This chapter focuses on the different ways that strategic uses of submarines have influenced developments in international law. It highlights the security dimensions in discussions at the failed Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960. Superpower dynamics during the Cold War also influenced decisions leading to the negotiations for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as the negotiations themselves. The growing importance of nuclear-powered submarines, as well as nuclear weapons on conventionally-powered submarines, spurred international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This chapter brings to the fore the strategic importance of military submarines for major maritime powers in recent decades as it provides critical context for contemporary development and application of international law. We conclude Part I of the book in this chapter in bringing together key themes in the legal history of submarines that continue to influence the modern international law of submarines.

In this chapter, we examine the allocation of rights and duties between States in relation to foreign-flagged submarine activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal State. Submarine activities include military activities and intelligence gathering, as well as extending to different forms of research. We assess the difference between military research and other forms of marine scientific research and the concomitant rights and duties of States in relation to these different types of research. Privately owned submarines may also engage in commercial activities in the EEZ associated with the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and for leisure or tourism purposes. The chapter identifies the applicable rights and responsibilities under international law to regulate those activities, as well as explaining limits on the rights of States through reference to due regard and non-abuse of rights.

The 1958 and 1960 United Nations conferences were of a piece, with the second convened to settle the unresolved questions from the first: the breadth of the territorial sea and fishing limits. At the earlier conference, the maritime powers had been preoccupied with disputes among themselves, but by 1960 they were forced to meet the challenges presented by states from the global South. Delegates from the latter took the view that the old maritime system upheld a discredited imperialist order, and they sought to bend the law of the sea to their own ends. Their campaigns to regulate the passage of warships through the territorial sea and to claim exclusive fishing zones and preferential fishing rights gave rise to disagreements with the powers, who sought to maximise the scope of their own naval and fishing operations. These differences would lead to the breakdown of the conference.

This chapter introduces the second general class of bargaining failure: information problems. If one side does not know how costly the other side views war, it may make an onerous demand. Opponents that have low costs reject, leading to war. Although this explanation for conflict is well known, many of its implications are misunderstood. The remainder of the chapter dispels some of them, showing that the probability of war can change as a function of the distribution of power and that more information might cause more conflict.