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This chapter investigates the President’s role in overseeing the administrative state, focusing on the contentious issue of for-cause removal restrictions for independent agencies. It argues that while the recognition of “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) is inconsistent with the Constitution’s tripartite power structure, Congress may still create agency independence through statutory discretion and bipartisan structures without violating the President’s executive power. The chapter proposes a formalist middle path: the President retains the constitutional power to remove principal officers but lacks a constitutional right to control their statutory duties directly, aligning with historical practices from the First Congress, several early presidential administrations, and statements from Daniel Webster and William Howard Taft. This distinction avoids both unchecked presidential control, which risks politicizing administration, and a “persuader-in-chief” model which lacks historical support and risks a parliamentary despotism.
Once populist forces win elections, they follow a similar blueprint to transform the constitutional structure. The populist forces obtain control over the institutions that are central to constitutional power. The steps typically include filling the public administration and apex courts with loyalists, control over the media and autonomous organizations, and increased executive power in the hands of the populist leader. Populist forces promise authenticity and a government (state) that will cater to the people. These are political projects; the constitutional aspects are secondary, and where constitution-making is possible, it has been used to enable the new state, serving the interests of the new elite formed around the Caesaristic leader. The trajectories and exercise of power depend on the availability of a new constitution.
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