five basic functions: financing, provision, resource development, systemic integration and the meta-function of stewardship.
This chapter explores why and how health should be measured at the population level. It introduces generic health measures – such as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) and health-adjusted life expectancy – as tools to quantify overall health, enabling comparison across diseases, populations and time. We highlight conceptual and methodological challenges in health measurement, including how to define health boundaries and how to weight and compare different health states and conditions. The topics discussed include performance vs. capacity, observed vs. reported measures and the valuation of future vs. present health outcomes. The chapter also discusses ethical concerns around using health metrics for priority setting, particularly at the population level. Recent developments in this field have focused on ethical considerations around fairness and equity, and on how to better incorporate broader determinants of health into current measures of population health.
A cherished common law notion is equality before the law. This notion has shaped and defined Australian laws, and is important to law’s capacity to produce justice because it requires that everyone is treated the same before the law. However, equality before the law has not produced effective social justice and equality in Australia: demographic and socio-economic indicators consistently paint a picture of broad social inequality and a growing poverty gap – rather than one of an egalitarian society in which everyone achieves the same justice. This chapter explores how Australian laws work with the idea of equality to help explain why certain groups continue to be disadvantaged in their access to justice and the legal system. It provides a window onto different perspectives and experiences of Australian laws, which we encourage you to reflect upon throughout your legal studies.
Air pollution has been identified as the single largest environmental health risk by the World Health Organisation. Existing legal instruments are inadequate to respond to the scale of the challenge. The question of how to design more efficient, as well as more just, legal systems is becoming increasingly pressing. The essay identifies three sets of ethical conundrums that decision-makers must confront when regulating air pollution – related to why govern, how to govern, and where to govern. It uses the planetary boundary framework that identifies the processes that regulate the stability of the Earth system, as a conceptual lens, to explore the ethical implications behind the motivations driving air quality governance, the framing of a complex environmental problem and the global governance of localized impacts. In doing so, the essay reflects on how the design of more ethically oriented legal systems can enhance environmental law’s response to planetary problems.
Bringing light to AI-related harms is key to redressing them and to enable prevention. Meta-analyses of risks can also bring to light when harms were detected and by whom, leading us to better practices for prevention and detection.
Undesirable bias is a well-known issue in algorithmic decision-making. This chapter explores how fairness is defined and whether it can be studied quantitively, and explores several debiasing frameworks from the literature.
The central idea of this chapter is value pluralism. This third possibility assumes that multiple co-existing economic systems, forms of economic growth, and models of human development will persist into the future. Within this pluralistic approach, I emphasize three interconnected goals: alleviating poverty, more fairly distributing prosperity, and enabling the pursuit and achievement of human capabilities. This possibility aims to mitigate the worst effects of capitalism, harvest the benefits of prosperity, and distribute wealth in ways that are meaningful to people’s lives. I argue that these three goals should be at the forefront of creating the world of tomorrow.
Lives are comprised of the stories we tell. At the beginning of this chapter, I argue for the importance of understanding how narratives not only mirror but also shape our understanding of ourselves and others. I draw on classic and contemporary research in social and cultural psychology to show how narratives are remembered and transformed over time and between people. I also discuss master narratives – dominant stories that help create shared understanding and cohesion in societies. I then introduce two dominant master narratives concerning economic development. The first highlights growing inequality and its detrimental impact on societies. The second emphasizes that, despite the vices of capitalism, economic growth has led to increased prosperity. I situate these narratives in the contemporary political and academic zeitgeist, where inequality dominates. I end the chapter by discussing the moral imperative to alleviate global poverty, create fairer societies, and pursue human capabilities as a guide for rethinking economic development.
I provide an overview of the book in this introductory chapter. The scope, limits, and style of the book are outlined. I introduce a central tension: that humanity has never been so prosperous, yet it often feels to many of us as though we never have enough. The view from manywheres is a central organizing principle in the book. The idea is to stay on the move between multiple disciplines, methods, and perspectives to comprehensively understand economic inequality. From this holistic view, I articulate a new vision for economic development – one based on the alleviation of poverty, the creation of fairness in our shared economic systems, and the pursuit and achievement of human capabilities.
I present a case study in this chapter to illustrate the importance of moral psychology, fairness, and relative deprivation. There was little civic discontent in Ireland when the economy collapsed but, when Ireland had the fastest-growing economy in Europe, people took to the streets and ultimately voted the sitting government out of power. I detail a series of studies, mostly using ethnographic and qualitative methods, that revealed some of the historically ingrained cultural and moral reasons why Irish people passively accepted economic hardship and austerity during the downturn, only to protest en masse when the government introduced a bill charging citizens directly for the water they consumed. The water charge served as a symbol of injustice, and people took to the streets because they felt unfairly treated and deprived relative to others who were seen as benefitting during the economic upturn. It is not objective economic indicators, but rather people’s subjective understandings of these systems, that determine whether they are seen as fair.
This chapter investigates the global access to justice crisis, where approximately 1.4 billion people worldwide have unmet civil or administrative justice needs despite living in functioning legal systems. Through an analysis of data from multiple countries including across North America, South America, Europe, and Asia, the chapter demonstrates that individuals with legal problems often struggle to access adequate assistance. Unrepresented litigants face substantial disadvantages without legal support, including, losing custody of children, facing eviction, and experiencing asset seizure.
Four factors are exacerbating this crisis: growing societal complexity, which creates increasingly intricate legal procedures; overprofessionalization of the legal community; systemic bias favoring institutional plaintiffs; and the fundamental language gap separating laypeople from lawyers. Addressing this crisis is imperative for two primary reasons: fairness and social costs. The chapter proposes that legal AI systems represent public goods, similar to courts and schools, requiring coordinated investment to democratize access to justice.
How should asylum seekers be distributed across EU member states? And can EU citizens agree on the principles underlying such distribution? While scholars have proposed various fairness principles – such as allocation based on population size, wealth, or past intake – we know little about which principles citizens support. Using an original population survey in six EU member states, this study examines public preferences for distributive fairness in asylum governance. We find widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo of large asymmetries in refugee numbers and broad support for European responsibility sharing based on fair distribution. However, there are significant differences between member states in the principles that citizens support, and these preferences are also affected by the principles that would keep the number of refugees in their own country at a minimum. These findings suggest that while there is a transnational consensus on the need to move to a fairer distribution of refugees in the EU, its practical operationalisation reveals the deeper political divides on the matter.
I argue against John, Millum and Wasserman’s position that telic prioritarianism justifies morally acceptable discrimination against persons with disabilities. I propose alternative considerations that explain why disability discrimination in the lifesaving cases JMW discuss is morally problematic.
Natural language processing (NLP) has moved from a specialized research field into the everyday infrastructure of writing, search, translation, education, journalism, public administration, and scientific work. This transition changes what counts as progress. Accuracy, fluency, and benchmark performance remain important, but they are no longer sufficient when language technologies shape knowledge, decisions, identities, and public trust. This column introduces Responsible NLP as a research orientation that integrates fairness, transparency, privacy, safety, cultural diversity, environmental awareness, and human agency across the full life cycle of language technologies. It argues that responsibility is not an external constraint on innovation, but a condition for meaningful and trustworthy innovation. Future research must therefore ask not only whether an NLP system works but also for whom it works, under which assumptions, with what risks, and with what forms of accountability.
Long-term unemployment (LTU) is a challenge for both jobseekers and public employment services. Statistical profiling tools are increasingly used to predict LTU risk. Some profiling tools are opaque, black-box machine learning (ML) models, which raise issues of transparency and fairness. The present paper investigates whether interpretable models could serve as an alternative, using administrative data from Switzerland. Traditional statistical, interpretable, and black-box models are compared in terms of predictive performance, interpretability, and fairness. It is shown that explainable boosting machines, a recent interpretable model, perform nearly as well as the best black-box models. It is also shown how model sparsity, feature smoothing, and fairness mitigation can enhance transparency and fairness with only minor losses in performance. These findings suggest that interpretable profiling provides an accountable and trustworthy alternative to black-box models without compromising performance.
Trust is presented as a cornerstone of human–AI interaction. The chapter reviews psychological, sociological, and computational models of trust, including interpersonal and contractual trust, Luhmann’s theory of trust-as-prediction, and the Computers Are Social Actors theory that explains why people anthropomorphize machines. It examines risks of overtrust (automation bias, misplaced confidence) and undertrust (algorithm aversion, underuse of reliable systems). Strategies such as transparency, explainability, fairness, and accountability are discussed as ways to calibrate trust appropriately. The chapter concludes that trust in AI is dynamic, context-dependent, and must be designed into systems deliberately.
Narcissism has garnered a great deal of attention in the early twenty-first century. Because sociology has dominated much thinking in criminology, personality styles including narcissism have not received as much attention. Analysts can conceive of narcissism more broadly and, in doing so, attempt to explain the various forms of unfairness that take the form of crimes.
Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are competing views about the ethics of distribution. Both views have wide scopes of concern. But, writing in this journal, Michael Otsuka has discovered a case that seems to show an interesting asymmetry between the limits of egalitarian and prioritarian concern. In that case, intuitively one outcome is better than another (in a respect relevant to the ethics of distribution); prioritarianism can recover that intuitive judgment; but egalitarianism seems unable to recover it. I show, however, that egalitarianism can recover the intuitive judgment in question on a well-motivated basis. That result is of interest because it shows the possibility and prima facie plausibility of a version of egalitarianism with a surprisingly wide scope of concern – one according to which it matters that some are worse off than those who (merely) could have existed.
The usual definitions of algorithmic fairness focus on population-level statistics, such as demographic parity or equal opportunity. However, in many social or economic contexts, fairness is not perceived globally, but locally, through an individual’s peer network and comparisons. We propose a theoretical model of perceived fairness networks, in which each individual’s sense of discrimination depends on the local topology of interactions. We show that even if a decision rule satisfies standard criteria of fairness, perceived discrimination can persist or even increase in the presence of homophily or assortative mixing. We propose a formalism for the concept of fairness perception, linking network structure, local observation, and social perception. Analytical and simulation results highlight how network topology affects the divergence between objective fairness and perceived fairness, with implications for algorithmic governance and applications in finance and collaborative insurance.