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This chapter examines the emergence of the CCMCE, a legal/structural innovation that transformed the multinational firm into a constellation of legally separate but operationally unified corporate entities. Tracing its origins to the late nineteenth century, the CCMCE emerged from evolving doctrines of corporate personhood, limited liability, and the state’s adoption of territorial sovereignty as a legal principle. The pivotal shift occurred with New Jersey’s holding company laws (1888–96), enabling corporations to own other corporations and organize control through pyramidal structures. Combined with the formal recognition of intangible property – such as goodwill and future income streams – this model allowed firms to optimize control, risk, and regulatory positioning across jurisdictions. The CCMCE’s international diffusion, initially driven by practical business needs, soon enabled new forms of jurisdictional arbitrage, as corporate groups leveraged legal fragmentation to separate tangible operations from regulatory liabilities. By embedding the firm in a network of legally autonomous subsidiaries, the CCMCE model created opportunities to exploit the ‘law of two prices’ and selectively engage national regulatory regimes.
Chapter 4 opens up the black box of the firm to assess the effects of leadership on reform outcomes in China Infrastructure (CI) (pseudonym), a central SOE in the construction industry. The chapter features paired comparisons of the consecutive tenures of chairmen in CI and process tracing of original data gathered during fifteen months of fieldwork inside the company, primarily in its Beijing headquarters, between January 2014 and June 2016, with follow-up visits in June 2018, December 2019, and December 2023. It presents evidence that the chairman’s leadership generated variation in the degree to which market expansion was decentralized and in the balance of influence among intra-firm actors. The chapter also evaluates and rules out alternative explanations: guanxi with and intervention by higher-level officials, shifts in policy by administrative superiors, and changes in industry competition in domestic and international markets.
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