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Behind the front lines of the Second World War raged a different kind of battle. In secret camps across Britain, thousands of enemy spies, soldiers, and war criminals were interrogated in the effort to defeat Nazi Germany and the ideology that drove it. Drawing on extensive British archival sources, Artemis Photiadou uncovers the methods, motives, and moral tensions behind this vast machinery of questioning. Within it, officers, scientists, and linguists sought to extract military intelligence, as well as to grasp why individuals fought Hitler's war and, eventually, to assess their complicity in the regime's crimes. The resulting interactions expose the complexity of those who were questioned, the assumptions of their interrogators, and the ethical contradictions of a liberal state at war. This is a vivid account of how Britain attempted to comprehend the enemy it was fighting. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter examines how the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) in Britain developed its sophisticated system of interrogating German soldiers. While CSDIC’s use of microphones is now widely known, the process that produced its intelligence remain poorly understood. The chapter shows that CSDIC was initially designed to gather pieces of information overheard among soldiers, but eavesdropping alone soon proved insufficient for the scale and complexity of the war. Soon enough, CSDIC UK had become the final step in a much larger screening process that sifted hundreds of thousands of soldiers to identify a select group for the bugged sites. The actual process in its camps then formed a cycle: statements obtained in direct interrogation were checked against private conversations between prisoners, which in turn revealed new leads for direct interrogation. Microphones, therefore, were part of a broader interrogation method rather than its entirety. The chapter also highlights the people at the centre of this system, whose work yielded a remarkable body of intelligence, yet its emotional and psychological toll remained largely concealed by secrecy well after the war.
What emerges from the three cases is that interrogation was a central component of the wartime state, and that it remained essential immediately after the war. It also delivered: each camp extracted the information it was tasked to obtain, and its output was generally considered reliable. At the same time, there were biases that ran so deep that they were not recognised, with the three cases confirming Britain’s failure to grasp the extent and nature of mass murder and genocide, even as told by its own sources. The comparison also shows that interrogation relied on forms of psychological manipulation, though the character and intensity of those methods differed between the different camps. At the same time, higher command had an interest in ensuring that all detainees were treated in a manner consistent with Britain’s self-image and legal obligations. While abusive practices did occur, they affected a relatively small number of those under interrogation and were out of sync with standard practices. Taken together, these findings confirm that interrogation was not an isolated activity but one shaped by wider institutional priorities and cultural attitudes.
Interrogating Nazism uncovers a history in which interrogation became a valuable information-gathering method in the context of the Second World War, giving Britain remarkable knowledge of Nazi Germany in the process. Much of that knowledge, concerning individuals, armies, atrocities and numerous other subjects, could not have been gained through any other means in such detail. Not only was it obtained in interrogation camps, it was also preserved in tens of thousands of reports, indexes and verbatim transcripts of secretly recorded discussions. In many ways, the sources emanating from interrogation are a ‘first oral history’ of the Second World War. This is a term that David Cesarani used to describe the interviews of Allied psychologists with German soldiers – some of which had their origins in the interrogation camps studied here – but which is appropriate for much of the archival material that makes up this book.
The chapter deals with Hamas’s human intelligence (HUMINT) activity. Hamas, of course, makes use of the most traditional method of intelligence gathering – information from human sources. This chapter details how Hamas first recruited local sources for short periods and specific missions. Gradually, sources were recruited who could operate outside of Israel; these sources were sent on longer-term and more advanced missions. Hamas also used the internet, i.e., social media and email, to contact and handle potential sources. This chapter also describes how Hamas turned collaborators with Israel into double agents and ran operations using these agents.
The chapter seeks to lay out the conceptual and practical foundations of information warfare in the twenty-first century. Different concepts are identified and defined, together with how they affect and influence the information and cognitive realms of global audiences. The evolution and development of information warfare is identified and analysed. In addition to establishing why the problem of information warfare exists, and at this point in time, some proposals are explored as to how to set about addressing the problem.
Edited by
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
Edited by
Matthew Craven, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,Sundhya Pahuja, University of Melbourne,Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science
During an era marked by suspicion, and recurrent failures of ‘humint’ (human intelligence gathering), Cold War decision-makers were increasingly captivated and guided by the prognostications and intimations of ‘sigint’ (signals intelligence), ‘comint’ (communications intelligence) and ‘elint’ (electronic intelligence): that is, intelligence gathering through the interception and interpretation of electronic or electromagnetic signals and communications. Decision- and policy-making under the rubric of international law engaged continually with the would-be, could-be or might-have-been moves of key protagonists, as those moves appeared in electronic data. International legal order came to be marked, during the Cold War, by the latent or virtual agency of these overlapping ‘data shadows’ in ways that leave an enduring legacy today. This is demonstrated here by brief discussion of two instances of international conflict, and associated legal analysis, in ‘the “hottest” theatre’ of the Cold War: Asia.
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