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This chapter critically examines the widespread assumption that belief in free will is pragmatically beneficial for society. While some researchers argue that disbelief in free will leads to antisocial behavior, reduced moral responsibility, and societal dysfunction, the chapter challenges these claims by highlighting methodological flaws and replication failures in the relevant studies. The author argues that the supposed benefits of belief in free will are overstated and cannot justify maintaining it as a “noble fiction.” The second half of the chapter explores a more troubling consequence: the moral and political costs of believing in free will. Drawing on empirical research from psychology and political science, the author shows that belief in free will correlates with increased punitiveness, reduced empathy, stronger belief in a just world, and greater acceptance of economic inequality. These views coalesce into what the author calls the “just deserts cluster,” which sustains systems of blame and punishment by presuming individuals deserve their lot in life. In contrast, adopting free will skepticism is shown to promote compassion, humility, and social justice by recognizing the role of luck and systemic factors in shaping human behavior. The chapter lays the groundwork for a moral reorientation grounded in realism and empathy.
This chapter considers the practical implications of free will skepticism and discusses recent empirical work that has just begun to investigate the matter. It argues that there are good philosophical and empirical reasons for thinking that belief in free will, rather than providing the pragmatic benefits many claim, actually has a dark side; i.e., it is too often used to justify punitive excess in criminal justice, to encourage treating people in severe and demeaning ways, and to excuse and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. After addressing recent empirical findings in social psychology that purport to show that diminishing one’s belief in free will increases antisocial behavior – findings that are overblown and questionable – the chapter discusses contrary findings in moral and political psychology that reveal interesting and troubling correlations between people’s free will beliefs and their other moral, religious, and political beliefs. It concludes that we would be better off without the notions of free will and just deserts.
Recent free will denialism (FWD) tends to be optimistic, claiming that not only will the rejection of the belief in free will and moral responsibility not make matters dreadful but that we are indeed better off without them. I address the denialist claim that FWD has the philosophical resources to effectively safeguard human rights and respect for persons in the context of punishment, even without belief in free will, moral responsibility, and desert. I raise seven reasons for doubt concerning the ability of FWD to maintain deontological constraints. Together they present a strong case for doubting the optimism of FWD.
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