To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter introduces the fundamental idea of The Life of Freedom in Kant and Hegel: the notion that we can only make sense of autonomy by returning to the concept of life. This return is needed to understand fully the genesis, the form, and the reality of human freedom. Such an account can be developed by means of a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies of freedom. As we can learn from Kant’s account, the notion of autonomy is threatened by the paradox of self-legislation and an opposition of freedom and nature that makes the reality of freedom unintelligible. As Kant already indicates and Hegel goes on to develop, we can overcome these problems by reconceiving of autonomy as a form of life. The chapter outlines the reading of Kant and Hegel supporting this view, situates the resulting systematic position in current debates on the sources of normativity and the nature of human freedom, and defines its relation to other approaches norm and nature (ethical naturalism, forms of life, and biopolitics).
The conclusion clarifies the historical trajectory and the systematic and the systematic upshot of The Life of Freedom in Kant and Hegel. Regarding the historical trajectory, it delimits the new understanding of the transition from Kant to Hegel it has argued for. Rather than depicting Hegel as leaving Kant behind, the investigation has revealed that Hegel’s account has led us deeper into Kant’s problems and has made it possible for us to reaffirm them as part of the vital dialectic of freedom. In terms of the systematic upshot, the chapter clarifies the ways in which we can understand autonomy in terms of living self-constitution. I distinguish the basic freedom of self-constitutive entities shared by living and spiritual beings from the practical freedom of spiritual beings. I clarify the way in which the self-constitution of spiritual beings rests upon and remains dependent upon their self-constitution as living beings. I show that for self-consciously self-constitutive beings, the form of their life necessarily remains a problem. I sketch the necessary internal and external plurality of this form of life, its reflexive character, its self-transgressive nature, and the freedom it requires vis-à-vis its own form. To develop a clear understanding of this form of life, we need a critical theory of second nature.
This chapter analyses Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘form of life’ as his final model of context. It argues that the deliberate vagueness of this concept represents Wittgenstein’s attempt to avoid the metaphysical commitments involved in previous formal models while still providing tools for understanding context. This strategic formlessness contrasts with how the concept was later interpreted in anthropology.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.