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A state’s entitlement to tax a person is said to rest on either source, which is a connection between the state and the income, or residence, which is a connection between the state and the owner of the income. The source state can tax income sourced in the state, whereas the residence state can tax all of the resident’s income. Historically, these bases for tax were uncontroversial because most people earned all or almost all their income in a single state. Digitalization and globalization have changed how people live their lives, however, and have provoked questions about whether states can assert an unlimited entitlement to tax all of a person’s worldwide income, even if that person does not reside in its territory. This chapter demonstrates that income taxation of individuals in the twenty-first century does not require a personal link of the ’residence’ kind. It details policy options that would preserve the personal income tax on individuals without a singular reliance on a person having a sole residence. Ending the reliance on residence would alleviate many of the most pressing challenges facing the international tax regime, including the taxation of remote workers, digital services, and digital nomads.
This chapter explores the evolution and techniques of corporate tax arbitrage, focusing on how multinational corporations (MNCs) exploit the structural features of the international tax regime. It traces the origins of the system to the 1928 League of Nations framework, which privileged source and residence taxation while neglecting valuation and the treatment of intangible assets. This omission, combined with the legal autonomy granted to subsidiaries within centrally coordinated multi-corporate enterprises, created enduring arbitrage opportunities. The chapter analyses how firms leverage intangible assets, ownership structures, and corporate residency rules to reallocate profits across jurisdictions, exploiting regulatory mismatches. It highlights the role of offshore financial centres (OFCs), intermediary subsidiaries, and hybrid instruments in enabling tax avoidance. Case studies – such as Apple’s use of stateless entities and Amazon’s transfer of losses via Luxembourg – illustrate how MNCs circumvent tax rules through entity design, subsidiary chaining, and strategic use of global value chains. Using new evidence from the CORPLINK study, the chapter estimates that although OFC intermediaries represent only 1.7 per cent of subsidiaries among the world’s top 100 non-financial firms, they control up to two-thirds of group revenues. Tax arbitrage is shown to be systemic, not exceptional, and embedded in contemporary corporate structures.
This chapter argues that the current revolution in international tax continued in the two pillars of BEPS 2.0 have roots in existing developments from older tax regimes. Therefore, it concludes that the current revolution is less revolutionary than many have argued. Specifically, the chapter discusses how Pillar One derives from efforts to redefine the source of active income considering the digital revolution, which builds on US states’ use of sales factors since the 1930s as a source of corporate income. For Pillar Two, the chapter argues that the single tax principle implemented by Pillar Two can be traced back to the first model treaty from 1927. However, there are new elements worth appreciating, which include the new dynamics in the trilemma (open economy, tax competition, and social safety net) due to the global minimum tax, digital taxation, the emergence of market jurisdictions in revenue competition, the strengthening of multilateral cooperation in international tax matters, the tension between multilateralism and unilateralism, and the emphasis on the equity and inclusiveness.
The past decade has witnessed the creation of a new international tax regime (ITR). Since the advent of globalization in the 1980s and digitalization in the 1990s, the original ITR ceased to function as intended. The main problems were the increased mobility of capital related to intangibles, a relaxation of capital controls, and increased tax competition. The outcome was a significant fall in tax revenues that threatened the social safety net of the modern welfare state. The financial crisis of 2008 and harsh austerity measures led the public to pay attention to rich individuals and large corporations paying little tax on cross-border income. A new ITR has been created to resolve those problems. In particular, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which contributed for the OECD to develop a Common Reporting Standard for the automatic exchange of information; the OECD launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project 1.0; and the EU enacted the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives. These developments still have some limits, resulting in the advent of BEPS 2.0 consisting of two Pillars. The key question is how the new ITR will deal with inter-nation equity.
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