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This chapter discusses the implications of this research for our view of British economic policy in particular and the political economy and historical sociology of economic policymaking in general. A multidimensional approach to economic policymaking reveals heterogeneity and discontinuity in postwar economic policymaking that conventional paradigmatic explanations and epochalist categories overlook.
This book challenges the conventional narrative that the 1970s were a fundamental watershed between two seamless economic policy paradigms in postwar United Kingdom, Keynesianism and neoliberalism. Drawing on extensive archival research, José Tomás Labarca highlights heterogeneity and discontinuity in postwar economic policymaking rather than consensus. The book argues that there was no seamless Keynesian economic policy epoch, challenging widespread misconceptions about excessive government spending in the 1960s and 1970s to offer a novel interpretation of shrinking policy space in the 1970s. Centering the multidimensional politics of official knowledge, Labarca provides an original analysis of how conflicts between competing government elite coalitions drove fragmented policy change before and after the 1970s. While most research focuses exclusively on the politics of economic ideas, Fragmented Policy Change proves that not only economic but also organizational and bureaucratic ideas, processes, and interests influence the evolution of relatively (in)coherent policy regimes.
In late-socialist Romania, the state sought to govern economic crisis by demanding market-like conduct from cultural institutions while continuing to bind them to the political structures of socialism. Drawing on archival planning reports, media accounts, and post-socialist recollections, this article traces the emergence of a “self-financing regime” that reorganized cultural production around revenue generation, entrepreneurial conduct, and managerial accountability. I argue that self-financing constituted neither a retreat of socialism nor an incipient transition to capitalism, but an experiment in governing crisis by relocating the burdens of economic survival onto institutions themselves. This shift generated a contradictory institutional world: cultural actors were compelled to pursue economic self-sufficiency and become self-optimizing subjects even as markets remained ideologically repudiated, socialist obligations endured, and nominal decentralization extended bureaucratic oversight. Yet contradiction did not simply signal the incoherence of late socialism. As these tensions became embedded in everyday institutional practice, contradiction provided the very means through which austerity was rendered governable. The Romanian case thus shows how market-like rationalities could emerge from within socialist crisis management and crystallize into historically distinct forms of governance. By situating these entanglements before the so-called “end of history,” the article unsettles teleological narratives of socialist-capitalist rupture and reconsiders crisis as a historically contingent site where seemingly opposed political-economic logics can be made and remade in practice.
What if the deepest resources for globalizing IR lie not in capitalist modernity, but in humanity's much older struggles against hierarchy? This Element argues that Global IR cannot become genuinely anti-Eurocentric unless it breaks decisively with 'methodological presentism': the tendency to read the past in terms of the present. Engaging Global IR debates, and drawing on Karl Polanyi, Political Marxism, and evolutionary anthropology, the Element offers a non-presentist macro-historical narrative. It mobilizes deep history to trace the millennia-old human capacities to refuse domination, pursue autonomy, and sustain cooperation, thereby inviting readers to fundamentally rethink the sources of human interconnectedness and solidarity. On this basis, it proposes 'radical modernity', rooted in the prehistoric legacy of 'radical egalitarianism', as an alternative to capitalist modernity. Radical modernity is not a Western achievement later diffused to the non-Western world, but an alternative foundation for rethinking universality, difference, and the 'international' from below.
Through comparative analysis of two historical cases of transition from hierarchical to competitive international orders—from the Han dynasty to the Period of Disunion in third-century China, and from the Abbasid Caliphate to the Islamic Commonwealth in the tenth century—we consider how social movements have long been significant facilitators of international change. With reference to the contributions to these transitions of early Daoist and Sunni movements respectively, we offer a comparative framework for understanding how social movements may undermine established hierarchies and induce legitimacy contests that contribute toward the emergence of new international orders. Moreover, by contrasting these cases against the role of the Reformation movement in the development of European international order, the article both decenters the European experience and illuminates how social movements can be central to crafting fundamental, yet varying, relationships between political authority and society across highly diverse cultural and temporal contexts.
Decolonization left the future of small, city-states uncertain. Without large domestic markets to turn to, some city-states developed financial industries. Comparing Kuwait and Singapore, I examine how these states developed their financial sectors after decades of colonial underdevelopment. While both states sought to develop international financial centers, Singapore was far more successful in doing so. Kuwait opened numerous merchant-owned, domestic commercial banks but with sluggish rates of growth, while Singapore saw the emergence of new state-run banks; the consolidation, modernization, and growth of privately owned banks; and the establishment of a rapidly growing global financial center. I identify three processes to explain this divergence: (1) the state’s ability to discipline merchant-capitalists; (2) the institutional legacies of colonialism and postcolonial maneuvering; and (3) the incorporation of transnational experts into ruling coalitions. By unearthing the mechanisms of financial development, this article contributes to sociologies of development, finance, expertise, and small states.
This chapter makes the case for macro-historical approaches as one of the best examples of ‘big picture’ theorising in International Relations (IR) and argues that Barry Buzan’s work is a great model of this type of theorising in IR. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that Buzan and his scholarship played a very significant sociological role in the discipline’s trajectory in terms of legitimising this type of research. During the decades when much of the field of IR had turned away from macro-historical approaches, Buzan was among a handful of scholars who kept advancing them. His connections to IR on both sides of the Atlantic connected Constructivism and the English School, and it is in the intersection of these schools that macro-historical approaches and Weberian style historical sociology have thrived in IR.
Order, Authority, Nation develops a sociological account of political conversion from left to right through an examination of the historical case of Marcel Déat and the French neo-socialists. Déat and the neo-socialists began their careers in the 1920s as democratic socialists but became fascists and Nazi collaborators by the end of World War II. While existing accounts of this shift emphasize the ideological continuity underlying neo-socialism and fascism, this book centers the fundamentally discontinuous and relational character of political conversion in its analysis. Highlighting the active part played by Déat and the neo-socialists in their own reinvention at different moments of their trajectory, it argues that political conversion is a phenomenon defined not just by a change in belief, but at its core, by how political actors respond to changing political circumstances. This sociological account of a phenomenon often treated polemically offers a unique contribution to the sociology and history of socialism and fascism.
In the conclusion, we weave together the themes of the volume. We trace three historically overlapping configurations corruption and colonialism, corruption and modernity, and neoliberalism and anti-corruptionism and suggest that we may be entering into a one (a fourth one) characterized by illiberalism. Additionally, we propose “deep analogies” that cross-cut the configurations, including corruption’s inevitable intertwining with power, institutional sedimentation, and processes of evaluation.
This chapter analyzes the “Negro Plot” of New York in 1741, in which numerous black slaves and free people, as well as Catholic whites, were accused of conspiring with and corrupting others to commit a series of arsons in New York City over a bitterly cold winter and amid the threat of war. The chapter shows how corruption accusations surrounding the plot were “promiscuous,” in the sense that, as embedded in the colonial politics of the day, accusations made in terms of corruption escalated to increasingly implausible targets, even as they served to legitimate unlikely accusations. I show that this very promiscuity linked with the construction (and disintegration) of political narratives and official careers and was tethered to moralized visions of social order.
While nationalism is a term that is often associated with instability, violence, extremism, terrorism, wars and even genocide, in fact most forms of nationalism are nonviolent. Beyond politics, it is a set of discourses and practices that shape economic, social, legal, and cultural life all over the globe. This book explores the global rise and transformation of nationalism and analyses the organisational, ideological, and micro-interactional mechanisms that have made it the dominant way of life in the twenty-first century. In a series of case studies across time and space, the book zooms in on three key forms of lived experience: how nationalism operates as a multi-faceted meta-ideology, how national categories have become organisationally embedded in everyday practices and why nationalism has become the dominant form of modern subjectivity. The book is aimed at readers interested in understanding how nation-states and nationalisms have attained such influence in contemporary world.
This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the book layout. It contextualises the topic historically and defines the key terms of the debate. It also illustrates key issues, with illustrative examples of how nationalism permeates different spheres of social, political, economic, and cultural life.
This chapter focuses on the historical relationship between nationalism and conspiracy theories in times of pandemic. It argues that premodern conspiratorial narratives were mostly focused on eschatological and theological images, aiming to blame and delegitimise the religious Other. In these imaginary plots, the spread of disease was interpreted as an attack on one’s religious beliefs. With the rise of nation-states and the decline of empires and patrimonial kingdoms, periodic outbursts of epidemics gradually attained more nationalist interpretations. In these narratives, the threatening Other was usually nationalised, and even traditional religious groups became reinterpreted as a threat to one’s national security
Few social scientists expected another major inter-state war in Europe. The dominant positions either confine warfare to the dustbin of European history or downplay its significance in late modernity. Sociologists of war have been less surprised by recent developments, however. In a wider socio-historical context warfare remains a crucial catalyst of social change. No other social phenomenon has continuously influenced the social world to such an extent and this has been particularly the case in European history. In this article, I critically review recent developments in the sociology of war. I also look at the ways in which existing analytical tools can be deployed to explain the return of inter-state warfare in Europe. I argue that the integration of longue durée comparative historical sociology with micro-sociological scholarship on everyday behaviour in war is the best way forward to understanding the long-term dynamics of war and society.
The introductory chapter explains and legitimates the approach of the book: why does it make sense to write the long-term (pre)history of democracy as a history of two distinct phenomena – pluralistic participation and individual equality – and of their convergence? Why can it be argued that this convergence was not unavoidable and is not irreversible?
This article poses a synthetic analytical approach to casing migratory projects that set out to effectuate a redistribution of power and resources: migration as contentious politics. Contentious migration is presented as an attempt by a collective to mobilize adequate political leverage to advance claims in the location of immigration through spatial relocation and demographic change. To demonstrate the analytical leverage of this approach, this article then conducts a case study of the under-examined Hechalutz settlement movement active in North America between 1905 and 1953, which facilitated the settler migration of American youth to rural agricultural colonies on the colonial frontiers of late-Ottoman and British Mandatory Palestine. It draws on extensive, original findings in colony and national archives, examining official movement publications, correspondences, emissary notes, meeting minutes and daily records from the training farms across North America, diaries, and obituaries. Through eventful analysis, the article explicates three salient mechanisms of the mobilization for contentious migration: (1) environmental (attributing political opportunity and threat); (2) relational (forging networks, as a proxy for diffusion and organizational cohesion); and (3) cognitive (devising resonant diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings).
Michael Mann’s concept of infrastructural power is increasingly invoked to grapple with how state capacity has been leveraged upon processes of financialization since the 1970s. Yet while furnishing new insights about state–market hybridity, the literature risks transforming “infrastructural power” into a synonym for financialized state agency. This chapter restores the intended scope of Mann’s concept by situating it within his Sources of Social Power quadrilogy. It then surveys the concept’s applications in interdisciplinary finance studies and proposes three ideal types of infrastructural power: instrumental, communicative, and network-forming. These types are illustrated with historical and contemporary examples to highlight the historical depth and diversity of infrastructural powers in financial governance. The conclusion addresses the concept’s limitations for identifying whether public or private actors hold greater power in financial governance.
Scholars have paid minimal attention to the political and practical objectives that guided Tuskegee Institute’s sociological program and institutional interventions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Leveraging a multi-modal, historical sociological approach grounded in primary and secondary analyses of biographical data, narratives, and archival data, I show that Tuskegee’s institutional interventions illustrate three abolitionist tactics: (1) building consciousness through research dissemination and place-based investment, (2) galvanizing Southern Whites and political elites to abolish lynching locally, and (3) countering the propaganda used to justify lynching to inspire divestment from lynching and carceral punishment. Booker T. Washington’s commitment to eradicating structural racism and resource deprivation in the aftermath of slavery led to Tuskegee Institute’s formation of the first department of applied rural sociology in the United States, and the Negro Farmers’ conference and Movable School interventions supported a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy. Likewise, the research activism of Monroe Work, disseminated via The Negro Year Book and individual publications, sought to galvanize the abolition of lynching and carceral punishment. In the wake of re-emerged visibility of White supremacist terrorism and commitments to practicing Du Boisian sociology across the United States, I argue that reviving the memory of Tuskegee’s institutional practices makes a case for reconsidering the place of abolition in academic sociology in the twenty-first century.
If our aim is to pluralise the ‘subjects, methods, and aims’ of the academic study of international organisations, then one fairly obvious route to follow is that of historicisation. Historians of international organisations have elected a variety of avenues to relate the creation and the design of international institutions. Building on their work, this chapter offers another tool to the methodological palette the present volume offers; on the other hand and more specifically, I want to reflect on what international organisations are from the point of view of their making. To do so, I zoom in on one important moment in the history of modern international organisations: the 1865 international telegraph commission in Paris that convened to determine the scope and purpose of the first formal and permanent international organisation, the International Telegraph Union. I approach this case through the lens of micro-politics, combining biographical and sociological methods. Methodologically I study international organisations by means of biographical membership analysis; theoretically I argue that international organisations cannot be fully understood in separation from the situated political motives of their makers.
Recent years have seen the development of a range of approaches concerned with theorizing and empirically demonstrating the significance of “transboundary entanglements” – patterns of connections between and across social sites. This work, spanning disciplines from sociology to international relations, and including subfields from postcolonial scholarship to global history, seeks to transcend the methodological nationalism associated with much preexisting historical social science by examining how, and with what effect, transboundary entanglements are formed and transformed over time. To date, however, the rich theoretical and substantive contributions made by these approaches have not been matched by comparable attention to the methodological principles and transposable procedures that can be used to analyze transboundary entanglements. This article contributes to this task. We make the case for a principle we call “global methodological relationalism” and explore how this principle can be operationalized through a three-step procedure: first, track relations across a boundary; second, follow these relations over time and across cases to establish variation; and third, provide an explanation of this variation. We highlight sites of overlap and contrast with existing methods for case selection, tracing historical processes, and making causal claims in small-N research, and establish the ways in which a “global historical sociology” oriented around “global methodological relationalism” can assess the significance of “transboundary entanglements.”