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While many activists in the International shared a common ideological background and some hostility to the way the modern textile industry relied on low-paid female labor, they often differed on how this converted into practical attitudes and policies, depending on national situations, occupational differences, and political leanings. This article first tries to assess how the International discussed female labor centrally, in the congresses, but also in the General Council, using the minutes of the proceedings. It then moves on to a few general points about the attitudes of the British trade unions on women’s work, before focusing on how the question was handled practically at the local level by the London tailors: To do this, it focuses on the way the tailoring trade used both male and female labor. It tries to document the trajectory of Matthew Lawrence, the secretary of the London Operative Tailors, who at the Congress of the International Workingmen’s Association (IWMA) in Lausanne in 1866 argued against a ban on women’s work and who, in April 1867, led a strike of the London tailors, both men and women. The article ends with the debate in France in the labor movement and in the IWMA in the 1860s, when the Proudhonian male breadwinning stance was challenged by feminists and socialists. One example is that of bookbinders in Paris, including Nathalie Le Mel, Eugène Varlin, and Marie Iatskévitch, who opposed any ban on female labor and advocated equal wages.
This chapter outlines the historical evolution of the “Production Paradigm” in economic thought. It begins by exploring production as a defining characteristic of modern societies, shaped by the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions, and contrasts natural resources with produced wealth. The chapter then highlights 18th-century Physiocracy, focusing on François Quesnay’s Tableau Économique as a groundbreaking framework. It transitions to Classical Political Economy, examining the contributions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo and reflecting on the intellectual decline that followed. Marx’s theories, particularly his approach to the transformation problem, are analyzed in relation to Ricardo’s work. The chapter concludes with a critique of the marginalist counter-revolution of the late 19th century, emphasizing its departure from production-centric models and missed opportunities in classical analysis.
Frederic Bastiat’s last work was Economic Harmonies, published in 1851. He died while completing it, and although it had some uptake in the nineteenth century, in recent times scholarly interest has focused on his other work. In the Harmonies, he makes a remarkable claim: when properly understood, in a free market society all people’s economic interests are in harmony. If we consider that Karl Marx was arguing at the same time that those same societies are afflicted by an endemic class struggle that can end only with a communist revolution, the contrast is sharp. In this essay, I explore Bastiat’s rationale for his claim as a rejoinder to an influential argument mounted by Marx against economic liberty.
Human capital is a central concept in the field of political economy. Human flourishing is an even more central possibility at the heart of studies of the human condition more generally. Human beings can be assets in a way. They can embody human capital with a prospect of generating a favorable return on investment. When might that be good for the people involved? When might being human capital contribute in a positive way to human flourishing? When might the relationship be vicious rather than virtuous, so that being human capital opens doors to exploitation rather than to flourishing?
There is a consensus in the literature that the Marxism of the Second International (1889–1916) lacked philosophical sophistication and that understanding of Marxism’s Hegelian origins was lost soon after Karl Marx’s death, only to be recovered with the emergence of Western Marxism in the 1920s. This article challenges this consensus, urging revision of the basic outlines of the intellectual history of Marxism. It begins by sketching two ways contemporary scholars understand the Hegel-Marx connection. It then shows that these views were anticipated before World War I in the work of Max Adler. Against the view that Hegel was “put back into Marxism” in the 1920s or 1970s, then, this article maintains that there have always been sophisticated as well as simplifying accounts of the Hegel-Marx connection.
According to Kant, citizenship amounts to freedom (Freiheit), equality (Gleichheit), and civil self-sufficiency (Selbständigkeit). This Element provides a unifying interpretation of these three elements. Vrousalis argues that Kant affirms the idea of interdependent independence: in the just society, citizens have independent use of their interdependent rightful powers. Kant therefore thinks of the modern state as a system of cooperative production, in which reciprocal entitlements to one another's labour carry a justificatory burden. The empirical form of that ideal is a republic of economically independent commodity producers. It follows that citizenship and poverty, for Kant, are inextricably connected. Vrousalis explains how Kant's arguments anticipate Hegel's discussion of the division of labour, Marx's account of alienated labour, and Rawls' defence of a well-ordered society. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Chapter 1 revisits Goethe’s endorsement of a “free trade of sentiments and ideas” in the light of the free trade discourses of his age. First, I dissect these discourses’ complexity and doctrinal incoherence in eighteenth-nineteenth-century British, French, and German political economy. Then I explore the ambivalences in Goethe’s vague suggestion about a free trade world literature by addressing his peculiar attitude to commerce, his reminiscences of the administrative economics of Cameralism based on the heritage of the self-sustaining Aristotelian household, his aversions to modern finance, and his nostalgia for the medieval trade fair. Based on these decidedly antiquated considerations informing his understanding of the mediums, sites, and agents of commercial and intellectual exchange, I suggest that as opposed to Marx’s approach to world literature as an offspring of modern industrial capitalism, Goethe’s views were bound up with pre-modern merchant capitalism.
Chapter 5 focuses on the notion of “common possession” (Gemeingut) in the formulas of world literature by Marx and Goethe. I suggest that their sense of collective possessiveness drew on the history of communal land ownership and its ramifications in German historical jurisprudence and Romantic philology. The chapter also claims that Goethe’s (conservative) scepticism about the liberal absolutization of private intellectual property formed an unlikely alliance with early socialist thought (Proudhon). On the other hand, the label “common good” attached to world literature in the Communist Manifesto not only resonated with Marx’s belief in the approaching dissolution of bourgeois property but also pointed at the ambivalent legal status of world-literary works before the internationalization of copyright. I argue that Karl von Savigny’s distinction between property and possession cuts across the legal history of world literature before and after the Berne Convention and signals a perpetual crisis of ownership in literary works.
This chapter explores the connection between natural law and the Marxian notion of communism, emphasising the continuities between the theories of community and sociability in Pufendorf and Marx.
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, while useful for moving past the ecological limitations of the standard reading, is limited insofar as it focuses on individual actors—consumers, citizens, and politicians in particular. Kant’s ethical thought emphasizes individual humans rather than economic and political systems, and his teleological thought appears scientifically outdated. This chapter asks whether these aspects of Kant’s thought need revision. It begins by placing Kant in dialogue with Darwin and Marx, pursuing a critical discussion on the human species and political systems in the context of the Anthropocene. The Kantian reply, I suggest, encourages us to reconsider Kant’s philosophy of history and philosophical anthropology. Kant’s ideas are significant for the climate crisis insofar as they enjoin normative reflection on the human species globally and in the long term. I conclude with critical reflections on Kant’s racism and sexism as obstacles to reading Kant in the Anthropocene.
Stephen Darwall is a moral philosopher who has played a central role in contemporary debates around the foundation of ethics. This book is a sequel to his earlier volume Modern Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to Kant, and like its predecessor it explores the history of the period through its key ethical thinkers. Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche – the founding members of the 'continental' tradition – are masterfully examined as they are brought into vivid conversation with both analytic philosophy and the mainstream Anglophone philosophical tradition. The author addresses topics which include the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill; the anti-naturalism of Sidgwick and the British idealists; and Nietzsche's late-century critique of morality. He reveals that all these canonical thinkers – just like their precursors and successors – were wrestling with fundamental and enduring ethical problems, even when they claimed otherwise or were presenting their views in new and challenging terms.
A number of philosophical themes run throughout Marx’s corpus. Foremost is his focus on free social and political relations – on emancipated people governing themselves together rather than being mastered by others. There is no doubt, however, that Marx was a sharp critic of law, justice, and right (Recht) – which Kant had argued can only be realized in a state – and that Marx’s communist social ideal is nonjuridical. A second theme is that although Marx rejects the modern deontic conception of morality, he is very much aware that his own ideal of freedom is a modern conception, which is based, like modern morality, in a view of the unique value of human persons – the “self-worth of men” as “free.” A third is Marx’s communitarian emphasis on “a community of people [organized] for their highest ends”: a “democratic” society of free people, whether organized as a state or not. It is important that Marx does not ground his democratic conception as orthodox liberal moderns do in a deontic conception of fundamental equal human authority. Ultimately, Marx’s ideas must be understood as a liberal egalitarianism of the good rather than of the right.
This chapter presents a critical analysis of how historians have used the concept of capitalism. It argues that the financial history of capital needs to be integrated more fully into the histories of all social relations if we want to use history to refine a ‘presentist’ concept about financial power and its effect on society and political choice. It is a contention of what has been termed the ‘new history of capitalism’ that financial history is often too narrowly institutional in that it focuses to narrowly on economic growth and not the social effects of financialisation on broader society. Finance, in these histories, when socialised, is generally presented as having a negative role on broader social relations. However, capital was created institutionally through relations of interdependence first, and then once created was used by those who accumulated great amounts of it to become more powerful.
Marx’s early theory of labour and alienation originates from idealist concepts of spontaneity and formativity. His ideas of socialism and emancipation in the 1840s reprise aspects of Kantian autonomy and heteronomy and follow Fichte in linking labour with spontaneity. Marx formulates the dialectic of the will in a way favourable to the moment of particularity as membership in a social class, and sees one particular class as simultaneously a vehicle of universal interest and revolutionary transformation. Quantitative change is insufficient though necessary: a merely distributive socialism might enhance the living conditions of the workers, but would leave intact structures of exploitation which deprive workers of their agency as well as their happiness. His theory of history and emancipation, recently described as a self-actualisation account, can be more precisely identified as a variant of post-Kantian perfectionism, which, like Feuerbach’s, contains a strong admixture of pre-Kantian elements. This blending of heterogeneous elements has profound theoretical and practical consequences, notably in the absence of a developed concept of right.
Discusses ethical questions raised by the life cycle of clothing, including those related to labor (e.g. sweatshops) and those related to the environmental impact of clothing production and disposal.
The Introduction sets out the argument of the book, and distinguishes the approach taken from those of Louis Althusser and Daniel Brudney. It offers a preliminary assessment of the difference made by reading Marx’s project as that of the actualization of philosophy, and of the implications for understanding his relationship to his philosophical predecessors.
This chapter returns to the conception of philosophy as the thought of the illimitable object from which Marx began. It then considers how, in the here and now, the actualization of philosophy can be conceived as the actualization of a resurgent absolute idealism. This actualization shows the question of the ‘applicability’ of philosophy to the world to be misplaced: philosophy, being human thought as such, and philosophy actualized the actualization of that, our human thinking life is already its own application to the ‘real’ world. This is brought out by considering that there are, in and around us, pockets of communism—actual, not merely potential.
This chapter lays out one way through the argument of Capital Volume 1, with the intention of showing that we have now fully entered the realm of the actualization of philosophy. Marx does not impose any preordained dialectical schema or procedure, but shows in detail how the exploitation of workers that commodity production under capitalism requires leads to the expropriation of the expropriators, and thereby to communism. In doing so, he performs the critique of political economy, not as the critique of some field of study, but through the concrete demonstration of how things function, and thereby how they are to function.
This chapter examines the genuine dialectic at work in Capital Volume 1 (to be contrasted with the failed dialectic of Hegel). A focus of the chapter is the role of opposition and contradiction in this non-pre-determined dialectic. Attempts to read Marx as if he meant to speak of opposition instead of contradiction are rejected; opposition is, instead, shown in much of the material in question to develop into contradiction. Contradiction does not follow one pre-established pattern; but Marx, throughout, works under the aegis of the Principle of Non-Contradiction. In a sense, the chapter outlines the methodology of Marx’s mature work, but only insofar as it is recognized that this methodology cannot be spelled out other than by retracing actual arguments in Marx.
This chapter examines the unstable intellectual situation of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, in which an abstract conception of the Hegelian subject–object that had allegedly been naturalized by Feuerbach into the pair human–nature jostles, on the one hand, with a recognition on Marx’s part of a historical dimension lacking in Feuerbach but which had already been present in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and, on the other, with an emerging familiarity with radical politics. Marx’s conception of the human as Gattungswesen, the basis of a communism that as fully developed naturalism equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism, is still indebted to that of Feuerbach. At the same time, he is developing his own conception of the human that resolutely carries Aristotle’s theory of soul through into the case of rational soul where Aristotle himself suffered a failure of nerve.