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This chapter examines court cases of citizenship deprivation in France and the UK. As the chapter reveals, virtually all citizenship deprivation cases have failed in the courts. There has not been a single ‘blockbuster case’ in which the courts have defied Parliament or the executive in support of such high principles as citizenship equality, private life, or even basic principles of access to courts. In this chapter, we explore why this is the case, and the mechanisms through which it has occurred. In doing so, we address two of the book’s central concerns: how we got to where we are today, looking at how courts have accompanied or resisted the expansion of citizenship deprivation powers, and the stories of constitutional citizenship that underpin these court cases.
The Convention contains an inherent tension between, the one hand, the aim to provide effective protection of Convention rights and, on the other hand, the need for the ECtHR to allow sufficient freedom to the States and respect their special abilities and powers to make choices and decisions, also in light of the inherent indeterminacy of the Convention provisions. It is against this backdrop that the Court has developed its famous yet complex margin of appreciation doctrine, on which this chapter is focused. Insight is given into the development of this doctrine in the Court’s case law, its main rationale and functions, and the types of cases where the doctrine is (and is not) applied. In addition, the main factors determining the scope of the margin and their interaction are explained (common ground facter, better placed factor, nature and intensity of the interference). Finally, some attention is paid to the difference between doctrine and reality in the Court’s case law.
This chapter examines unreasonableness and irrationality as grounds of judicial review.It begins with an examination of Wednesbury unreasonableness as a standard of review, before considering it as both a substantive and a procedural threshold.It is suggested that there may be a lowering of the Wednesbury threshold in Hong Kong, particularly as a standard of procedural review.The intensity of review under Wednesbury unreasonableness is then examined, both as a lower and as a higher intensity of review.It is argued that, and explained how, unreasonableness and irrationality are and should be treated as distinct concepts and grounds of review, before the role of reasons is considered in relation to unreasonableness and irrationality.
This chapter considers the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, and the failure to take into account relevant considerations, as grounds of judicial review.This includes a discussion of the intensity of review if a relevant consideration is taken into account.
This chapter begins with a detailed discussion of statutory exclusion of review, in particular by means of the statutory ouster clause.This is followed by considering statutory limitation of review, including both the time-limited ouster and the partial ouster.Non-justiciability is considered as a bar to judicial review proceedings.The chapter concludes with a discussion of the variable intensity of review, in particular deference seen in such contexts as the Chief Executive’s power to pardon criminal offenders or commute their penalties, and prosecutorial discretion.
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