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This conclusion synthesizes the book’s findings and draws lessons for understanding and countering authoritarian propaganda. It argues that service propaganda—reaffirming and informative coverage tailored to pro-regime citizens—functions primarily as a tool of belief maintenance rather than persuasion, sustaining autocrats’ bonds with their supporters over the long term. While effective, this model faces inherent risks: crises can erode trust when reaffirming content conflicts with citizens’ lived experiences, and catering to supporters creates a strategic lock-in difficult to reverse. The conclusion draws four lessons for combating authoritarian messaging. First, truth alone is insufficient—citizens prefer propaganda because it meets their informational and emotional needs, and media literacy interventions often fail or backfire. Second, weakening propaganda requires undermining the regime’s connection to citizens, a task best accomplished by capitalizing on crises and exogenous shocks rather than information provision alone. Third, independent journalism remains essential: even with a small audience, it sustains oppositional thinking and preserves professional capacity for future democratic openings. Fourth, resisting authoritarianism requires playing a long game—supporting institution-building and engaging not only liberal opponents but also the broader public that has found meaning in authoritarian propaganda.
This chapter examines why most Russians trust state-controlled media over independent news sources, even as they acknowledge the political bias of the former. Drawing on an online survey and a large-scale source reputation experiment, it shows that trust in propaganda outlets is deeply rooted in political orientations: Putin supporters overwhelmingly trust state television and other state-controlled media, perceiving them as accurate and patriotic, while extending little credibility to independent outlets. Opposition-minded citizens are considerably more skeptical of propaganda but often still consume and trust state news agencies. The chapter demonstrates that state media’s perceived credibility boosts belief in propaganda stories by 2–5 percentage points—a modest but cumulatively significant effect. It also examines how citizens justify trust in biased media and why common news literacy practices, such as cross-checking with other sources, can backfire in state-dominated information environments, where coordinated propaganda reinforces itself across outlets. Together, these findings explain why independent journalism struggles to attract audiences in autocracies: the Kremlin’s service propaganda cultivates genuine loyalty among supporters, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of consumption and trust that independent reporting cannot easily break.
This chapter examines how public trust in Russian state media held up during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a period of acute crisis that included the suppression of independent journalism, heavy pro-war messaging, and unprecedented Western sanctions. Drawing on panel survey data, original surveys, and news awareness experiments, the chapter documents that state television maintained its audience and credibility among Putin supporters throughout the first two years of the war, while independent media failed to attract meaningful numbers of new viewers despite their accessibility through virtual private networks and Telegram. New supporters who rallied to Putin after the invasion became even more avid consumers of propaganda, whereas only opposition-minded citizens turned away from state media. The chapter argues that this resilience reflects the durable trust cultivated by decades of service propaganda: pro-regime citizens had little incentive to seek alternatives and easily dismissed inconvenient critical information. Propaganda’s primary wartime role was not to generate support for the invasion—Putin’s personal authority provided that—but to normalize the war, sustain the regime’s legitimacy, and supply rationalizations that helped citizens make peace with a costly and unprovoked conflict.
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